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This book examines how women in Guinea articulate themselves politically
within and outside institutional politics. It documents the everyday practices
that local female actors adopt to deal with the continuous economic, political,
and social insecurities that emerge in times of political transformations.
Carole Ammann argues that women’s political articulations in Muslim
Guinea do not primarily take place within women’s associations or institu-
tional politics such as political parties; but instead women’s silent forms of
politics manifest in their daily agency, that is, when they make a living, study,
marry, meet friends, raise their children, and do household chores. The book
also analyses the relationship between the female population and the local
authorities, and discusses when and why women’s claim making enjoys legiti-
macy in the eyes of other men and women, as well as representatives of ‘tra-
ditional’ authorities and the local government.
Paying particular attention to intersectional perspectives, this book will be
of interest to scholars of African studies, social anthropology, political
anthropology, the anthropology of gender, urban anthropology, gender stu-
dies, and Islamic studies.
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Introduction
Women’s Political Articulations
Prologue: Kankan’s Dibida Market
In 2011, there were several markets in Kankan. Dibida, Kankan’s main market, is
located in the city centre. Sogbe, Kankan’s second largest market, is still con-
sidered to be very central, while the markets of Missirat and Sénkéfara are less
populated and to be found in the peripheral neighbourhoods. Nowadays, Dibida
market is a closed area whose high ceiling ensures bearable temperatures. Vendors
inside the market offer food on tables. Some sell vegetables from their own gardens
near the Milo River, others sell fruits, kola nuts, and palm oil from the Forest
Region, onions from Mali, and imported as well as locally produced rice. Outside
the market, people continue selling items on stands or blankets on the ground.
There, the vendors not only sell food, but also other items such as cosmetics and
second-hand clothes. In addition, there are many ambulant vendors. However, a
clear distinction between ambulant and non-ambulant vendors is difficult to make.
Some vendors from inside the market send off their children to sell their com-
modities as ambulant vendors outside Dibida’s walls. Through that practice, they
hope to acquire customers who usually do not go inside the market. Women con-
stitute the large majority of the vendors, though men occupy some of the tables as
well. Contrary to their female counterparts, they typically sell non-perishable
goods. When I asked the market women how much they earn, none could give me
a precise answer as they do not make these calculations. Petty trade is not per se a
profitable business, as Susanna Fioratta (2015) illustrates for the Fouta Djallon.
Many market women buy the ingredients for supper with the money they earn
during the day and are thus responsible for nourishing their families.
Kankan’s intellectuals1 depict market women as rather poor and uneducated;
however, they do not constitute a homogenous category. The most prominent
distinction among them is their ethnic background. Age is another important
differentiation. Elderly women are associated with more experience and wisdom
and have therefore more authority than younger vendors. If there is for example,
a quarrel in the market, elderly women are consulted. Additionally, a differ-
entiation regarding economic background can be made: The larger a vendor’s
table and the more expensive her commodities, the better is her (and usually her
family’s) economic situation. Ambulant vendors and women who sell their
commodities on blankets on the ground are typically poorer than those who
use a table. Market women, who are given names in accordance to the pro-
ducts they sell, differentiate between items of daily use, which ‘provide money
swiftly’, and others such as cosmetics, jewellery, or clothes that people do not
buy in economically harsh times. The religious background of the vendors is
of minor importance, the majority of Kankan’s inhabitants are of Muslim
faith. The market customers represent the whole range of Kankan’s (female)
population.
In general, women in Kankan spend a considerable amount of time in
markets. It is not only a workplace, but also a space to establish and foster
social and commercial relationships and to express their aspirations and
disappointments: On Dibida, similar to other markets, all aspects of human
life are discussed and gossip is everywhere (cf. Storr 2008; Clark 2010,
15–17).2 At Dibida market, many conversations are centred around
family issues and local (gendered) norms such as marriage, illegitimate
pregnancy, and both male and female demeanour within matrimony, fol-
lowed by debates on shifting realities, religion, and the latest news.
Elderly people accuse the youth of taking drugs and not listening to their
parents anymore. Likewise, many conversations centre on the rice quality.
Market women complain about the costs of living, putting a special focus
on the high food prices before turning to their last subject of controversy,
namely the lack of governmental support.
At the beginning of my fieldwork in Kankan, I faced difficulties in how to
interact with women, while access to men of all ages was most of the time
without any problems. Almost none of the women speak French and they do
not have as much spare time as men do. Moreover, not all of them liked to
give an interview in front of a voice recorder. I did not know how I would be
able to talk to them informally and listen to their naturally occurring talks.
Together with Thierno Abdoul Sow and Djénabou Dramé, the two research
collaborators, I was wondering how I could tackle that difficulty. Finally, we
came up with a solution: Kankan’s markets! They are an important social
space for women’s political articulations. In 2011, Kankan was a city without
public electricity and, therefore, at least one woman from every household
had to go shopping in the market on a daily basis. Consequently, Thierno,
Djénabou, and I decided to spend considerable time in Kankan’s markets. We
were sitting on hard benches besides market women for long hours where we
were observing what was going on and listening to their conversations. And
from time to time, we were asking some questions.
Silent Politics Emerging from the Everyday
There are people who fight, but silently. Not everyone is noisy.
(Madame Kanté, head of the local Office of Women’s and Children’s Affairs,
interview, 21.02.2012)
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Women and the State in Guinea
Recent scholarship has usually not regarded ordinary3 women in (Muslim)
African societies as political actors. Past studies have narrowly focussed on
women’s access to, their presence in, and their influence on institutional politics
(Goetz 2003). Furthermore, they have often analysed women’s forms of popular
resistance, struggles, and collective actions. However, by researching only
women’s agency in institutional politics, we oversee their political articulations
“outside the male-dominated institutional sphere” (Waylen 1996, 11). This eth-
nographic study shows, in contrast, that ordinary women in Kankan, Guinea’s
second-largest city in terms of inhabitants, are talking and doing politics
although they often deny doing so when prompted in interviews.
Based on one year of anthropological fieldwork, this book depicts from an
actor-centred perspective women’s modes of silent politics in Guinea – a country
on which, in general, little social science research exists so far. It examines how
Figure I(1) Kankan’s Dibida Market
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women in Kankan articulate themselves politically within and outside institu-
tional politics. Thereby, it does not consider women as a monolithic block, but
pays special attention to the intersectional perspective, that is how age, ethnicity,
religion, marital status, as well as women’s educational, economic, and occupa-
tional background influence their agency. Throughout the book, I neither depict
women as voiceless victims nor as noisy heroes who publicly unite to defend
their rights. I rather give a nuanced picture by describing the political aspect of
women’s everyday agency. But before doing that we need to look briefly, at the
historical and political context in order to be able to situate women’s everyday
agency in Guinea today.
When Guinea became independent in 1958, Ahmed Sékou Touré autocratically
ruled the country for twenty-six years. In 1984, Touré died and General Lansana
Conté took power in a bloodless coup d’état. Conté too, autocratically presided
over the country until he died in office in 2008. After these two long-time
Presidents, the short presidency of Moussa Dadis Camara between 2008 and 2009,
and the tumultuous transitional period afterwards, Guinea’s first more or less free
and democratic presidential elections took place in 2010. They brought Alpha
Condé to power, a man for whom the majority of Kankan’s inhabitants had voted.
Being aware that political transformations offer a privileged access to institutional
framing, this book’s central attention is the period from 2010, when Guinea was
preparing the presidential elections, until 2013, when the transitional period offi-
cially ended with the holding of legislative elections.
Within the scientific literature and the country’s elite, Guinea is praised for its
high number of women within important political positions. Contrary to this view,
I argue that the local and national institutional political sphere is not where Gui-
nean women can successfully make claims – even though the national government
officially promotes women’s social, economic, and political empowerment.
Women’s possibilities to make decisions and set the political agenda, especially
within political parties, are limited. In Kankan, this is also due to the huge influ-
ence of ‘traditional’ authorities,4 from whose sphere women are systematically
excluded. Moreover, the state’s focus on creating women’s associations does not
have an impact on the ground. Many non-governmental organisations (NGO),
such as the foundation launched by Djènè Kaba Condé, Guinea’s First Lady,
which officially promotes women’s advancement, however, seems to rather serve
the interests of a small (female) elite instead.
Overall, I argue that women use modes outside the institutional settings
to articulate themselves politically. It is rather by daily bargaining with
local state employees or representatives of ‘traditional’ authorities that
women are able to pursue their goals. This does not, however, mask the
fact that those interactions are characterised by many power imbalances,
not least because the latter are not familiar with the bureaucratic lan-
guage. Ordinary women are most successful in reaching their aims by
merging into what Asef Bayat (2010) calls ‘passive networks’, which enable
them to make claims they would not be able to put forward individually if
they do not have the necessary contacts.
4 Introduction
In this book, I explore modes of silent politics; that is, what happens before
ordinary women’s claim making becomes visible to a larger audience or before
they unite in institutionalised associations. I investigate moments when social
problems become recognised as such and thus turn political. I call women’s
forms of political articulations that emerge from the everyday ‘silent politics’
because they are hardly perceptible, not easy to grasp, and because women
typically do not perceive their actions as political. I argue that women’s silent
forms of politics manifest in their daily practices, that is, when they make a
living, study, marry, meet friends, raise their children, or do household chores.
Within Kankan’s patriarchal structures, gendered norms generally proclaim that
women are under the authority of either their fathers, brothers, or husbands.
And even though women mostly bargain within the locally acknowledged gen-
dered norms of Guinea’s society, they are not passive victims as they are all too
often depicted. Women’s agency is manifold as they silently use various ways of
influencing their lives and the lives of others.
This book documents the everyday practices that local female actors
adopt to deal with the continuous economic, political, and social insecu-
rities that emerge in times of political transformations. Women have been
actively engaged in nationalist movements worldwide (Ranchod-Nilsson and
Tétreault 2000; Thapar-Björkert 2013), also in Guinea (Schmidt 2002,
2005; Pauthier 2018). Many scholars have demonstrated that motherhood
has been a typical feature of women’s mobilisation in the struggle for inde-
pendence, and this is also the case in the postcolonial nations (Clark 2001;
Van Allen 2009; Moran 2012; Bouilly, Rillon, and Cross 2016; for the
Guinean case, see Dessertine 2019b, 8–9). While the politicisation of
motherhood has worried some authors (e.g. de Alwis 2004, 133), others
urge us not to generally “condemn women’s mobilisation on the basis of
their ‘traditional’ identities and concerns as mothers and home-makers”
(Randall 1998, 192). As this book will illustrate, women in Guinea too,
made and still make use of their social roles as mothers, aunts, sisters,
wives, or household managers to make claims.
Women’s Political Articulations
We women, we think that politics is a sleazy affair. Everything that is political
does not interest us. We are already afraid if someone mentions politics.
(Aishatou Diakité and Djénabou Dramé, young graduates, informal
conversation, 29.01.2013)
Here, women are generally only talking about the prices, because women are
not interested in politics. Especially women who have not been to school are
not interested in politics. They say that everything is expensive; the prices must
be reduced.
(Djouba Boumbaly, female radio journalist, interview, 17.01.2013)
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I never liked politics. It is something that is not good at all! Politics can provoke
problems between you and your friend because you like different politicians. Finally,
your friendship breaks up. For me, this is the reason for saying that I do not like
politics. Politics is not good! Politicians are there for a certain time and then they go
with their pockets full of money. We ordinary people in contrast, we have nothing!
We are here to struggle day and night; the politicians do not even know if we live or
not! So, I never liked politics!
(Safiatou Dramé, training to become a doctor, interview, 14.11.2011)
These three quotations depict a general discomfort of women in Kankan of
varying age and from different educational, ethnical, and economic backgrounds
when they talk about politics. Many of them do not want to be associated with
what they consider as ‘a dirty male business’. ‘Politics is for the politicians’ is a
typical statement in this regard. Politicians in general and female politicians in
particular have a controversial reputation in society; women (and men) consider
them as greedy and egoistic. Especially since the presidential elections of 2010,
they regard politics as a cause for the division between individuals and groups.
The attitude of considering politics as a dirty, dishonest, immoral, and corrupt
business is not specific to women in Kankan; it can be found in different places
and contexts (Kerkvliet 2002, 10; Spencer 2007, 32).
Women who do not frequent a political party typically do not see themselves as
political actors. Thus, Georgina Waylen’s (1996, 18) statement that women who
are “involved in ‘the politics of everyday life’ [often] do not see their activities as
political” also holds true for women in Kankan. They follow a conventional
approach where the political includes only an institutional setting. Politics, in an
emic perspective, is identified with the President, ministers, the parliament, elec-
tions, political parties, governmental policies, trade unions, and rebellions. Other
spheres of people’s lives are considered as apolitical. People make boundaries
between the political and other spheres to keep specific areas, such as religion
or their families, outside of “contaminating” (Curtis and Spencer 2012, 179)
politics. Women in Kankan use this boundary-making strategically, for example
by framing their public protests in social or economic terms, in order to
increase their credibility.
It is a recurrent challenge for anthropologists that the people we do research
with and about, have a far narrower definition and conception of the political
space, which they often confine and reduce to the practice of institutional politics
only. However, if we narrowly analyse the institutional political sphere, we miss
women’s political articulations5 that mostly take place outside the institutional
setting. Therefore, I differentiate between Kankan’s women’s emic perception of
politics – what Janine Dahinden (2016, 7), drawing on Rogers Brubaker (1996),
calls the “common-sense” category – and my etic understanding of what con-
stitutes the political – the analytical category. The lens used in this book traces
the political, following Jonathan Spencer (1997, 9), “from mass rallies to village
arguments, in some cases into houses and families and through the particula-
rities of everyday practice.” Thus, I look for the political “at every level and in
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every sphere” (Leftwich 1984, 12). Everyone can be a political actor, every form
of agency can become political, and everything can be politicised (Kallio and
Häkli 2013, 7–8).6
Generally, my approach to the political is influenced by Benedict J. Kerkvliet’s
(2002, 2005) work on everyday politics. According to him, everyday politics:
involves people embracing, adjusting to, or contesting norms and rules
regarding authority over, production of, or allocation of resources. It includes
quiet, mundane, and subtle expressions and acts that indirectly and for the
most part privately endorse, modify, or resist prevailing procedures, rules,
regulations, or order. Everyday politics involves little or no organization. It
features the activities of individuals and small groups as they make a living,
raise their families, wrestle with daily problems, deal with others like them-
selves who are relatively powerless and with powerful superiors and others.
(Kerkvliet 2005, 22)7
In brief, I analyse politics as a category of practice (Curtis and Spencer 2012,
179) emerging from the everyday.
Silent Politics
When analysing the political articulations of women, youth, poor, and other
politically marginalized groups, the work of Asef Bayat (1997, 2000, 2010) is
insightful. He talks about a “quiet encroachment of the ordinary” which for
him constitutes “a silent, patient, protracted, and pervasive advancement of
ordinary people on the propertied and powerful in order to survive hardships
and better their lives” (Bayat 1997, 57). Bayat stresses that such ordinary
actions just episodically result in collective action. Usually, they “are marked
by quiet, atomised and prolonged mobilisation” – similar to what Benedict J.
Kerkvliet (2002, 15) describes for the poor people in the Philippines’ rural areas
and Susan Thomson (2014) for people in the Rwandan authoritarian state.
This also holds true for women in Guinea. There, malcontent merged into
mass mobilisation with women being actively involved on just three occasions:
Firstly, during the general strikes in 1953; secondly, when market women pro-
tested against Sékou Touré in 1977; and, thirdly, when general strikes paralysed
the whole country in 2006 and 2007. Most of the time, however, women’s
political articulations are subtler and do not manifest in public protests.
One focus of this book is the women-state nexus. Feminist research pleads
to analyse how the state affects women’s daily lives – and vice versa. How
does the state produce and reproduce gender relations, but also relations
between other groups within a society? Such a focus allows us to “include not
only opposition, but also negotiation, not only struggle, but also strategic
bargaining” (Rai 1996, 26). The state is very complex and cannot be divided
from society. The state’s boundaries are blurred, fluid, and elusive; various
actors constantly define and redefine them (Greenhouse 2002, 8; Nugent
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2004, 198). The state and society constitute each other and all kinds of dif-
ferent actors are “doing the state” (Migdal and Schlichte 2005, 14). Anita
Schroven (2010), for example, nicely describes the dilemma of state employees
in a small Guinean costal town during the general strikes of 2006 and 2007.
While the bureaucrats see themselves as citizens confronted with the same
everyday hardship the strikers protest against, they actually represent the very
state addressed by the objectors.
Women’s political articulations can, amongst others, be perceived during
encounters with and daily conversations about representatives of the local gov-
ernment in Kankan. Widows, for example, jointly meet the treasurer to claim
their widow’s pensions. Local Big Women merge into an Association of Female
Leaders when political instability threatens to turn into violence and market
women subversively spread rumours about government’s mismanagement and
misappropriation. In addition, they constantly complain about the costs of living
in general and the high food prices in particular. Women also accuse the Gui-
nean government of not providing basic services. Overall, this book discusses
when, why, and how women make claims. Furthermore, it analyses when this
claim-making enjoys legitimacy in the eyes of other men and women as well as
representatives of ‘traditional’ authorities and the local government.
Because women in Kankan typically articulate themselves politically outside
the institutional setting, I call their political agency ‘silent politics’. Their silent
politics is “fleeting and intangible” (Navaro-Yashin 2002, 3); it is “surreptitious,
indirect, and entwined” with women’s everyday lives (Kerkvliet 2005, 21). Silent
politics manifests when women, for example, try to remain their husband’s only
wives. Or when looking at highly educated women’s endeavours to find a suitable
husband. Borrowing from Nomi Dave (2014, 19), silence – as well as silent pol-
itics – “exists as a dense presence, both intensifying and complicating existing
structures of power.” Silent politics is not equivalent with invisibility or being
mute;8 silence also involves using one’s voice to make claims. It is rather the ways
of women’s political articulations that are generally not noisy; they are latently,
but silently perceptible. Or as Madame Kanté’s (interview, 21.02.2012) statement
above stresses, women can also fight silently.
Women’s Agency
Every day has its time because life consists of three days: yesterday, today, and
tomorrow. Yesterday is gone, today is now, but we do not know what will
happen tomorrow.
(Diegnalen Bangoura, retired male soldier, group interview, 22.02.2012)
Agency, “inherent in human action” (Förster and Koechlin 2011, 7), is the
lens through which I analyse women’s everyday life and their political articu-
lations in urban Kankan. Much of the literature on agency examines a per-
son’s capacity to act individually in a given context, “independently of
structural constraints” (Rapport and Overing 2014, 3).9 Anthropologists have
8 Introduction
criticized agency as being a Eurocentric concept because it focuses too much
on bargaining (Keane 2003; Hastrup 2007, 26). Saba Mahmood (2001), for
example, suggests that we think about agency beyond the notion of resistance.
I do not understand agency just as bargaining based within present actions
but, like the research participant cited above and following the sociologists
Mustafa Emirbayer and Anne Mische (1998), in its three temporal dimensions. If
we take the habitual context, the local social practices and norms, and the imagi-
nation of the future into account, we attain a more complete and nuanced under-
standing of a person’s agency. Emirbayer and Mische (1998, 970) maintain that
agency is “the temporally constructed engagement by actors of different structural
environments – the temporal-relational contexts of action – which, through the
interplay of habit, imagination, and judgment, both reproduces and transforms
those structures in interactive response to the problems posed by changing histor-
ical situations.” One’s past experiences and habits, one’s imaginations of what the
future may hold, and one’s judgments and evaluations of the present are inter-
connected and constantly influence agency, even though the temporal orientation
of specific actions varies.
Through their repetition and continuity, past experiences add to order and
stability in an individual’s identity and in its agency. Habitual actions are
incorporated into thoughts and bodily experiences. As Koulako Cherif, a man
who works for a national NGO put it: “Habits are second natures; they cannot
easily be changed” (interview, 17.12.2012). Through habitual actions, norms
and social patterns are produced and reproduced (Emirbayer and Mische 1998,
975–984). Norms of respectability and morality are gendered – in Kankan as
well as elsewhere. Multiple and at times conflicting norms and moralities exist;
they are not fixed but rather shaped and reshaped through daily interactions.
Consequently, a plurality of femininities and masculinities exist (Connell 2005
[1995]). In familiar situations, repetitive activities are taken for granted and not
something of which one is conscious (Rapport and Overing 2014, 7).
Life consists of more than habits and routines. Actors constantly imagine
their future, which they at times “either hope for and try to bring about or
fear and seek to avert” (Johnson-Hanks 2002, 872). When unknown and
challenging situations arise, past experiences may not help; past responses
may not fit: “As they respond to the challenges and uncertainties of social
life, actors are capable of distancing themselves (at least in partial exploratory
ways) from the schemas, habits, and traditions that constrain social identities
and institutions” (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 984). The outcome is a tem-
porary dislocation that necessitates new, untried actions. These situations
prompt the actors to scrutinize habits and past occurrences and to be creative
in their search for alternatives; it is at this point that the imagining of possible
new patterns is born (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 983–993). This may result
in a conflict between current local gendered norms and the imagination of
different possibilities (Rapport and Overing 2014, 7). Imagining always con-
tents a political dimension as it produces powerful images of alternative ways
of living together (Norval 2015). However, as the case of young, well-
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educated women in Kankan will illustrate, young people do not always chal-
lenge the values of their elders. Along with Emirbayer and Mische (1998,
984), I agree that “the formation of projects is always an interactive, cultu-
rally embedded process by which social actors negotiate their paths toward
the future.” Nevertheless, thanks to this “projective” or “foresightful”
dimension of agency (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 983) people expand the
horizon of their possible responses in the present.
Instability has an enormous impact on how many people on the African
continent are making a future (Pelican and Heiss 2014, 8). This unpredictable
future also influences the third dimension of agency, namely the present
situation. People reflect on, ponder, judge, and evaluate possible responses
with regard to the demands of specific, conflicting circumstances. Actors
constantly deal with ever-shifting settings, a conscious process of daily man-
oeuvring. In some circumstances, they agree with and behave according to
habitual practices, while in others, they may have to challenge, resist, subvert, and
contest them. Possible courses of action are evaluated against the background of
habits, on the one hand, and of imagined future trajectories, on the other hand
(Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 994–1002).
In her article “Bargaining with Patriarchy”, Deniz Kandiyoti (1988) argues
that women strategically bargain over different aspects in life to enhance their
social security and personal advantages without challenging fundamentally
male supremacy. Taking this approach up, Orit Avishai, Lynne Gerber, and
Jennifer Randles (2012, 404) write that “women are strategic actors who
navigate and appropriate a complex terrain of domestic, economic, and
religious practices and expectations in meeting the demands of contemporary
life.” Haleh Afshar (1996) illustrates on the example of Iranian women and
Lila Abu-Lughod (1990) on Bedouin women, how they simultaneously
embrace and resist existing gendered systems. This also holds true for women
in Muslim Kankan’s patriarchal society who understand the rules of the game
and know how to play them. They mostly bargain within the boundaries of
the socially accepted gendered norms as they fear the prospect of being stig-
matised as a ‘bad’ woman. And sometimes they imagine new or slightly dif-
ferent values. Generally, a woman’s silent politics is more effective the older
she is. Besides, the fact that many women provide for their families effects
intra-household dynamics and gender relations more generally.
Overall, in this book I look at how women’s agency creates and recreates
cultural practices and gendered norms and how women use them for their
own interests. Women’s agency in Kankan is not only influenced by con-
temporary bargaining processes, but also by past experiences and the open-
ing-up of new possibilities regarding an imagined future. I use the concept of
agency as proposed by Mustafa Emirbayer and Anne Mische to detect and
depict women’s various modes of silent politics which do not always become
visible when solely focussing on present bargaining processes (Emirbayer and
Mische 1998).
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Researching Women in Kankan
Research on Gender in Guinea
This book aims to bridge some of the many research gaps regarding Guinea. The
recent scientific reception of Guinea focuses mostly on the country’s historical past
and political transformation processes. Generally, there is bulkof scholarly workon
the Touré-era but not much on the Conté period (see Chapter 1). Questions
regarding gender in Guinea have been largely neglected (Dessertine 2019b).
Nevertheless, there are a few notable exceptions: The historian Emily Lynn Osborn
(2011) focuses in her book on political history in the Upper Guinea Region not on
politicians and high offices, but rather tells the story of household and state-build-
ing by putting the emphasis on husbands and wives, brothers and sisters, mothers
and fathers, foreigners and locals, as well as masters and slaves. The historian
Elizabeth Schmidt (2002, 2005) highlights women’s implication in the nationalist
movement and Céline Pauthier (2007, 2018), another historian, draws attention to
female representation, mobilisation, and political activities since the 1950s. The
anthropologist Filomina Chioma Steady (2011) gives examples of female leader-
ship in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, but does, however, ignore the influence
of ordinary women on the state. Furthermore, the anthropologists AnnaDessertine
(2019b) and Carole Ammann (2018b) provide overviews on women’s involvement
in Guinean state formation processes.
The anthropologists Karen Smid (2010) and Rebecca Furth (2005) both con-
centrate on the Fouta Djallon. While the former discusses the effects of Islam on
female expectations and visions regarding their trajectories on earth and the
afterlife, the latter looks at status and marriage practices. The demographer
Aurélie Godard (2010) examines the social and economic organisation of
women in the Guinean Coast Region. Together with others, she further does
research on women and work in the rural environment (Godard and Meffe 2006;
Godard, Meffe, and Petit 2007). There is also a gap in research regarding the
region and the city of Kankan (Osborn 2011, 6). However, exceptions are some
noteworthy authors writing about the Upper Guinea Region: Emily Lynn
Osborn (2004, 2011) researches trade and politics before and during colonial
rule. The geographer Mabetty Touré (2013) looks at gender in a rural context.
Lastly, the geographer Monique Bertrand (1997) examines mobility, and Anna
Dessertine (2013, 2016, 2019a) researches young people, mobility, and mining.
Kankan, a Guinean Secondary City
Kankan is the centre of the Upper Guinea Region, located some 650 kilo-
metres northeast of the capital Conakry. According to the newest census,
approximately 220,000 people are living in the city (Republique de Guinée
2014).10 Kankan is composed of 27 neighbourhoods and can be characterised
as a secondary city (Ammann 2017). While the governor of the Upper
Guinea Region and the prefect of Kankan are nominated by a president’s
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decree (Rey 2007, 41), the population elects the city’s mayor. At the time of
research, however, a so-called special delegation, consisting of members of the
local Rally of the People of Guinea (Rassemblement du Peuple de Guinée, RPG)
ruled over the municipality because the former mayor had been dismissed in
2011 due to ‘serious misconducts’. Since 1985, the Guinean authorities formally
recognise the council of the elders’ function (Rey 2007, 55). In Kankan, its
members are male and usually descendants of the powerful Kaba or Chérif
families. The Sotikemo, to whom the local population refers to as the city’s ‘tra-
ditional’ chief, spiritually and politically watches over Kankan.
According to popular perception, each of Guinea’s four geographical and
administrative regions is home to one of the four main ethnic groups, the Fulani,
the Manding, the Susu, and the people from the Forest Region, such as the
Kpelle (Guerzé), Toma, and Kissi (Goerg 2011). Today, the Fulani are said to
present the majority in Guinea, followed by the Manding and the Susu (Camara,
O’Toole, and Baker 2014, 154–155). In Kankan, the Manding constitute the
majority, whereas the Fulani community is the largest minority. Besides, a small
number of people who identify with other ethnicities and originate from neigh-
bouring countries also live in the city. The wars in neighbouring Sierra Leone,
Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire have driven out Manding people from the Upper
Guinea Region who had lived in these countries. Kankan has the image of a
place where different ethnic communities live harmoniously next to each other.
In reality, however, inter-ethical cohabitation is much more complex and chal-
lenging, as Chapter 2 will demonstrate.
At the religious level, the Muslims, with an estimated share of 85 percent of
the population, are Guinea’s largest group (Camara, O’Toole, and Baker
2014, 257). Kankan is a Muslim religious centre with numerous mosques.
Even though the large majority in Kankan is of Muslim faith, there are no
apparent cleavages between Islam and Christianity, of which the population is
proud. Islam is very present in people’s everyday life. Religion as a basic
principle with its habitual practices penetrates all spheres of people’s lives; it
shapes their daily experiences. According to the local perception, Kankan is
not very productive at the economic level. A study by the United Nations
(2013, 7) found out that the poverty rate in Kankan is higher than in the rest
of the country. Moreover, it states that women and young people are the main
victims of this difficult economic situation. Djénabou Dramé, one of the
research collaborators, used to say ‘ici, ça va à la kankanaise,’ meaning that
everyday life is continuing, and things, especially at the economic and infra-
structural levels, are not really progressing.
Kankan’s society is patrilinear. Officially, public opinion regarding gender
relations according to local meanings, articulated as religious and customary
norms, is unequivocal. A woman’s place, in Kankan, like in other West Afri-
can cities, is at home, where women are in charge of the children and all
domestic work (Bano Barry, Diallo, and Camare 2006, 12). The head of the
household – the family’s number-one breadwinner and decision-maker – is a
man. Article 324 of the Guinean Civil Code, which was valid at the time of
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research, stated: “The husband is the head of the family. He executes this function
in the common interest of the household and the children.”Article 396 added that
he exercises parental authority (République de Guinée 2015, author’s translation).
The popular perception of a wife’s role is that of a subordinate, fulfilling her hus-
band’s every desire and obeying his every command. During their childhood and
youth, girls must obey their fathers; once married, women come under the
authority of their husbands (Godard and Meffe 2006, 1056). However, daily rea-
lities paint a different, more subtly nuanced picture. Female agency is manifold
and they do articulate themselves politically, as this book will show.
In Guinea, polygyny11 has been officially forbidden since the Touré period
(article 315, République de Guinée 2015). Nevertheless, its practice, namely
taking up to four wives, was and is still widespread. According to the demo-
graphic and health survey of 2005 (République de Guinée 2006: 97), 53 per-
cent of married women live in a polygynous household. In polygynous
families, one woman is usually responsible for cooking, washing, and ironing
the husband’s clothes, and so on, for two to four days. During this time, it is
also her right to spend the nights in her husband’s room. Afterwards, it is the
next wife’s turn. A widow should remarry after some time; at best, one of her
late husband’s younger brothers.
Doing Fieldwork in Kankan
Polygyny constituted one of the many personal challenges I faced when doing
research in Kankan. Fieldwork is a fundamental social endeavour; the
researcher with his or her convictions forms part of the experience in the field.
Our multiple identities, our background, our habits, and our imaginations of
the future highly influence fieldwork (Robben 2007, 61–63; Huggins and
Glebbeek 2009, 9). I reflected elsewhere about how my identities have affected
my research – from data gathering, data analysis, to the writing-up process.
Overall, I would like to call for more reflexivity on our positionalities in
anthropological research (Ammann 2018a).
The data for this study was collected during one year of ethnographic
fieldwork and is based on interviews, group discussions, informal conversa-
tions, as well as observations of and participation in everyday life. The first
phase of fieldwork lasted from August 2011 until March 2012. The second
phase took place between November 2012 and February 2013. During the
whole time, I was able to live in the house of the Fofana family. Madame
Fofana, as I used to call her, was born in the mid-1960s and grew up in a
polygamous family. Madame Fofana’s husband, a school director, had died in
January 2009 due to an illness. She told me that he had a good salary and was
well esteemed and connected. His death signified a major shift in the emo-
tional, economical, and social lives of all family members.
Madame and Mister Fofana had four children: Diaka, born in 1990, was in
her final year at the Julius Nyéréré University where she studied management.
Alpha was born in 1992 and frequented school in Conakry where he lived
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with his grandparents. Doussou, born in 1993, also lived with them in the
capital city and attended a technical college to study computer science. Ibra-
hima, born in 1995, was in the final year of high school in a private school in
Kankan. Lastly, Sala, born in 1993 and originating from the countryside, had
lost both his parents and also lived with the family. After Mister Fofana’s
death, Madame Fofana remained single. When I was wondering why she did
not remarry, Madame Fofana laughed and told me that many people were
pushing her to marry again. However, she preferred staying single and living
her own life (interview, 14.01.2013). When her husband was still alive,
Madame Fofana did not work for money. After his death, she suddenly
needed to be the family’s breadwinner. At the time of research, she produced
bonbons, frozen sweets.
Crucial for my fieldwork was finding suitable research collaborators. After
one month in Kankan, I started collaborating with Thierno Aboul Sow and
Djenabou Dramé.12 The former had learned the basis of reading and writing
during three years of school attendance and was unemployed at the time. The
later had earned a bachelor’s degree in political philosophy. At the time of
research, she worked as a teaching assistant at the university and was a
member of various NGOs. They were both in their mid-twenties, originated
from Fulani families, and were born and raised in Kankan.
Thierno and Djénabou were not simple field helpers; in fact, they fit much
more into Townsend Middleton’s and Eklavya Prahdan’s description because
they acted as “interlocutor and ‘fixer’ of ethnographic relations;” they were
“constitutive of the field itself” (Middleton and Prahdan 2014, 357). Indeed,
Thierno and Djénabou influenced what I was focusing on, in which neigh-
bourhoods I spent time, and with whom I spoke; lastly, they decided what
they translated and how they did it.13 Thierno and Djénabou told me how to
behave appropriately in ever-changing situations, how to approach delicate
topics, and how to formulate questions. When we were unsure how to tackle a
certain issue, the three of us sat together, discussed the problems, and had a
go at a new strategy. Thus, our approach was always commonly reflected and
readjusted. In brief, they had a huge impact on my understanding of the
social, economic, and political layers of Kankan’s population, and thus, they
co-produced the data.
By participating in Thierno’s and Djénabou’s everyday lives (as they were
in mine) and observing their agency, I gained a great deal of insight into local
gendered norms. In certain situations, it was challenging for Djénabou to ask
the research participants so many questions. Probably the most difficult
interview for her was the one with her own father. In such situations, she
turned to me and accused me jokingly of speaking too much. By saying so,
Djénabou could hand over the responsibility for her ‘rude’ behaviour. She was
also very cautious not to dwell too much into the participants’ personal issues.
It seemed as if Thierno, in contrast, felt at ease with the role of the person
who asks questions – even though he was aware of his inferiority regarding
schooling and economic background compared to many research
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participants. The described difference between Therno and Djénabou hints at
disparities regarding proper gendered behaviour in Kankan: While it is
appropriate for a (young) man to be interested in and ask countless questions
about a person’s life, the same demeanour is difficult for a (young) woman,
especially when she addresses elderly men.
Working with research collaborators raises questions of authorship, author-
ity, and ethical considerations in general (Galizia and Schneider 2005, 8;
Gupta 2014). As colleagues and I have argued elsewhere (Ammann, Kaiser-
Grolimund, and Staudacher 2016), we plea for an anthropological writing that
explicitly reveals the impact of research collaborators in our projects – not only
in the PhD theses, but also in scientific books, edited volumes, and articles. Or
in the words of Townsend Middleton and Eklavya Pradhan: “Incorporating
their voices marks a definitive step in recognizing and perhaps getting beyond
the ‘hidden colonialism’ at hand so as to chart a more inclusive and innovative
ethnography for the future” (Middleton and Pradhan 2014, 371–372).
Intrinsic to my research was the focus on “the everyday, the ordinary and
the seemingly insignificant” (Lewis 2005, 381). I grasped everyday life
through three approaches: Firstly, the mapping of social actors; secondly,
discourse analysis; and, thirdly, social-practice analysis. This circular
approach was helpful in grasping new and constantly changing social spaces
and perceiving the political articulations therein. The three components are
interrelated and constitute each other; each approach is only fruitful with the
knowledge gained through the other two (Förster et al. 2011). I used inter-
views, informal conversations, and naturally occurring talks for the analysis of
discourses. I further collected (online) media articles. Generally, I identify
with Claudia Roth’s (2005, 185, author’s translation) method of ‘situational
research’ that entails waiting “with my questions for the right moments, those
situations, in which they were appropriate and embedded.”
I participated in the daily lives of the Fofanas, Thierno, Djénabou, and other
friends and acquaintances. I joined weddings, funerals, baptisms, and took part
in public events such as the annual independence celebrations. Observations
were undertaken on a daily basis, especially in the social spaces of markets and
cafés. As a female research participant put it: ‘Women discuss their social pro-
blems where they sell or where they braid their hair’ (field notes, 09.01.2013).
Men in contrast recurrently meet in one of the many cafés where they discuss
and debate a large variety of topics. Amara Kamano, who was born in the
early 1970s, stated: “In cafés, there is nothing people do not say. If you want to
hear the city’s news, you must go to the cafés; it is only there that you will hear
certain things” (interview, 10.01.2013). Cafés, as social spaces, have many
similarities to grins, the famous attaya-tea group. Both are meeting points
where (young) people, mostly men, gather. “Grins [and cafés] thus function like
a space of political expression and are presented as places where political opi-
nion can be sampled” (Bondaz 2013, 69, author’s translation).
Overall, I applied a variety of methods to research women’s political articula-
tions in the secondary city of Kankan. As each of these methods has its strengths
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and limits, the application of a methodological diversity can help with the
crosschecking and triangulation of data and, hence, validate them (deWalt and
deWalt 2011, 102). Generally, there was no clear distinction between data gen-
eration, its interpretation, andwriting it up; it was rather a circular process where
every stage influenced the next one (Gupta 1995, 398–399).
The Chapters
The different parts of this book tell their own narratives; at the same time,
they all contribute to the overall story by looking at the women-state
nexus and women’s political articulations in Kankan from various angles.
Women are the main focus, but in some subchapters, they do not figure
very prominently. Hereby, I want to illustrate that women’s partial absence
does also give valuable insight into women’s political articulations in a
Muslim Guinean city.
Figure I(2) A Typical Café in Kankan
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Chapter 1 deals with Guinea’s historical trajectories. Hereby, I include data
of how the research participants remember past conditions and events. I aim at
demonstrating how women have contributed to the Guinean state and nation-
building process. In this chapter, I demonstrate that elderly women, who have
been or still are engaged within the institutional political sphere, started to do
so during the First Republic when Sékou Touré wanted to make women one
important pillar of his proclaimed revolution. I further argue that during the
rule of General Lansana Conté, women were more pushed to the margins and
no longer put on centre stage.
When I arrived in Kankan in August 2011, ethnicity was a constant topic of
contestation. Chapter 2 takes this topic up and illustrates that in Guinea, ethnic
belonging has not always been as important as it was before, during, and after the
presidential elections of 2010. Here, I explain why and in which ways ethnicity has
recently been politicised. Then, I elaborate on the contradicting governmental
discourse and practices regarding ethnicity. In this chapter, I also demonstrate that
when it comes to ethnicity, in most cases, gender is of marginal importance. The
Association of Female Leaders serves as an example to show why and how
women present their argument when leaving the predetermined path for locally
acknowledged forms of female political articulations.
Chapter 3 analyses Alpha Condé’s discourse of change as he strongly focuses
on women and youths. It describes how the President, whose main stronghold is
the Upper Guinea Region with Kankan as its largest city, embodies hope. Kan-
kan’s population expects that the coming into power of ‘their’ leader would
facilitate its access to state resources, enhance the building of the city’s infra-
structure, and provide job opportunities. The chapter further shows that women
adopt two main criteria along which the state’s performance is evaluated: On the
one hand, women expect the (local) government not to misappropriate public
funds; and on the other hand, they mainly assess the state’s performance
according to its willingness and ability to reduce the food prices. Thus, Kankan’s
female population judges past and current Presidents, above all, by the food
situation they faced at a certain time.
Chapter 4 analyses how the state performs and engages the issue of gender. The
data illustrates that in Guinea, gender equality is locally understood as the pro-
motion of women and the state depicts women as the needy and vulnerable part of
society: The Guinean government and its employees frame the female population
especially the not ‘formally’ educated women as immature and as victims. That is
why the state bundles the different efforts labelled as ‘women’s concerns’ within the
Ministry of Women’s and Children’s Affairs. I argue that the government’s official
way of handling women complies with the international discourse on gender
equality and women’s promotion. In reality, however, ordinary women have diffi-
culties accessing the different administrative units – also those of the Women’s and
Children’s Affairs – which further enhances gender inequalities. In the second
section of this chapter, I demonstrate how Djènè Kaba Condé, Guinea’s First
Lady, presents herself as a representative of the country’s female population, even
though she has little in common with an ordinary Guinean woman, who is not
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highly educated and does not have a permanent and well-paid job. I explain why
the behaviour of the Guinean First Lady can aptly be capturedwith the concept of
the First Lady Syndrome described by Jibrin Ibrahim (2004) and of femocracy as
defined by Amina Mama (1997): As soon as she became Alpha Condé’s wife,
Djènè Kaba Condé started campaigning for her husband and promoted gender
equality and women’s rights.
In Chapter 5, the focus lies on women within Guinea’s institutional poli-
tical sphere. The first section starts by providing an overview on women’s
increase in institutional politics at the continental level. Then, it highlights
women’s involvement in Guinean national politics. It further zooms in on
Rabiatou Sèrah Diallo, a trade unionist and the president of the Legislative
National Transitional Council (Conseil National de Transition, CNT) between
2010 and 2014. In the second section, the chapter analyses women in the local
political sphere by introducing two women who had highly visible posts.
Then, it depicts three ordinary female members of local party branches in
Kankan. On the basis of these examples, this chapter elaborates more broadly
on women’s roles within (local) political parties. It concludes by describing the
ambivalent image of female Guinean politicians in local and national politics.
Overall, I argue that women’s claim making within Guinea’s institutional
politics is rather limited. Politics remains to be defined as a male domain.
Within the sphere of party politics, women are not to express their ideas,
make propositions, or raise new issues to discuss except for the well-educated
women who hold important positions.
Chapter 6 deals with women’s political articulations that emerge from the
everyday. Based on the portraits of several women and concerning issues such
as looking for a suitable husband, generating an income, and continuing one’s
education, it illustrates how femininities, masculinities, and gender relations
are bargained over in daily life. The chapter demonstrates that even though
the female research participants claim that their decision-making is limited
and women mostly bargain within the locally acknowledged gendered norms
of Kankan’s patriarchal society, their agency is manifold and they use var-
ious ways of influencing their lives. This chapter further shows that women’s
strategies to reach their goals are diverse. They use ‘sweet talks’ with their
husbands or intermediary parties if they want to convince them of certain
issues. Making decisions relating to income-generating activities, family
affairs, education, and marriage issues can create difficulties, thus women do
so with discretion. Women also behave properly according to social and
religious norms, for example by keeping the house and the children in order,
by being polite to elderly people, by praying five times a day, or by not
wandering around at night. Thus, they gain a reputation as a ‘good’
Muslim woman that allows them to pursue desired goals. Overall, I argue
in this chapter that women in Kankan use their agency strategically to (re-)
negotiate various forms of power and authority. They know in which
situations it is suitable to remain silent and when it is legitimate to raise
their voices.
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Chapter 7 tackles the everyday bargaining of statehood through encounters
between state representatives, ‘traditional’ authorities, and ordinary women.
While in Kankan, the local government is an ambivalent sphere for women,
the ‘traditional’ authorities are even more so. Women are systematically
excluded from that sphere insofar as ‘traditional’ posts are exclusively
reserved for men. Nevertheless, women can silently have some influence, as
they advise powerful men through their positions as mothers, sisters, aunts,
wives, or daughters. With the example of widows who claim their pensions, I
illustrate that the formation of what Asef Bayat (2010) calls a “passive net-
work” can be a useful tool for women to pursue their goals when dealing with
representatives of the local government.
The chapter further emphasises that even if women are just rarely present
during popular protest, the idea that they could be marching on the streets gives
them some power. By closely looking at market women and their encounters
with local state employees, it also illustrates that market women as collective
actors can sometimes pursue their goals not least because they substantially
contribute to their families’ budgets. Lastly, I argue that having personal rela-
tions to state employees is helpful in many ways: On the one hand, one has a
direct access to a specific institution and must not take the hierarchical way
which might never lead to the desired outcome. On the other hand, it enables
people, also women, to act individually when addressing their problems.
Notes
1 In Kankan, people are called ‘intellectuals’ or highly educated when they have
finished high school.
2 Already before Guinea’s independence women used market places to spread mes-
sages, as Elizabeth Schmidt (2002, 287–288) illustrates.
3 When looking at ordinary (men and) women, I mean average women (in Kankan)
who are not, for example, highly educated and do not possess special social or
economic resources.
4 These ‘traditional’ actors “do not simply inherit their position from their fore-
fathers, nor do they stick to an unchanging model of what is appropriately labelled
as ‘tradition’ and what is not. Very much as ‘tradition’ itself, ‘traditional’ actors
are always in the making, and the driving forces of this process are deeply
embedded in the political articulation of social difference” (Förster and Koechlin
2018, 242, quotation marks added).
5 Leaning on Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001), I understand articulations
as “ways in which actors express their own views and how this expression connects
them” (Förster 2015, 209). Through articulations, social relations are established and
political positions are shaped. They are always embedded within the local social
discourse. More precisely, political articulations are those social practices through
which members of a society communicate – verbally and non-verbally – how they
want to deal with social problems, regardless of whether the actors consider them as
political. Hence, political articulations are about how a society wants to live together
and establish relations between various actors. Only if other persons perceive an
actor’s agency as such – that is, when actors relate to each other – does it become
socially relevant and can be considered as political articulations.
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6 Some social anthropologists have criticised this broad, “diffuse and nebulous”
(Curtis and Spencer 2012, 168) usage of the political (e.g. Candea 2011).
7 AbdouMaliq Simone (2004, 12–13) similarly describes how people in African cities
are reaffirming coalitions: “Sometimes people coalesce in organization that have
names, but where it is unclear to almost everyone what precisely the organization
is and what it does. At other times, an event may trigger an entire neighborhood
into apparently unfamiliar courses of action but with a synchronicity that makes it
appear as if some deep-seated logic of social mobilization is being unlashed. At
still other times, the ways in which localities both activate and resist change in
relationship to the decisions of government authorities construct tentative plat-
forms for people to collaborate in ‘silent’ but powerful ways.”
8 In the scientific literature, silence is often important when traumas and war are
researched, for example Holocaust survivors and their descendants, the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa (Ross 2001), or Persian migrant
women in Australia (Warin and Dennis 2008).
9 For an overview on anthropological literature on agency in Africa, see Mirjam de
Bruijn, Rijk van Dijk, and Jan Bart Gewald (2007), Casey High (2010), as well as
Dieter Neubert and Christine Scherer (2014). Lastly, Francis Nyamnjoh (2007)
writes about methodological and ethical challenges of researching agency in
Africa.
10 Here, I add up the numbers for Kankan centre and Karifamoriyah, a nearby vil-
lage that is today considered as part of the city. Generally, these figures must be
handled with care: O’Toole and Baker (2005, 121), for example, indicate the
number of Kankan’s inhabitants as 278,000 at the beginning of the 2000s.
11 I use the term polygyny, referring to men marrying multiple women, rather than
polygamy, a term hinting to multiple male or female spouses. The new Civil Code
officially legitimised polygyny again in 2016 (République de Guinée 2016).
12 Thierno and Djénabou have asked to be cited by their proper names. Elsewhere, I
have reflected extensively on our collaboration and their contribution to the pro-
cesses of data gathering and data analysis (Ammann, Kaiser-Grolimund, and
Staudacher 2016).
13 Unfortunately, my knowledge of Maninkakan remained basic. Consequently,
Thierno and Djénabou translated the research participants’ statements into French.
Not being able to communicate in the local language is a major shortcoming of my
research and it increased the importance of the two research collaborators.
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1 Gendered Conceptions throughout
Guinean History
Introduction
In the past, gender identities in Africa “have been particularly fluid and con-
tested” (Miescher and Lindsay 2003, 4). As the media all too often depicts
Africa as one unit, it is especially important to note that “there is no generic
‘African’ woman (or man), and that African women’s and men’s lives, like
those of all people, are fluid and change over time” (Ampofo, Beoku-Betts,
and Osirim 2008, 5). Thus, this chapter analyses how women as a social
category have been constructed politically, economically, and socially
throughout Guinea’s history. Hereby, the scope is not to give an overview on
the complex history of today’s Guinea, but rather to provide the basis for
understanding ongoing debates and contestations surrounding the Guinean
state as historical, political, social, and economic legacies that shaped and
still shape the population and the state apparatus. The focus lies on how the
research participants remember past conditions and events. Another emphasis
is put on women’s influence in the state formation and nation-building pro-
cesses. What political roles and social places in the Guinean society did its
past Presidents assign to women? In which ways did their discourse and
actual practices regarding Guinea’s female inhabitants vary? And how have
women conformed and adapted to and possibly subverted these ideas?
Human agency is always an outcome of its three temporal dimensions.
Here, I deal with its past dimension, as this highly influences the present.
When looking at the connection between the past and the present, it is
important to note that remembering and forgetting – either individually or
collectively – are related in multiple, intricate ways; the past and the present
cannot be separated. When talking about the past, people always give their
own interpretations. Further, the past informs how people experience the
present and the presence influences how people remember the past. Memories
are not fixed because remembering is an ongoing process. Memories can
chance as the actors’ social experiences change. This becomes evident when
individuals and groups from the local, national, as well as international levels
use records of the past to make claims to critique present circumstances
(Connerton 1989, 3). In the Guinean case, especially the memory of the First
Republic under Ahmed Sékou Touré is politicised: Different groups interpret
this time by applying a victim and perpetrator dichotomy (Arieff and
McGovern 2013; Camara 2014, xvii–xix).
In what follows, I look at how various actors have shaped and reshaped
gender relations in Guinea. I analyse how the Guinean state has influenced
them and how the research participants evaluate these efforts retrospectively.
This historical perspective helps in understanding how gendered norms are
bargained over in the present and how they are imagined to be in a future to
come. I firstly discuss the Muslim migration into the Milo River Valley. I
show on the one hand, how Kankan was founded, and on the other hand,
how the processes of household building and state-building were mutually
interlocked, and as such, how women have been an important factor in their
spouses’, brothers’, and sons’ success. Secondly, I introduce how the French
colonisers forged the Guinean colony through a male bureaucracy. Thirdly, I
demonstrate how the anti-colonial Democratic Party of Guinea-African
Democratic Rally (Parti Démocratique de Guinée-Rassemblement Démocratique
Africain, PDG-RDA) has been established and explain women’s engagement
within the nationalist movement. Fourthly, I provide an overview over the First
Republic (1958–1984) under the independence hero Sékou Touré. Here, I illus-
trate how Touré represented himself as the nation’s father and as a promoter of
women and gender equality. Fifthly, I discuss women’s minimal political influ-
ence during Lansana Conté’s reign between 1984 and 2008. I also illustrate why
national strikes paralysed the country in 2006 and 2007 and what role women
played therein. Lastly, I show how the Guinean population experienced the
turbulent transitional period since Lansana Conté’s death.1
Gender in Pre-Colonial and Colonial Times
Household Building as a Pillar for Pre-Colonial State-Building
In the seventeenth century, Muslim clerics from the North founded the state
of Baté in the Milo River Valley, the origins of present day Kankan (Kaba
1976b, 410). Its main villages and towns were clustered around the Milo River
that served as an agricultural, transportation, and communication basis.
Baté’s inhabitants trace their history back to Sun(d)jata Keita and the Mali
Empire and feel culturally and historically associated with the Mande world
(Osborn 2011, 13). Interestingly, the epic of Sun(d)jata Keita is spiked with
women who – in their roles as mothers, wives, and sisters – influence the
course of actions of their male relatives (Osborn 2011, 6; Dessertine 2019, 3).
In Baté, all villages and towns had their own chiefs, male members mostly
of the Kaba family (Goerg 1986, 184). Baté’s inhabitants focused on agri-
culture and religious studies. Agriculture limited the families’ material wealth
and men depended on the contribution of the female family members to cul-
tivate their fields. Men rarely had more than two women, as they could not
afford the bride wealth. Not relying on warfare, the Muslim migrants had to
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establish good relations with their non-Muslim neighbours, especially mem-
bers of the Condé family who were perceived as the “owner of the lands”
(Osborn 2011, 43).
Emily Lynn Osborn (2011, 41) advocates taking into consideration the
households’ role when analysing state-building in West Africa. She emphasises
that in pre-colonial Baté, households were essential for the building and dur-
ability of the state: “Stories about sibling rivalries, religious differences, and
deviant wives – and the idealized gender roles that are woven through them –
present, in effect, an account of the workings of power and politics in the nascent
state of Baté” (Osborn 2011, 23). Women could not take up leadership positions,
and state-building was a “thoroughly masculinist and patriarchal” affair
(Osborn 2011, 3). However, Osborn highlights that households were important
pillars of state-building and consequently, women had some indirect political
influence: Baté’s male elites were eager to avoid conflicts within the households
because they could have devastating effects on their state-building efforts.
Furthermore, women could use their social roles as mothers, daughters, and
wives to influence their male relatives. Especially elderly women after meno-
pause could attain a respected status (Osborn 2011, 3, 32).
Around the late 1760s and early 1770s, Brahima Condé attacked Baté.
Some people fled the region, others were captured. Alfa Kabiné Kaba, a
devout and learned Muslim and Baté’s chief at that time, found refuge in the
Fouta Djallon (Osborn 2011, 50–54). When armies of the Fouta Djallon
theocracy defeated Condé Brahima, Kaba and his followers returned to the
Milo River Valley where they founded the city of Kankan. Once again, the
region did not base its existence on warfare; but instead the practise of
building up a household constituted an important factor in the state-building
process (Osborn 2011, 50–56). Alpha Kabiné Kaba is said to have introduced
a political system of city growth through marriage of foreign men to local
women called Nabaya. Thanks to this system, merchants and migrants have
been integrated into Kankan’s households. Especially single men from the
Mande region north of the city could profit from Nabaya, as they were
usually allowed to marry one of Kankan’s women. Thus, marriage was an
important state-building strategy (Osborn 2011, 57).
By the early nineteenth century, Kankan had become a “major centre of
commerce and production” (Osborn 2011, 19) and of Islamic erudition
(Goerg 1986, 191). Those days are remembered as a time when the city grew
and prospered under the benevolent guidance of Alfa Kabiné Kaba who is
referred to as M’Bemba, ‘our grandfather’. Kaba is presented as an ideal
man; a devote Muslim, wise and just, without martial ambitions (Osborn
2011, 59–62). At that time, not only men but also women were engaged in
trade. But while men’s long-distance trade in gold, kola nuts, slaves, and salt
was quite profitable, women’s localised commerce such as growing vegetable
and dyeing cloth were less lucrative. These new economic patterns had an
impact on gender relations in Kankan: Its households were still an essential
element of statecraft; however, with the accumulated wealth invested in slave
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labour, men were less dependent on the collaboration and contribution of
their female relatives, therefore gender relations within the households shifted.
In the accounts of those times, women figure less prominently than before
and tales of ‘bad women’ whose actions had a devastating effect on the
whole city had vanished. Women were rather depicted as simple and sub-
servient. Emily Lynn Osborn (2011, 62–67) takes this as a sign that men
were less afraid of women’s agency because they did not have to rely on
them like in the decades before.
Bemba is the nickname of an elderly man who is very active in Kan-
kan’s political and cultural life. He claims to know its history well and
talked about Kankan’s founding time in every of our conversations. When
I asked Bemba about women from Kankan who were positively remem-
bered until today, he mentioned Fadima Jenné, Alfa Kabiné Kaba’s
mother: “Fadima Jenné accepted that her son was within everyone’s reach
so that they could profit. Not every woman would do this. Today, if a man
distributes everything, his mother or someone within the family might
become angry and discredit him. Fadima Jenné however, has been very
famous and far-sighted” (interview, 10.12.2012). Bemba depicted Fadima
Jenné as a ‘good’ wife and caring mother who had submissively carried
out her duties and had not complained about her son supporting Kankan’s
population in manifold ways. Hence, Bemba’s narration follows the same
line as Osborn’s (2011, 64) statement that Fadima Jenné “presents a con-
centrated ideal” of female behaviour.
Colonial State-Building: Women’s Influence Decreased
In the mid-nineteenth century, Baté’s young men became more and more
attracted by the idea of expanding their territory through warfare.
During their military campaigns, men accumulated slaves and wives as
symbols of power and wealth. Baté’s households were still symbolically
important for state-building, but no longer sites of political production
and reproduction. Thus, as the importance of Baté’s households changed,
women’s ability to indirectly influence politics as mothers, sisters, and
wives decreased radically. Emily Lynn Osborn (2011, 74–91) underlines
that, in the narratives between 1850 and 1881, women mostly figure as
victims of men’s violence.
In the last third of the nineteenth century, the Manding trader and warrior
Samory Touré conquered a significant part of West African territory. Samory
Touré built Mosques and the conquered people had to convert to Islam. His
many wives and thousands of slaves served as a proof of Samory’s wealth and
power (Camara, O’Toole, and Baker 2014, 8). Initially, the Kaba, Kankan’s
leading family, entered into a fragile alliance with Samory Touré. When the
Kaba rejected Samory’s wish to marry into their family, the latter lay siege to
the city and finally occupied it in 1881. Samory Touré’s reign of Kankan
lasted for ten years (Osborn 2011, 109–111).
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Initially, the Samory Touré and his warriors successfully fought against the
French colonisers. Thus, the Manding ruler became a hero and was especially
praised as an idol during the Guinean struggle for independence (Camara,
O’Toole, and Baker 2014, 8). Kankan’s population, however, does not
remember Samory as a hero because of the negative consequences his warfare
had on the city (Osborn 2011, 109–111). In the local narratives of Samory
Touré, women do not figure prominently, demonstrating that Kankan’s “male
elites no longer relied on their wives as they once had. Men could accumulate
wealth and power through warfare in the form of booty and slaves, which
reduced men’s dependence on their female relations and constrained the
influence of women’s household roles” (Osborn 2011, 99–100).
Since 1879, the French advanced into the Upper Guinea Region,2 but its
final occupation was only achieved after a long military conquest (Goerg
1986, 225). Almost a decade after their first inroads into the interior of what
would later become Guinea and Mali, they also conquered Kankan in April
1891 (Goerg 1986, 236–237). Due to its business activities, the city already had
more than 10,000 inhabitants at the beginning of the twentieth century – more
than Conakry at that time. Especially the commerce with rubber was lucrative,
and a significant part of Kankan’s population profited from its collection and
trade. The thriving and vibrant city of Kankan was also an economically
important region for the French colonisers. In 1914, the last section of the
railway between Conakry and Kankan had been finished, thus tying the city
closer to Conakry and its port (Goerg 1986, 275–291).
The French colonial power’s goal was to install an impersonal bureaucracy
“dedicated to mobilizing and managing male colonial subjects” (Osborn
2011, 182) by using “territorial measures and demarcated borders – not per-
sonalized relationships – to anchor their power and structure the state”
(Osborn 2011, 125). By 1890, the colonial system tried to eradicate the influ-
ence of local ‘traditional’ chiefs. At the same time, the colonial educational
system created opportunities for young men; also for those who had no ties to
one of Kankan’s leading families. With the introduction of colonial schools
and the new administrative practices, a small male elite evolved in the urban
centres (Camara, O’Toole, and Baker 2014, 9).
Unlike local political leaders, the colonisers did not use the domestic sphere to
articulate and enlarge their political power; even if the colonial administrators
married African women, they and their children were considered to be irrelevant
for state-building. Colonial officials also spatially separated their household and
the office of rule (Osborn 2011, 128–135). Anna Dessertine (2019, 1) confirms
that women’s influence during the colonial period radically decreased during the
colonial period; it was restricted to the domestic sphere – like in other French
colonies. Overall, a “masculinization of the political domain” occurred (Desser-
tine 2019, 4). Summing up, in Guinea, like in other parts of Africa, “the colonial
state manipulated gender identities […] with the result that the gender relations
became more imbalanced than during pre-colonial times even though both per-
iods are marked by patriarchal societies” (Pankhurst 2002, 119).
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Women within the Nationalist Movement
In Guinea after World War Two, various political parties have been estab-
lished. They were mostly affiliated along regional or ethnic lines (Du Bois
1970, 186). In 1946, African leaders, among them Ahmed Sékou Touré,
formed the Pan-African African Democratic Rally (Rassemblement Démo-
cratique Africain, RDA). One year later, the Democratic Party of Guinea
(Parti Démocratique de Guinée, PDG), the Guinean branch of the RDA, was
created (Camara, O’Toole, and Baker 2014, xxxix). Contrary to the other
Guinean parties, the PDG-RDA was based on an inclusive regional, ethnic,
class, religion, and gender alliance. On September 28, 1958, Guinea over-
whelmingly rejected the constitution offered by Charles de Gaulle in the
referendum. “The No vote of the Guineans became the basis of the heroic
myth and revolutionary image of Sekou Touré” (Kaba 1977, 25). For the
Guinean population, it is still a cause of pride.
Women started engaging in Guinean politics around 1946 (Rivière 1971,
105). In the nationalist movement, they were crucial. This is no Guinean
particularity: The support of women at the grassroots level was important for
many African political parties engaged in the struggle for independence
(Mama 1997, 37–38; Ranchod-Nilsson and Tétreault 2000; Steady 2011, 58).
During the early years of the PDG-RDA, most of the politically active
women came from the elite and got involved in politics through their hus-
bands. This changed after the general strikes of 1953 during which women
played an important role: Women from all classes protested against economic
hardship, due to which they could not fulfil their social duties as mothers and
wives. From this point on, the PDG-RDA started mobilising women on a
larger scale (Schmidt 2005, 113; Pauthier 2007, 221). The party successfully
integrated women’s associations, which, after 1940 subsequently crossed
ethnic boundaries (Schmidt 2002, 283–285).
Unlike other Guinean political parties at the time, the PDG-RDA took
‘women’s concerns’ such as health, sanitation, and education seriously. Not
least because “Sékou Touré in particular made much of women’s power, using
images, anecdotes, and parables that appealed to the largely nonliterate
population” (Schmidt 2005, 125), the party could attract female supporters in
large numbers. In 1954, local PDG-RDA women committees were established
throughout the country enabling the party to attract female supporters in
grand masses (Schmidt 2005, 126). Altogether, women fundamentally trans-
formed the PDG-RDA’s mobilisation tactics, communication methods, pro-
grammes, and objectives (Schmidt 2005, 114). They created songs and
slogans, which they sang to transmit their nationalist message, to embarrass
political opponents and men who did not join their party. The female market
chiefs in Conakry, for example, transmitted their political messages to the
female vendors and customers. Generally, the PDG addressed women in their
roles as mothers and wives, but at the same time, some changes regarding
local gendered norms occurred: Women went to political meetings, spoke
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publicly, and mobilised for the party (Schmidt 2002, 287–295). Some women
also explicitly violated gendered norms, as the example of the so-called
female “shock troops” illustrates – these were security guards who punished
political opponents (Schmidt 2002, 291–292). In 1955, during a meeting in
Kankan, a woman said: “No woman of Kankan has yet spoken here in this
public meeting. Before the arrival of the RDA, women did not have the right
to speak in an assembly of men! Today, thanks God, thanks to the RDA, I
will speak to this tribunal like the men. The woman has become the equal of
the man” (cited in Schmidt 2005, 124).
Gender in the Postcolonial Era
Women’s Ostensible Empowerment during the Touré-Era (1958–1984)
Ahmed Sékou Touré, Guinea’s first President, marked its country remarkably.
A bulk of literature engages with Touré, his reign, and his contested legacy.3
Until today he is vividly remembered, especially among the elderly who lived
during those times. Alpha Condé, too, refers to Guinea’s first President in his
speeches and actions. The legacy of Touré does not only live on in memories,
it still strongly shapes the country and is, for example, detectable in pre-
sent administrative practices as various authors demonstrate again and
again (McGovern 2007, 2012, 2017; Straker 2007a, 2008, 2009; Engeler
2019; Schroven 2019).
Sékou Touré’s main preoccupations were state and nation-building. He
wanted to lead his country to a unified, independent, ‘modern’, and ‘developed’
nation in which ethnic differences should dissolve (Johnson 1970, 354–355).
Along the official doctrine, Guinea became a socialist popular democracy
where the people were in power. Consequently, every citizen had to be a
member of the PDG mass party and thus merge into ‘a People’ (Camara 2014,
109–113). The party was highly centralised and hierarchically structured. As
my data shows, this idea of respecting the hierarchical state structure is still
very present in Guinea today. The research participants remember the Touré
era as a secure time when almost no crimes were committed; one could walk on
the streets at any time without being afraid. They contrasted this to the situa-
tion nowadays as people long for a strong state that can deliver security and
basic services.
Charismatic Touré, a gifted orator and writer, veiled absolute political
power and appointed all key positions within the party and the government.
Furthermore, he was the leading articulator of the party’s ideology. As Lan-
siné Kaba (1976a, 211) puts it, he “exert[ed] all powers simultaneously, thus
becoming the living hero, the embodiment of the nation, and the ultimate
interpreter of national reality.” Through his speeches and his manners, Sékou
Touré displayed the image of himself not only as Guinea’s President, but as
the country’s father.
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Women played an active role in the PDG from the very start, also because
Touré made them his key followers. They were, for example, to convince their
husbands to join the party (Doumbouya 2008, 172). After independence, many
women still backed the PDG and the party enforced female emancipation (Pau-
thier 2007, 225). Women’s emancipation and youth’s empowerment went hand in
hand with the PDG’s ideology of people’s enlightening. Both groups became the
party’s most important pillars. Touré repeatedly explained that women (and
youth) had been the number one victims of colonisation which had degraded them
to second-class citizens. In his view, a society could only be judged as ‘modern’ if
its female population was free and actively took part in political life. By liberating
women, Touré wanted to free the whole society “from its insufficiencies” (cited in
Lewin 2010, 45, author’s translation). In an interview, the President claimed: “[…]
we think women are the country’s future, even before youth, and, consequently,
favours the social, intellectual, and moral advancement of a people” (cited in
Rivière 1968, 409, author’s translation). Thus, by (ostensibly) caring for women
and youth, the party gained their support.
Sékou Touré’s and the general population’s respect for women, on the one
hand, and the latter’s support for Touré, on the other hand, are remembered
to this day. Various research participants explained how the President wanted
Guinea to be a country for women and children. If someone mistreated a
woman ‘he had a real problem’ an elderly man sitting in a café explained
(informal conversation, 15.01.2013). ‘At the time, women were really respec-
ted’ Amara Kamano, a highly educated woman in her forties, recalled
(informal conversation, 15.12.2012).
Women were organised in the Revolutionary Union of Guinean Women (Union
Révolutionnaire des Femmes de Guinée, URFG) at the local, district, regional, and
national levels (Camara 2014, 131). The major claims of the URFG were the
state’s control of marriage, the enhancement of girl’s school enrolments, the
improvement of women’s knowledge on sanitation issues, and the increase of
women’s contribution to the economic and political sphere (Rivière 1968, 409).
Further, professional female associations of tailors, dyers, fish smokers, and others
were united in Centres for Female Promotion (Centre de Promotion Féminin,
CPF). Thus, the ruling party incorporated existing female associations of mutual
help into its economic programme of collectivisation (Camara 2014, 166). In 1964,
the party revised its politics and structure to make the PDG a party of the elite and
not of the masses. Consequently, the state dissolved the party’s women’s branches
at the neighbourhood and village levels (Rivière 1968, 422).
For Céline Pauthier (2007, 230), the embedment of women into these asso-
ciations created an important social space where they were protected against
male interferences. However, there have also been voices who criticised women’s
involvement within the PDG. They claimed that women thereupon neglected
their conjugal and family duties. Yet, many former female activists with whom
Mohamed Saliou Camara (2014, 167) spoke, rejected such accusations. On the
contrary, they stressed that their involvement (or that of their female family
members) in party politics had a positive impact on their families.
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For some well-known female politicians, the URFG served as a launch pad for
their careers, including Jeanne Martin Cissé (1926–2017), the first woman to head
the United Nations (UN) Security Council; Mafory Bangoura (1910–1976), who
became minister of social affairs (1970–1976) and a national hero just after her
death; and Rabiatou Sèrah Diallo (b. 1950), who became the leader of a trade
union and then the president of the Legislative National Transitional Council
(Conseil National de Transition, CNT) (2010–2014) (Pauthier 2018). Two of the
elderly female research participants who are still engaged in politics started their
political activity during the Touré era: One of them is Mariama Keita, a steno-
grapher born in the early 1940s. Generally, Mariama Keita remembered the time
of the First Republic as a positive one: She had been young and a member of a
local dance and theatre group. She recalled how she, carrying her baby on her
back, and her group had welcomed Sékou Touré in Kankan. “When the President
came, we danced and served him” (interview, 01.02.2012). AsMariama Keita held
a post within the local party’s organisation, she hadwritten the visit’s minutes. The
party’s committee met once a week, she remembered. At that time, women were
not afraid of politics; there was a certain emancipation, she explained. During the
Conté period, Keita refused to join the Unity and Progress Party (Parti de l’Unité
de du Progrès, PUP). Instead, she supported Alpha Condé’s RPG although she
suffered from repressions. The example of Mariama Keita illustrates how the
URFG and the cultural promotion under Touré enhanced women’s engagement
in (local) politics. Some of these women remained active within institutional poli-
tics throughout their lives.
Some measures impacted on women and girls’ conditions negatively while sup-
posedly intending to improve the situation. Schoolgirls had to prove their virginity
through an examination that was known as ‘the visit’. If a schoolgirl was found to
have lost her virginity, she and the responsible boy or man were publicly shamed. If
the girl was pregnant, she was expelled from school for one year. This supposedly
encouraged education and decreased teenage pregnancy. In addition, prostitution
was severely punished (Doumbouya 2008, 174; McGovern 2012, 147–148).
Another issue that affected women during the First Republic was polygyny, which
was practiced both in poor and in better-off families (Hanry 1970, 57). Already in
1962, a law enabled awife to oppose her husband’s taking a secondwife if he could
not economically sustain both (Rivière 1968, 410). Four years later, the Guinean
government officially prohibited polygyny (Steady 2011, 63); this ban, however,
was never implemented (Camara 2014, 164). From the instauration of these
different laws mentioned above, the prohibition of polygyny is the one most
remembered by the female research participants. Amara Kamano narrated:
During the Touré era, there was no polygyny. If you were polygamous,
you hid it. If you said, you wanted a second wife, the first wife would try
to meet Sékou Touré and say to him: ‘My husband does not care for me.
He says he wants to take a second wife.’ Touré immediately delegates
people to fetch your husband and to send him to prison.
(Informal conversation, 09.02.2012)
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Several points are of interest in this account: Firstly, Amara Kamano adopted
the idea of Touré as a caring father who looked after and solved the problems
of his children. Secondly, her narrations pretended the existence of a personal
relationship between an individual, in this case a worried wife, and the Pre-
sident. Thirdly, it illustrates how Guinea’s population considered Touré to be
omnipotent; his will could be executed everywhere within the Guinean terri-
tory. Fourthly, Touré’s power did extend into the intimate sphere; the account
is an example of how the ruling party tried to control every aspect of a per-
son’s life. Lastly, it demonstrates how Touré – according to Kamano – cared
for women’s preoccupations.
Women were also promoted to higher posts in the state administration
(Godard 2010, 63–64). Several of the elderly female research participants
recounted how they, as state employees, gained a regular income: Aisha Bah, a
woman born in the 1930s, proudly told me that she had worked as a secret agent.
Her task was to find out who imported forbidden commodities to Kankan, and
then, to report this to the state authorities. Ninety other women doing the same
job and herself had travelled all over the country for training, Bah narrated. She
remembered the Touré era as an easy one: She had a job and could live with little
money – not like today (informal conversation 09.12.2012).
When the government turned more and more oppressive, particularly
between 1964 and 1977 – due to real or imagined plots – women were some
of the rare voices opposing the regime. This was especially the case whenever
essential commodities such as rice, oil, and sugar were hardly available
(Hanry 1970, 61; Rivière 1968, 424). As the prices were fixed at such a low
level, many merchants could hardly make a living (McGovern 2007, 137).
The tight control of the private commerce by the economic police was a huge
burden for women who sustained their families by petty trade (Doumbouya
2008, 174). Women’s political mobilisation culminated in the manifestation
against Touré at the end of August 1977 (Pauthier 2007, 225). That year, the
alimentary situation was extremely harsh because Touré had announced that
all direct imports were suppressed (Lewin 2010, 41). According to Ibrahima
Baba Kaké (1987, 180), the protests were directed against the economic and
social hardship rather than a movement with a political cause.
Already in June 1977, incidents between the economic police and market
women caused major demonstrations in N’Zérékoré and Kankan (Pauthier
2007, 231). In Conakry, an incident at the M’Balia market between a female
vendor and a member of the economic police led to a collective reaction by
the market women. They refused to continue to accept the insults and har-
assments of the economic police. Joint by vendors of other markets as well as
young and unemployed men, the women marched to the President’s seat, the
Palais de la Présidence, where several thousand protesters gathered. Sékou
Touré addressed the women directly and made the economic police respon-
sible for the vendor’s troubles. Thus, women were not presented as enemies of
the revolution. Nevertheless, the situation did not appease, on the contrary.
The following day, the party organised a meeting at the Palais du Peuple.
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Many women arrived with a red handkerchief, rejecting Touré’s order to dress
in white, and thus symbolically refusing to submit to his reign (Doumbouya
2008, 174–176). The final clash between the army and the women caused
more than 60 deaths and 300 injured women. In some smaller cities of the
interior, similar incidents took place; they lasted until September 7, 1977 (Pau-
thier 2007, 232). Many contemporary witnesses consider this event as the
beginning of a less repressive period of Touré’s regime: “The protests of 1977
constituted a symbolic turn for Sékou Touré and his regime. After this event, he
resumed his foreign diplomacy and appeased his interior policy. In collective
memory, these protests seem to be the only popular response to the dictatorship.
This makes women the most effective actors regarding social mobilisation”
(Pauthier 2007, 232, author’s translation).
The research participants named the protests of 1977 ‘women’s revolt’.
Some of them told me vividly how women insulted the President and how
they were making such a noise that Touré could not speak. Further, they
explained how women nearly assaulted the stage in the Palais du Peuble,
which made the President flee. In these accounts, women were depicted as
very brave and persuaded by their own claims; even the police could not
intimidate them. The research participants considered women to be legitimate
actors to oppose the President.
Reorientation of Women’s Role in Politics during the Conté Period
(1984–2008)
After Touré’s death on March 26, 1984, an interim President was assigned.
But on April 3, the military under General Lansana Conté took power
through a coup d’état. Conté identified as a Susu and was born near Dubréka
in 1934 (Camara 2014, 273). Under Conté’s reign, fundamental changes in
Guinea’s economy took place: Trade was not restricted anymore and foreign
investments were welcomed. The adoption of the Adjustment Program
brought neo-liberal reforms along the will of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), like in numerous other African countries. Consequently, the
public sector was drastically reduced and former state companies were priva-
tised. The rupture between the strict socialist economic policies of the First
Republic and the economic liberalisation during the Second Republic had far-
reaching consequences for the whole population as the gap between those who
have and those who have-not was widening (Camara 2014, 290–314; McGovern
2015). “Women played a pivotal economic role within this context of insecurity
as their involvement in food production and small business became increasingly
indispensable to household survival” (Dessertine 2019, 6).
While especially the merchants profited, the majority of the population
experienced harsh times. This contrariness is reflected in how people remem-
ber the Conté period. A research participant recalls how having money sud-
denly became a crucial factor; without it, no one could go to court, for
example. Others long for the Conté period, because commerce was not
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restricted. ‘I even feel nostalgic about Conté’s time. Then, it was easy to make
money’, a male student said to his friend (naturally occurring talk, 23.11.2012).
Others such as Fode Sow, an elderly, blind man, judged Conté’s economic policy
more critically: “When Lansana Conté came, he said: ‘liberty; everything you
earn is for you.’Merchants but also thieves and liars came and they all profited a
lot. At that moment, this was not liberty any more but debauchery” (interview,
17.10.2011). Many of the research participants remember how, at the beginning
of Conté’s regime, the few factories in Kankan closed because the President had
sold them to foreigners. This resulted in the workers’ suspension. Until today,
Kankan’s population hopes that these factories would reopen one day and thus
creating job opportunities for the unemployed youth.
In the 1990s, Conté slowly opened up Guinea’s political landscape – similar
to many other African countries. The military regime was dissolved and in
1992, political parties were officially recognised (Arieff and McGovern 2013).
Many of the newly established youth, women, and student’s organisations got
integrated in one of the many political parties. Thus, in Mohamed Saliou
Camara’s (2014, 328) view, they “became subsume[d] by party politics and
often ill-defined ideological propaganda.” Nevertheless, many different NGOs
and associations engaged in the promotion of human rights and generally
tried to improve people’s living conditions.
During the campaigns for the subsequent elections, the administrative appara-
tus and the powerful military supported the sitting President and his PUP. In 1993,
Lansana Conté officially won the presidential elections with 51.7 percent of the
votes; Alpha Condé became second with 19.6 percent of the ballots (Camara,
O’Toole, and Baker 2014, 91). Thereafter, the executive and legislative were firmly
in the hands of the head of state, and the regime transformed into a one-party rule.
In 1998, Conté won the presidential elections again. The government arrested
Alpha Condé and imprisoned him for two years (Chambers 2004, 129–130). In
2003, Lansana Conté was declared winner with 95 percent of the votes; however,
the opposition had mostly boycotted the manipulated presidential election
(Chambers 2004, 130). During my research, I heard several accounts of people
who had worked for the public administration at the time. They told me how state
employees were harassed or even fired if they did not join the PUP.
Unlike his predecessor, Lansana Conté and his PUP did not adopt an offi-
cial discourse of women’s promotion. In general, gender was not an impor-
tant issue, neither for the President nor for the government or the political
parties. This partly explains why there is little scholarly work on the topic.
Even though Céline Pauthier (2007), in her analysis on Guinean women’s
social and political mobilisation, focuses on the period between 1945 and
2006, the Conté period – except for the general strikes – does not figure in her
article. The political opening of many African countries in the 1990s pre-
sented a possibility for women to reinforce their claims, and a multitude of new
women’s organisations emerged. Further, throughout the continent donors
increasingly funded women’s associations, therefore making them less depen-
dent from the male dominated patronage networks (Tripp 2003, 234–236).
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Mohamed Saliou Camara (2014, 314) sees in the opening of the Guinean
political landscape the beginning of “politics and policies of women’s libera-
tion.” Elizabeth Schmidt (2005, 13) has a different standpoint. According to
her, “in the early 1990s, Guinea was in the midst of a reactionary backlash
against women and the political, economic, and social gains they had made
during the first two and one-half decades of independence. The military regime
criticized the way in which Sékou Touré and the RDA allegedly had destroyed
the family, broken homes, and violated African culture and Muslim traditions
by emancipating women.”
The Millennium Development Goals (MDG)4 and the Dakar (1994) and
Beijing (1995) UN Platforms for Action5 influenced Conté’s policy for
women: Following these initiatives, the Guinean Ministry for Women’s and
Children’s Affairs started a women’s promotion policy in 1997. Its purposes
were “improving the legal framework for the promotion and protection of
women; institutionally strengthening the empowerment of women; facilitating
the economic self-reliance of women; and strengthening the familial, social,
and cultural role of women along with their societal status” (Camara 2014,
316). The government also adopted some legal reforms to stop women’s dis-
crimination, for example in the domain of inheritance and land ownership.
Additionally, the government promoted women’s education and health care.
Mohamed Saliou Camara (2014, 314–321) is convinced that, consequently,
women’s awareness of their own rights increased.
Women’s Involvement in the General Strikes of 2006 and 2007
As the President’s health deteriorated in the 2000s, power struggles among the
political and military elite intensified and the gap between the elite and the suf-
fering population widened. Especially towards the end of Conté’s regime, impu-
nity and insecurity were notorious, and the drug trade and criminality generally
increased (Camara 2014, 400–402). For the research participants, the years
between 2000 and 2008 have been marked by legal uncertainty, corruption,
and crime. Everything was for the political class and nothing for the popu-
lation, they lamented. Thierno recounted that ministers distributed millions at
concerts to show how wealthy they were. The signs of these embezzlements
were everywhere: Low-ranking civil servants sent their children overseas for
study, constructed villas, and drove expensive cars. A male student said to his
friend in this regard: ‘Everybody ate too much. Even the chicken and the
insects ate’ (naturally occurring talk, 23.11.2012). Here like in other West
African countries, eating is a synonym for the misappropriation of public
funds, a figuratively filling of one’s stomachs. At the time, no one was afraid
of negative consequences, an elderly man in a café explained: ‘Everybody
became a permitted thief ’ (informal conversation, 27.2.2012). According to
Mister Koivogui, who teaches at Kankan’s university, this behaviour was
triggered by the President who had once said: “If you take something, leave a
little bit” (interview, 14.01.2013).
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Living conditions were already difficult at the beginning of the 2000s. They
became even more so when the state abolished subvention for gasoline, caus-
ing a rise in the prices of basic commodities, especially rice. At the same time,
the unemployment rate increased and the Guinean franc was devaluated. The
political opposition was weak, fragmented, and disorganised. The people,
initially apathetic, retreated into the intimate sphere. But the suffering of the
population eventually led to a national crisis, and social unrest culminated in
the general strikes of 2006 and 2007 (International Crisis Group 2005;
McGovern 2007, 126–128).
There had already been calls for strikes by trade unions before 2006, but the
people did not follow them on a large scale. Then, at the end of February 2006,
days of ville morte (dead city) paralysed the capital city (McGovern 2007, 126–
128). On June 8, 2006, the trade unions launched the next general strike. It
spread throughout the country and resulted in violent confrontations between
the strikers and the security forces. In January and February 2007, yet another
general strike tied up the country (Gerdes 2009, 5).6 The trade unions’ major
demands were the creation of an inclusive government under a prime minster,
the separation of powers, the fight against corruption and bad governance,
and, most importantly, the general improvement of the population’s living
conditions (Camara 2014, 388–392). The government brutally reacted to the
protests (International Crisis Group 2007a, 2007b; Human Rights Watch
2007a, 2007b). In February 2007, the trade unions and the government signed
an accord. Subsequently, Lansana Conté installed Lansana Kouyaté as new
Prime Minister, but this did not change anything regarding the fact that poli-
tical power was still in the President’s hands (Schroven 2010b, 668). Michelle
Engeler (2008), accordingly, talks about an “unfinished revolution.”
These general strikes incorporated all sectors of the Guinean society; they
were especially marked by the massive participation of young people and
women across ethnic boundaries. Sory N’Nay Bérété, a young male graduate,
said: “Because this movement was supported by the whole Guinean popula-
tion, it made a huge impression on me. Everybody dashed forward in this
battle” (interview, 24.12.2012). According to Céline Pauthier (2007, 232–237),
the Guinean population regarded women who protested as legitimate actors
to express their grievances. She illustrates this with the following example she
witnessed: In February and March 2006, a rumour circulated announcing a
women’s protest, which in the end proved untrue. Nevertheless, when the
author asked the research particpants, “every person interrogated on the
subject agreed upon the idea that a mobilization by women would enjoy total
legitimacy and would prove to be more efficient than one organized by other
political or social actors. […] In a diffuse manner, women were considered
best positioned to launch the mobilization: after them, every category of the
population would follow” (Pauthier 2007, 220, author’s translation).
The women protesting emphasised that their protests were not political; they
just wanted to fight against difficult living conditions. There are several reasons
for this behaviour: The political parties did not enjoy a good reputation and
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were largely discredited. They usually belonged to so-called Big Men who
pursued their own political, social, and economic goals. Furthermore, women
were afraid of repressions by the security forces. This example once again
demonstrates that throughout Guinea’s history, women mobilised whenever
the social and economic situation prevented them from fulfilling their social
duties as mothers and wives.
Female Victims during the ‘Transitional Period’ (2008–2010)
When Lansana Conté died in December 2008, the country had “reached a point
of socio-political exhaustion comparable to where it was at President Touré’s
death 24 years earlier” (Camara 2014, 392). Immediately after his death, a group
of military men calling themselves National Council for Democracy and Devel-
opment (Conseil National pour la Démocratie et le Développement, CNDD)
seized power in a bloodless coup d’état. They declared Captain Moussa Dadis
Camara as the country’s President. Dadis Camara, born in 1964 and originating
from the Forest Region, promised to organise democratic and free elections and
initially said he would not stand for office (Engeler 2008, 97–98). Throughout the
country, the coup by the CNDD was welcomed. The population expected that
the military regime would bring stability, enforce the rule of law, fight corrup-
tion, and finally lead to the democratisation of the country (McGovern 2015,
247). Due to Dadis Camara’s relatively young age, the youth were especially
enthusiastic about the new President, hoping, amongst other things, that he
would effectively tackle youth unemployment (Camara 2014, 415–419).
When the CNDD postponed the presidential and legislative elections again
and again, the population resumed protesting (Arieff 2010, 1). On September
28, 2009, the anniversary of Guinea’s rejection of de Gaulle’s constitution,
Guinean security forces opened fire on opposition members. The latter were
protesting peacefully in the Conakry stadium against the President’s intention
to stand for presidency – against his initial declaration. Altogether, over 150
people died and many more were injured. Many of the protesting oppositional
women and girls were subjected to extremely brutal sexual violence. According
to Human Rights Watch (2009, 61–62), the high level of sexual violence sug-
gests that it had been organised by high-ranking officers and was not the result
of individual acts. In the context of Guinea’s mostly Muslim society, these
events traumatised the girls and women, not least because they feared being
rejected by their families due to the stigma attached to victims of sexual vio-
lence (Human Rights Watch 2009; International Crisis Group 2009). Subse-
quently, the security forces covered up the bloody event. To date, the Guinean
government has not fully investigated this massacre and the sexual violence
involved; thus, it has not delivered justice to the victims and their families
(Human Rights Watch 2017, 2019). Then, on December 3, 2009, Aboubakar
‘Toumba’ Diakite, a member of his guard, shot Dadis Camara in the head.
Soon after, the injured junta leader was flown to Morocco for medical treat-
ment from where he went to exile in Burkina Faso.
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Interestingly, almost all research participants appreciated the short reign of
Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, mainly because of his achievement to rein-
stall law and order. He was, for example, able to reduce crimes such as
thievery and drug trafficking. A farmer, born in the 1960s, stated that the
theft of cows had almost stopped. ‘He brought back the order in this country’
a man in a café stated (informal conversation, 15.01.2013). Moreover, corrupt
practices were reduced and the economic downfall stopped. According to the
research participants, Dadis Camara immediately ‘started to work’ after the
coup d’état; its results could be seen at once. A typical statement was that
Dadis Camara was appreciated by everyone in Guinea, regardless of their
ethnic background. The shooting on September 28, 2009, did not lessen the
positive judgment of his reign. Djénabou, for example, agreed with the fol-
lowing statement by an eighty-year-old Manding woman: ‘September 28 was
the opposition’s fault. Dadis [Camara] told them not to go on the streets that
day. They should have chosen another date. Now September 28 has a negative
connotation, which is sad’ (informal conversation, 09.02.2013).
Nevertheless, I also heard voices which said that the Guinean population
had enough of being governed by a military; that the latter generally ‘ate too
much money’. Typically, the research participants considered Dadis Camara’s
moodiness as problematic and criticised his behaviour when dealing with
elderly people: ‘He did not know how to talk to the people, he really insulted
them’ (informal discussion, 20.11.2012). I was told that the positive attitude
towards Dadis Camara changed when he considered to run for the presidency.
But overall, the research participants would welcome his return from Burkina
Faso where he has been living since 2010.
On January 15, 2010, along the Ouagadougou Declaration, a ‘government
of national unity’ headed by the former Vice-President of the CNDD-gov-
ernment, General Sékouba Konaté, was formed. Long-time opposition leader
Jean-Marie Doré became Prime Minister and the trade unionist Hadja
Rabiatou Sèrah Diallo headed the CNT (Arieff 2010, 1–2). Although the
‘Government of National Unity’ was challenged from many sides, it finally
succeeded in organising presidential elections in June 2010, not least because
of massive international pressure (Camara 2016).
Conclusions: Guinea’s Historical Trajectory and Gender
Women and the Guinean State up to the Mid-1980s
In this chapter, I was looking at the research participants’ subjective experi-
ences and their memories of Guinea’s past and especially at women’s con-
tribution to Guinea’s state formation. I was researching how Guinea’s heads
of state and their governments have imagined women’s place in society.
During the pre-colonial era, the processes of setting up a household, in the Milo
River Valley were strongly linked to state-building. Some (postmenopausal)
women, who were well connected and respected because of their Islamic
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knowledge and the adhesiveness of their households, could exert indirect
political influence. Their influence, however, decreased during the colonial era.
The French administrators did not use the domestic sphere to articulate and
enlarge their political power. Informed by French republicanisms’ ideas of
gender relation of the nineteenth century (Creevey 1991, 356), the colonisers
wanted to improve African women’s status. By 1930, some young women living
in the Kankan area could benefit from formal education (Rivière 1971, 104).
Further, the French gave women the right to divorce in colonial courts (Goerg
2007). All in all, however, the French colonisers created a masculinist system of
rule that “opened some opportunities for women, but […] also funnelled them to
particular roles and subjected them to new constraints and restrictions”
(Osborn 2011, 9).
Women were, then again, very present in the nationalist movement that
fought for independence. Did this mobilisation have a lasting impact on gender
relations in the country? For Elizabeth Schmidt (2002, 115) “[w]omen’s
emancipation in Guinea was but a brief interlude.” She notes that, generally
women accepted their undervaluation and subordination, “they violated gender
roles to create conditions in which they once again could fulfil those same
gender roles” (Schmidt 2005, 142). Drawing on general patterns in the history
of women’s mobilisation on the African continent, Aili Mari Tripp (2003, 235)
reminds us that women’s organisations primarily focused “around religious,
welfare and domestic” issues and not on political concerns. Filomina Chioma
Steady (2011, 62) on the contrary, claims that Guinean women did not limit
themselves to the domestic sphere. She argues that the nationalists’ struggle
against “multiple layers of inequality” generated “a type of African feminism.”
Claude Rivière (1968, 407) agrees that Guinean women’s political conscious was
raised in the decade before independence. The research participants, too, praised
women for their involvement in the nationalist movement.
This chapter has illustrated that the socialist period of the First Republic
was full of contradictions. Therefore, the memories of Sékou Touré’s reign are
controversially and emotionally discussed amongst the research participants.
Only two issues are mostly incontestably seen as Touré’s accomplishments,
namely the achievement of independence and the feeling of national unity he
invoked. The most negative aspects of his reign are the committed human
right abuses, the subsequent exodus of Guineans, and the poor records in
economic development (Arieff and McGovern 2013, 201; Camara 2014,
228–236). Interestingly, I could often sense a certain nostalgia for the Touré
period, similar to what Mike McGovern (2007, 2017) describes. He argues
that Guinea’s first regime outlived its period in power through its symbo-
lisms and its socialist solidarity.
How effective were Sékou Touré’s measures to foster female emancipation?
For Pierre Hanry (1970, 74–75) women’s emancipation was encouraged
mostly through Touré’s speeches but did not change the daily lives of ordinary
women. Lansiné Kaba (1977, 30) reminds us of women’s substantial con-
tribution in the country’s struggles for independence. After 1958, women were
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present at all levels of the party and the administration. However, women’s
poor literacy rate had a negative effect on women’s advancement. Céline
Pauthier (2007, 225–229) emphasises that even if Touré wanted to make
women active agents of the proclaimed Revolution, he still addressed them in
their roles as wives, sisters, or mothers. Women actively took part in party
politics, but their function was not to take decisions. Their role was to dance,
chant, and spread the party’s message. Women were, under the dictatorship of
the ruling party, only allowed to disperse the regime’s ideology. This, however,
is not a Guinean peculiarity but a typical feature of African one-party
regimes (Tripp 2003, 235–236). Nevertheless, the URFG was a social space
where women could make new experiences of organisation and speaking
publicly. Anna Dessertine (2019, 5) argues that “despite a progressive political
investment in women, measures in favor of gender equality were not effec-
tively enforced and Sékou Touré’s regime paradoxically helped confirm
women’s affiliation with the domestic sphere.” Hence, Céline Pauthier (2007,
229, author’s translation) concludes: “The discourse on female emancipation
is marked by a fundamental ambiguity: if women are really put in front of the
social actors, their role is defined in an authoritarian manner by serving the
revolution, where their domestic and family talents are somehow transferred
from the private to the public sphere.”
Mohamed Saliou Camara (2014, 164–166) on the contrary, is convinced that
the PDG’s women policies were successful in the domains of education,
employment, and political participation. Gender equality was the party’s goal
not only rhetorically, but it was also put into practice. He stresses that not the
party but her own family hindered a woman’s advancement during the Touré
era. Mike McGovern (2007, 137, author’s translation), too, sees the lasting
effects of Touré’s gender policy: Sékou Touré “was sincerely engaged in favour of
a mobilisation which distinctive features were multi-ethnic, multi-generational
without sexual discrimination. He achieved effective and lasting effects. Nobody
did more for the promotion of women’s status in his country than Touré.”
One might conclude that women’s engagement in institutional politics
during the Touré era was contradictory: On the one hand, the Guinean state
looked at women as one category. This went hand in hand with the proclaimed
view of the single party: There were ‘the Guinean people’ who were not sepa-
rated along generational, ethnical, class, or gender lines. Women actively took
part in the various entities of the PDA. This engagement gave them a feeling of
being integrated into the nation-building process, and therefore an important
element of Revolutionary Guinea. At that time, women’s political engagement
was widely accepted. On the other hand, this did not mean that the regime
invited women to look for solutions to their problems or those of their society.
On the contrary, the party was setting the agenda, women had to follow.
Moreover, the different women committees were an effective means to control
the female population. Nevertheless, as the example of the 1977 women’s pro-
tests illustrates, women sometimes left the predetermined path and publicly
showed their malcontent with the government’s policies. Touré’s speeches,
44 Gender throughout Guinean History
women’s mobilisation within the URFG, and especially the respect they earned
through the manifestations of 1977 have a lasting effect to this day: Women
protesting publicly have a special legitimacy.
Women and the Guinean State since the Mid-1980s
After twenty-six years of rule by charismatic Sékou Touré and his socialist
one-party state, the Guinean population again experienced a period of
twenty-four years marked by just one authoritarian President, Lansana
Conté. During both regimes, the head of state symbolised the embodiment of
power. Both periods were characterised by violence, the oppression of (ima-
gined) political opponents, and general difficult living conditions for the
majority of the population. While the economy was highly regulated during
the Touré era, the Conté government moved over to neoliberal economic
promoted by the World Bank and the IMF.
The judgments of the Conté period differ. As Ramata Bangoura, an elderly
woman, accurately put it: “It was both, like paradise and hell at the same time”
(interview, 09.02.2013), depending on whether or not you profited from Conté’s
policies. The President’s creation of the multiparty system was seen as a big
accomplishment. Elderly people who still remembered the permanent fear of the
Touré era also praised Conté for the increase in freedom of speech. Then again,
research participants criticised Conté for neglecting the educational sector.
Especially the last years of Lansana Conté’s reign were difficult. Madame
Kouyaté, a local female leader, recalled: “He was not even the nation’s father,
but its grandfather. A grandfather in a way that Guinea went beyond liberty”
(interview, 21.11.2011). Here, the idealised image of the head of state as the
nation’s father comes up again. According to Madame Kouyaté, Conté did not
care for his population, as he did not provide them food. Additionally, he did not
punish his children if they disregarded the laws. Thus, he was not regarded as the
nation’s father. On the contrary, Lansana Conté was their too lenient grand-
father. As already mentioned, the mismanagement and the corrupt practices
under his regime annoyed the people: A female vendor concluded that “he did
nothing at all for the population” (interview, 15.11.2011).
The research participants in Kankan see in the First Republic a time of national
unity where ethnic belonging was of minor relevance. With the political opening
during the Second Republic, however, ethnicity became a central factor. While
Touré integrated women into his state-building project, and put much emphasis on
female emancipation, women were not put on the front stage during the Conté
period. Since 1965, February 9 was a national holiday when the death of the
heroic figure M’Balia Camara, who had died in the struggles against colonialism
in 1955, was commemorated (Pauthier 2007, 227–228). Lansana Conté showed
the rupture with the PDG ideology also symbolically when he decided to resche-
dule the National Women’s Day from February 9 to August 27, as a memory of
the women’s protests in 1977 (Camara 2014, 315). In 2005, the National Women’s
Day was again changed to February (McGovern 2007, 137).
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The Conté government signed international treaties and thus officially adop-
ted regulations to enforce women’s rights (Touré 2013, 93), but he did so mostly
to please the ‘International Community’. Since 2000, the female population
suffered alongside men as their buying power diminished. From what I learned,
Conté did not put an emphasis on women, neither on the political nor on the
social level. He was not interested in the people – be it woman or man – Sidiki
Kaba, a man working at the university, stated. Conté did not change anything in
favour of the female population; he was only interested in his power, Kaba
explained (interview, 06.12.2012). During Conté’s last years in power, the Gui-
nean population feared their country would collapse into civil war like neigh-
bouring countries had. At that time, attacks on cars on rural streets but also in
the middle of cities occurred daily, some research participants remembered.
They saw the general strikes of 2006 and 2007 and the tense situation during the
presidential election in 2010 in a stark contrast to the stable Touré regime.
The general strikes of 2006 and 2007 were marked by women’s massive
mobilisation. Even though women’s claims were ostensibly economical in
nature, women’s demands were highly political. Many of the research partici-
pants stressed that these general strikes were crucial for women’s self-concep-
tion and their engagement in the political arena. Interestingly, no woman told
me that she actively took part. This, however, does not mean that women in
Kankan did not engage in the protests. It could rather hint at a characteristic
of Kankan’s female population: Kankan’s women typically do not like being
associated with anything that is regarded as political. When women make
economic claims, for example, that the general living conditions of ordinary
people must improve, they mostly do not consider these actions as political.
Women rather choose to frame these claims within their social roles as mothers,
wives, or sisters. They say, for example, that they are unable to fulfil their obli-
gations as mothers to nourish their children. Summing up, Anna Dessertine
(2019, 1) aptly notes that throughout the Guinean history, “female political
mobilizations appear as an indispensable advantage for state power when they
are deployed in support of it, but these mobilizations can likewise disrupt and
generate major problems for the state when they are directed against it.”
Notes
1 Minor parts and earlier versions of this chapter have been published in the follow-
ing article: Ammann, Carole. 2018. “Political Parties and Participation: Guinea.”
In Encyclopedia of Women & Islamic Cultures (EWIC), edited by Suad Joseph.
Leiden: Brill Online. Reprinted with the publisher’s permission.
2 According to Jacqueline Knörr and Wilson Trajano Filho, the Upper Guinean
Coast covers (parts of) the following countries: Gambia, (southern) Senegal,
Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia (Knörr and Filho 2010, 2).
3 See, for example, Claude Rivière (1971), Adamoleku Ladipo (1976), Lansiné Kaba
(1976a, 1976b, 1977), Ibrahima Baba Kaké (1987), Alpha Ousmane Barry (2002),
Mike McGovern (2002, 2007, 2017), Mohamed Saliou Camara (2005, 2014), Jay
Straker (2007a, 2007b, 2009), Christian Højbjerg (2010), André Lewin (2010),
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Alexis Arieff and Mike McGovern (2013), Céline Pauthier (2013), Michelle Engeler
(2019), and Anita Schroven (2019).
4 One of the MDG’s eight primary goals was to promote gender equality and
empower women, cf. http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/gender.shtml (accessed
23.08.2019).
5 https://beijing20.unwomen.org/en/about (accessed 23.08.2019).
6 This strike was triggered amongst others by the President’s interference in an
ongoing judicial investigation (Camara 2014, 382–388). For more details on the
general strikes and the Guinean trade unions and their main demands, see the
reports and articles by the International Crisis Group (2007a, 2007b), Mike
McGovern (2007), and Anita Schroven (2010a, 178–190; 2019, 160–171). For the
turbulent months until the President’s death in 2008, see Michelle Engeler (2008).
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2 Contested Presidential Elections
in 2010
Introduction – Between Everyday Interactions and Scapegoating1
Ethnicity was an important issue of contestation during the time of my
field research: It kept popping up in online news, on the radio, in everyday
conversations at the market or in cafés, and during interviews, informal
conversations, and naturally occurring talks. From time to time, harsh
discussions about ethnic identity also occurred in the courtyard I was
living in. One day at the end of January 2012, I was coming home for
lunch. Diaka was sitting on a footstool cooking. Madame Fofana,
Mariam Bah, Diaka’s friend and our neighbour, and Abdoulaye Traoré,
another friend of Diaka’s, were sitting around her and hotly debating the
issue of ethnicity. Their conversation intrigued me, if only because I had
never witnessed such a heated debate in the yard before. Mariam claimed
that she had left Kankan the day after the presidential elections because,
as a Fulani, she feared for her safety:
Some Manding extremists even threw stones over the wall into our
courtyard. My name, along with those of two other Fulani persons, had
been placed on a hit list. I was extremely afraid! I did not go out on the
streets wearing my UFDG-shirt anymore!
(Field notes, 28.01.2012)
According to Mariam, after Cellou Dallein Diallo and his Union of Demo-
cratic Forces of Guinea (Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée, UFDG)
had received 52 percent of the votes in the first round, Alpha Condé
manipulated the system and, as a result, was eventually declared the winner
of the elections. Abdoulaye, who supported former Prime Minister Lansana
Kouyaté (who happens to be a Manding) of the Party of Hope for National
Development (Parti de l’Espoire pour le Développement National, PEDN),
Madame Fofana, and Diaka contradicted Mariam. During this debate, all
four resorted to generalisations that exemplified the ethnic stereotypes about
the Manding and the Fulani that were so widespread in those days. Mariam,
for example made a statement the like of which one would hear in Fulani
circles across the country: ‘We [Fulani], have everything, money, education,
everything. We only lack political power. One day, we will get that too!’ (field
notes, 28.01.2012).
In Kankan, interethnic cohabitation is nothing new and ethnic fraction
does not always become apparent in daily life. When the conversations turned
to ethnicity, many of the research participants stressed that interactions
between the different ethnic groups have a long history and that inter-ethnic
marriages are a common occurrences. Mister Nabé, the vice-mayor and a
Manding, explained, for example, that he could not criticise the Fulani as one
of his wives is half Manding, half Fulani. He added that insulting one’s own
family is not appropriate (informal conversation, 03.02.2012). This reference
to the long history of inter-ethnic marriages is used nationwide to alleviate
tensions (Schroven 2019, 13). In Kankan, people also hinted at the fact that
many Fulani were born in the city and have lived there ever since. The same
holds true for Manding living in the Fouta Djallon. Not all Fulani living in
Kankan speak Maninkakan, but most of them can understand the language
after having spent some time in the city. I also got to know many Fulani who
are fluent in the newly learned language. Even though Maninkakan is the
main language on the local radio stations, regular programmes are broadcast
in Pulaar as well. The same holds true for the Islamic prayers.
At the local level, some associative organisations are ethnically exclusive,
including student organisations at the University of Kankan. Nevertheless, most
associations in Kankan are inclusive. That is often the case of the sèrè, which are
age-set associations found across Guinea, particularly in large urban communities.
During social events, where different cultural symbols are displayed, usually
people of Manding and Fulani ethnicity interact with one another in harmony.
Sometimes I heard people expressing their astonishment about the different cul-
tural practices. I also witnessed a marriage of a Manding couple where the Fulani
have been praised in songs. As far as some of the research participants are con-
cerned, national identity is more important than ethnicity. One such research
participant is Saa Daffé, born in the mid-1980s of a family from the Forest
Region. He stated: “If you tell me I am Kissi, I will emphatically retort that I am
Guinean. I need not tell you I am Kissi, I am Forestier. That is because I am
Guinean, and I can live anywhere in Guinea” (interview, 14.12.2011). This dis-
course related to the promotion of the Guinean nationality goes back to Sékou
Touré. Like Saa Daffé in the citation above, the political elite and ordinary citizens
alike regularly refer to the notion of the Guinean family. As Nomi Dave (2017,
116) convincingly demonstrates, these “calls for unity around the Guinean family
are in effect calls for political loyalty and against dissident.”
Considerations about Ethnic Politics
Gender research has extensively demonstrated that we all have multiple,
shifting identities, which are constantly invented, negotiated, contested, and
combined according to specific situations. The importance of specific
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identities changes through time and space. Ethnicity is one component of a
person’s identity, very much like other social categories such as age, gender,
race, class, nationality, religion, sexual orientation, or educational and work-
ing background. Ethnicity is always a relational concept as ethnic groups
draw boundaries that create insiders and outsiders. However, these boundaries
are blurred, flexible, and can change over time and from place to place.
Ethnic groups usually refer to a common history, belonging, and language;
they ascribe to themselves certain cultural characteristics and, sometimes,
specific physical traits as well (Beer 2012, 63–65).
Scholars argue that identities in pre-colonial Africa were “relatively fluid,
permeable, overlapping and complex” (Lynch 2013, 96). This changed to
some extend during colonialism and state formation after independence
(Berman, Eyoh, and Kymlicka 2004). One important discussion among
academics regarding ethnicity is the question of whether ethnicity is com-
pletely constructed or whether there is an essential, non-changing core to it.
While for situationalists or constructivists ethnicity is constructed, it has,
according to essentialists or premordialists, an immoveable core (Lynch
2013). In my understanding, ethnicity is highlighted in certain moments –
or concealed, for that matter – for example to legitimise one’s share of the
cake, whereas in others, ethnicity does not play a role: Intermarriages are
normal and an everyday life is shared. Thus, ethnicity is relational and
situational. It is an “open-ended and dynamic processes of social and poli-
tical creation” (Berman 2010, 3).
Identity politics is not a new phenomenon; human history is full of it.
Various authors have observed that ethnicity can become a highly politicised
issue, especially in times of economic scarcity and political competition
(Eriksen 2001 [1995]; Dorman, Hammett, and Nugent 2007; Berman 2010).
Empirical research generally blames political elites for acting like entrepre-
neurs that politicise ethnicity to mobilise their supporters. Numerous studies
warn against the excesses of identity politics as it may cause social division
and conflict. However, it is more fruitful to closely investigate how the state,
its institutions, electoral systems, and laws influence issues of identity than to
generally condemn identity politics, as Avigail Eisenberg and Will Kymlicka
(2011, 7–8) remind us.
Politics, political participation, and access to state resources are often
linked to the proverbial Big Men – and to a less extent to Big Women – and
the moral economy in which they are embedded, as it was observed in dif-
ferent West African countries. People think their leader, once in power, would
reward his or her clients for their support and, thus, they would be able to
have their share of the state’s resources. When addressing this amalgamation
between public and private property, authors usually use the concept of neo-
patrimonialism. Another related concept is that of clientelism, which refers to
the “existence of personal ties of dependence based on mutual, albeit highly
unequal, ‘services’ and forms of patron-client redistribution” (Olivier de
Sardan 2008, 5–6).
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In Guinea, like in many other West African states, single-party systems
dominated politics until the late 1980s. At the same time, the states’ cap-
abilities shrank as they were struggling with the adverse effects of the World
Bank and IMF-devised reforms known as Structural Adjustment Programs
due to which an increased struggle over state resources ensued. The new
situation increased ethnically based patronage (Young 2007, 251; Berman
2010, 15–18). The (partial) opening of the political landscape and the intro-
duction of a multi-party system in 1992 intensified the political competition in
Guinea. Thereafter, tendencies towards a voting behaviour according to
ethnic identities could be observed (Groelsema 1998).
Democratisation allowed ethnic affiliations to reach new heights as newly
elected politicians sought ‘our turn to eat,’ and the politics of the belly revealed
the personal, materialistic, and opportunistic character of politics and the rela-
tive unimportance of ideology, principal, or policy in the circumscribed political
sphere. This contestation is especially fierce during presidential elections as the
system of winner-takes-all “increase[…] smaller communities’ fear of domina-
tion by larger groups, the increasingly inequitable distribution of wealth, and
their ultimate exclusion from access to the state” (Berman 2010, 26). Conse-
quently, election periods are often marked by tensions and violent outbreaks,
especially if polls follow conflict or a transition period and when the electoral
process and its outcome are highly contested (Mehler 2007).
Personal relationships and trust within ethnic communities can provide access
to, as well as protection against, an unpredictable state or specific groups. As the
state is the most powerful actor offering jobs and contacts, patrimonial practices
within the state can be used as means to promote ethnic favouritism, as it has
been the case under Touré and Conté. Self-ascribed voter identity is influenced
by the “hope of future assistance and the fear of losing out if ethnic ‘others’ gain
power” (Lynch 2013, 103). As we shall see, this argument is frequently used in
Guinea to unite against the Fulani. Gabrielle Lynch (2013, 104) argues that
research should therefore not only focus on elites that manipulate ethnicity but
also look at the “highly personalized and localized nature” of politics and at
ordinary people’s agency who pressure their leader(s) to redistribute state
resources. Such everyday politics take place during gatherings of political parties,
in markets, cafés, or through the community radio.
Imagining an Ethicised Past
The history of ethnic and regional competitions in Guinea is long. The gov-
ernment and the population consider their own country as being divided into
four geographical regions and four major ethnic groups. The image of a geo-
graphically and ethnically quartered country goes back to colonial roots, as
Odile Goerg (2011) convincingly explains; it remains a practice in popular and
administrative discourse today. As soon as political parties were authorised in
1946, the affiliation along ethnic lines began. At that time, most of the women’s
associations for example, represented just one ethnic group (Schmidt 2002,
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2007). At the referendum of 1958, the percentage of no-voters was lower in the
Fouta Djallon than in the rest of the country (Goerg, Pauthier, and Diallo
2010, 6) – a fact that was still mentioned by some research participants.
After independence, Sékou Touré, a Manding, was strongly influenced by
Pan-Africanist ideologies of unity. His unification policies were aimed, as in
other African countries, at nationalisation processes against ethnicity. One
element of the nation-building process was to do away with ethnic and
regional differences and consequently, Touré abolished ethnic based parties to
foster national unity (Højbjerg 2007; McGovern 2012). However, his “politics
of ethnicity was double-voiced”, as McGovern (2017, 56) states. Many
Manding obtained positions in the military and the administration. Especially
after the Portuguese invasion of Conakry in 1970, prominent Fulani – but
also individuals of other ethnic groups – suffered persecution and fled the
country (Smith 2006; Arieff and McGovern 2013). Which ethnic group has
been the one most oppressed under Touré’s autocracy remains a hotly deba-
ted issue. Nonetheless, the Fulani are known to predominantly use the image
of their victimisation by the Touré regime to take particular stances in the
new political environment (Schoven 2016). Mohamed Saliou Camara (2014,
271) is convinced that even tough ethnicity was ostensibly of minor relevance
during the Touré-period, it played an important role inside the PDG.
During the Touré-era, the (Manding) business class became a scapegoat
whereby merchants, in particular, were accused of undermining the national
economy for personal gain. The trend continued during the reign of Lansana
Conté and is still in use under the current regime. “We find a heritage of this
period […] [in] the omnipresent rhetoric (of the government as well as of
ordinary people) that considers merchants to be greedy saboteurs and not as
entrepreneurs who ‘naturally’ want to keep their profit margins” (McGovern
2007, 134–135, author’s translation).
When General Lansana Conté came to power, a number of key adminis-
trative and military positions came under individuals of his Susu ethnic group.2
The coup attempt by the Manding Diarra Traoré in July 1984 had lasting
consequences for inter-ethnic relations in Guinea: In Conakry, in particular, on
the night of the coup attempt, crowds of Conté supporters enacted revenge by
looting and destroying Manding homes and businesses. The following day,
Conté attempted to legitimise the riots in an address to his supporters, saying:
“wo fataara!” which, in the Susu language means: “Their actions [destruction
of Manding property] were justified” (Camara 2014, 273–283). According to
Mohamed Saliou Camara (2014, 283), the “massive persecution of the Man-
denka elite gave rise to yet another pattern of ethnic victimization in Guinea’s
political culture.”
Here, Camara hints at a crucial point. The Manding research participants
vividly recalled the events surrounding the coup attempt. I heard stories of
how some victims of the riots fled the capital city and arrived in Kankan
having lost all their belongings. Kankan’s Manding populations see in this
event the beginning of the ethnicisation of the administration and the
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politicisation of ethnicity in Guinea. They allege that following the failed
coup (known in popular parlance as ‘Coup Diarra’), government positions
were increasingly staffed with members of the Susu and Fulani groups while
Manding technocrats were associated with the defunct Touré regime and the
‘Diarra group’ and expelled from such positions.
Historically, the Manding dominated trade in Guinea, particularly long-
distance trade. A locally well-known comedian explained that in Kankan
during the Touré regime, trade was in the hands of the Manding; The Fulani
raised cattle, worked as bakers, or did other smaller work (informal con-
versation, 18.01.2013). When Conté reformed the economic sector, many
nationally and internationally well-connected Fulani businessmen entered
commerce. The permanent establishment of Fulani traders led to increased
competition between Manding and Fulani merchants (International Crisis
Group 2011; Bah 2016, 11). In 2003, Conté accused the businessmen of
speculating with staple food (International Crisis Group 2003). This has not
been the only time he publicly blamed merchants of being saboteurs (McGo-
vern 2007). By doing this, Conté indirectly accused the Fulani of illegally
benefitting. As Paul Chambers (2004, 142, author’s translation) put it, he
“dangerously played with the inter-communitarian cleavage to exculpate from
his own responsibilities. Thus, other ethnic groups accused the Fulani, who
controlled the large majority of the petty trade in Conakry, of enriching
themselves on the expense of other communities.”
Many of the research participants, both Fulani and Manding, agree that
the Fulani have increasingly dominated trade and commerce from the Conté-
era onwards. Fulani merchants typically remember the time of the Second
Republic positively: They benefited from economic liberties and profited
therefore. A man in a café, like others, ascribes to the Fulani a business sense,
which he admires: ‘The Fulani are shrewd businesspersons and clever people’
(field notes, 13.02.2013). The following statement by a thirty-year old woman
is typical of the Fulani self-image: ‘Without us Fulani, nothing works in this
country’ (field notes, 21.02.2012). However, many of the Manding research
participants blamed the Fulani merchants for the ever-rising food prices using
terms similar to those that Lansana Conté did in 2003. Mohamed Saliou
Camara’s (2014, 271) verdict of who is to blame for the increase of ethnic
politics in Guinea is clear: “Indeed, although ethnicity has long played a role
in Guinean politics, thus causing most of Guinea’s current major political
parties to evolve along ethno-regionalist lines, there is ample evidence to
support the view that ethnicity degenerated into systemic ethnocentricity in
Guinea during the rule of General Lansana Conté’s regime.”
Aminata Camara, a female market official and member of the RPG, con-
curs with Camara. She lamented: “Conté abused power while dividing the
Guinean people. He said: You the Susu, do not allow the Manding to rule
you; you the Fulani, do not allow the Susu to rule you; you the people from
the Forest Region, do not allow the Fulani to rule you. In this way, he pitted
Guineans against one another” (interview, 31.01.2012). Mamadou Diouma
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Bah (2016, 13) has another point of view: “President Conté’s instrumental
approach to ethnicity produced a degree of ethnic balancing. Being from a
minority group, President Conté’s ethnic group’s ability to dominate and
exclude the larger groups – the Malinkés and the Fulanis – was minimal,
thereby less threatening to their long-term group interest.”
From what I learned, ethnicity was a decisive factor in everyday life and
institutional politics, even if it did not turn into (large scale) violence. It must
be noted, however, that there have been momentous instances of public
actions when ethnicity was relegated to the backburner. The general strikes of
2006 and 2007 were one such instance during which people of all ethnic
backgrounds rallied behind the trade unions and demanded change. Thierno
argues that the Fulani played an active role in the strikes, an argument that
the International Crisis Group (2007) shares.
To recapitulate, in Guinea, ethnic and regional cleavages go hand in hand.
As the International Crisis Group (2011, 4) has noted, ethnic politics has been
an issue throughout the country’s history: “Ethnicity’s role in Guinean political
history is itself a strategic issue. In every community, you can find people who
will tell you they have been discriminated against and who look for and find
evidence of this throughout their country’s history.” While ethnicity was, at
times, not an important issue of contestation, such as during the general strikes
at the end of Conté’s reign, the politicisation of ethnicity increased at times
such as before, during, and after the presidential elections of 2010.
Contested Presidential Elections: Cellou Dalein Diallo against
Alpha Condé
Alpha Condé, Guinea’s president since 2010, was born in Boké in 1938. When
he was fifteen years old, he emigrated to France where he studied economics and
law. After his doctorate in public law at the University of Sorbonne, he taught
there as a professor for more than ten years. Due to Alpha Condé’s engagement
against the PDG during his exile in France, Sékou Touré sentenced him to death
in 1970 in absentia. Condé returned to Guinea from his exile in 1990 and stood
for the presidency in 1993 and again in 1998. After the presidential elections in
1998, Lansana Conté condemned Condé to five years in prison, because he was
accused of having left Guinea illegally and of having planned a coup d’état to
overthrown the president. In 2001, he was prematurely set free (Camara,
O’Toole, and Baker 2014, 91). Alpha Condé promoted an image of him as the
eternal fighter for democracy who had also accepted to suffer personally for his
convictions. Since 2010, he has been married to Djènè Kaba Condé.
The First Round
Being Guinea’s first officially ‘democratic’ presidential elections, the competi-
tion over who would preside over the country was fierce. One reason for this
is the prevailing the-winner-takes-all policy that enables the president’s party
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to staff the posts in the administration with their own people. Another cause
is, as Mohamed Saliou Camara (2014, 431) writes, that:
experience has proven that if presidential elections precede legislative
elections, the political party or coalition that gets its candidate elected is
more likely to win the legislative majority. To many opposition leaders,
this implied that, unless they find ways in which to influence the pre-
sidential election and position their respective parties and coalitions for
cabinet and legislative positions, they run the risk of becoming hardly
relevant in the immediate post-transition period, at best, and in decades
to come, at worst.3
According to Alexis Arieff and Mike McGovern, the first round in June was
“widely judged to have been flawed but credible” (Arieff and McGovern 2013,
217). The Supreme Court readjusted the results published by the Independent
National Electoral Commission (Commission Electorale Nationale Indé-
pendante, CENI) after most candidates had contested them. This, however,
did not change anything for the fact that Cellou Dalein Diallo (UFDG) with
43.7 percent and Alpha Condé (RPG) with 18.3 percent of the votes qualified
for the second round, which was then rescheduled many times, mostly
because of disputes over the neutrality of the CENI. Only when Sékouba
Konaté finally appointed the Malian Siaka Toumani Sangaré as the CENI’s
president could the second round take place on November 7, 2010 (Camara
2014, 435–438). I was once sitting in a café and overheard a discussion
among young men. They all agreed that the appointment of a foreigner as the
CENI’s head has been crucial for the execution of the second round. Exactly
because Sangaré was Malian, the Guinean population considered him as
neutral and could thus accept his decisions, the young men stressed (field
notes, 10.10.2011).
Already during the first round, both leading candidates were princi-
pally supported in their places of origin: While the Fulani Diallo gained
more than 80 percent of the votes in some prefectures of the Fouta
Djallon, the Manding Condé received around 72 percent in the region of
Kankan (Union Européenne 2011, 52–54). Mister Koivogui, a lecturer at
the Julius Nyéréré University in Kankan who was born in the 1960s,
explained:
Your first base is your ethnicity. This is a situation people have accepted
like this and it was demonstrated during the last elections where the
Upper Guinea Region voted for the Manding, the Forest Region for the
Forestier, the Lower Guinea Region for the Susu and the Fouta Djallon
for the Fulani. This is just an old traditional reflex that is still here. With
the multi-party system, we unfortunately created an ‘ethnicisation’
instead of a nation.
(Interview, 14.01.2013)
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According to the research participants in Kankan, issues besides the two
candidates’ ethnic belonging such as their different life trajectories, their
reputation regarding corruption, and their bonds to the Conté regime were
also important for voters’ decisions. The International Crisis Group (2011, 6)
added that “the results obtained by candidates in government, […] their level
of education, technical competence, international contacts and personal
wealth” played a role too. However, it also emphasised that “there is no
doubt that ethnicity is one of the most important of all these factors.”
Especially Diallo was identified as a Fulani and consequently politically
isolated whereas not only Manding but also a large part of the Susu and
Forestier supported Condé. One reason for that was the claim of Diallo’s
supporters that it was now their – the Fulani’s – turn to provide the head of
state as the Manding had their President with Touré, the Susu theirs with
Conté and the Forestier theirs with Dadis Camara (Arieff and McGovern
Figure 2.1 Election Board in the Fouta Djallon
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2013, 217). This image promoted by the Fulani produced a counter image I
often came across during fieldwork: It claimed ‘everything else but the Fulani’,
as people of other ethnic groups were afraid of being ruled by Guinea’s largest
ethnic group, even more so since the Fulani are economically powerful and
people considered the Fulani-dominated Fouta Djallon as a place where the
population has better living conditions than in other parts of the country.
People told me that Diallo personally claimed it was now the Fulani’s turn to
provide the country’s President. Amara Kamano, a highly educated woman
who was born at the beginning of the 1970s, for example, stated:
[Cellou] Dallein [Diallo] also said that Touré has been a Manding, Conté
has been a Susu and now it is his turn. He said to the Fulani not to
accept this and to demonstrate. All the Fulani went at his side to say that
what Dallein had said is right, we are behind you.
(Informal conversation, 10.01.2013)
Mohamed Saliou Camara (personal communication, 03.02.2017) notes that
another factor might have played a role: Large parts of Guinea’s society per-
ceive the Fulani, in particular the elite, ‘as whiners and traitors’. The latter
promote an image of self-victimisation under the First Republic even though
some people from the Fulani elite have actively taken part in the conspiratory
actions to overrule Sékou Touré.
The Second Round
The four months in between the two polls were marked, in Camara’s words,
by “empty partisan rhetoric punctuated by personal attacks and ethnic self-
promotion” (Camara 2014, 439). Both camps tried to change the rules of the
on-going electoral process. Issues of historic culpability and patrimonialism
were manipulated and politicised also due to the lack of political programs.
Thus, Odile Goerg (2006, 4) is right in saying that “[i]n the jostle for election,
political actors constantly rework the past, placing it in the service of the
present.” In addition, rumours circulated on a daily basis. After an incident in
Conakry, for example, it was said that people of Fulani ethnicity had poisoned
several of Condé’s supporters (International Crisis Group 2011, 7; group dis-
cussion, Manding women, 14.10.2011). In the capital city, demonstrations of
(young) party supporters, vandalism of Fulani shops, and other violent out-
breaks and human rights abuses further increased the tensions. Neither the
political opponents nor the security forces reacted in a way to appease the
situation. Consequently, the popular perception of politics as “the battle between
ethnic groups” gained further weight (International Crisis Group 2011, 5).
Violence did not stop at the border of the capital: Manding living in the
Fouta Djallon and Fulani dwelling in the Upper Guinea Region have been
cast out. Several of the Fulani research participants fled Kankan and went to
their village of origin before the second round. This was especially the case for
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people who had come to Kankan rather recently. Some families just sent
their women and children away. Others stayed deliberately to show that
they have been living in Kankan for years and felt that they belonged to
the local community. One Fulani woman told me that she did not receive
a polling card before the second round. For her, this was a deliberate act
against the Fulani as the local RPG government tried to influence the
elections. Finally, the situation in Kankan became too dangerous for her
and she left the city.
Djénabou was born in Kankan and lived there ever since. She felt safe
and did not leave the city. However, she told me how tense the atmosphere
had been during the election day, especially in the queues in front of the
polling stations: Usually, people let the elderly pass, but this time they had to
line up like everyone else. Djénabou added that some Manding provoked the
Fulani who were queueing up, but the latter did not withdraw. They said they
had to represent also those Fulani who had fled Kankan. Thierno was not
scared either: ‘I am from here’ he emphasised (field notes 11.02.2012). This
illustrates that while some Fulani felt insecure in Kankan during the election
period of 2010, others were not afraid. Djénabou and Thierno both identify
with the Fulani, but they have lived all their lives in the city, they fluently
speak the local language, they are familiar with the Manding’s cultural par-
ticularities, and they are involved in local, social networks. They considered
themselves to belong to Kankan’s inhabitants and were therefore not afraid of
the danger.
Thierno told me that Bangaly, a Manding, did a lot to appease the situation
in between the two polls. Bangaly was born in the mid-1970s. He became well
known among the city’s (male) youth, as he possesses a small studio where
young local musicians can record their songs. Initially, Bangaly was apolitical
as he states himself. But then, the RPG government convinced him to take on
the post as the local government’s youth representative and thus, he entered the
political scene. According to Thierno, Bangaly could successfully prevent that
young men destroyed Fulani shops in Kankan. After the elections, he also sent
a delegation to the village of a Fulani man who had fled Kankan with his
family. This delegation finally convinced the man to return to the city.
Thierno stressed that this example is not an isolated case (field notes
15.03.2012). Bangaly explained that thanks to his committee’s interven-
tion, there have been fewer clashes in Kankan than in other Guinean
cities. Firstly, they had organised meetings with the various ethnic groups’
elderly, male representatives during which they discussed the problems at
hand. Secondly, they intervened when the tensions threatened to turn into
violence. Bangaly recounted:
One day, young Manding [men] mobilised. They said that they would
destroy all the Fulani’s spots. As soon as the prefect got to know this, he
called us. He said: ‘Bangaly, you must come, because the youth wants to
protest.’ That day, I was afraid! But because we are respected, once we
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arrived on the spot, we could appease the tensions. The young people had
stones, and iron, and wooden sticks with them. Luckily God gave us the
chance to appease the situation.
(Interview, 23.02.2012)
The example of Bangaly hints towards the fact that we cannot look at the
state as a monolithic block. While it is true that for the second round new
election offices have facilitated the victory of Condé in the region of Kankan
and rumours of Fulani who had been denied access to voting cards were
widespread (Union Européenne 2011, 56), there were also people working for
the administration that helped calming the tense situation between Fulani and
Manding.
Several of the research participants confirm that ethnic identity has been
politicised and turned into a decisive factor during the presidential elections.
Madame Bah, a local female leader, for example, stressed: “Since a long time,
there has been union between ethnic groups. It is now with politics that this
attitude has been disrupted” (interview, 13.01.2012). Djénabou, on the other
hand, is convinced that ethnic tensions have always been there, but not at the
surface. According to her, it was politics that made them visible and aggravated
the situation. Nowadays, ethnocentrism is mostly a problem between the
Manding and the Fulani. ‘Before’, she emphasised, ‘people supported someone
because he was an oppositional. Now they say: “I don’t like the Susu, I don’t
like Conté.” Formerly, people were not interested in politics, now even children
reduce a person to his or her ethnicity’ (field notes, 27.11.2012). However, as
(historical) accounts from other parts of the country illustrate, ethnicity and
marginality have strategically been used since Guinea’s independence (McGo-
vern 2017; Schroven 2019).
Condé’s surprising victory in the second round – considering the results of
the first poll (18.3 percent) – with 52.5 percent of the votes triggered more
violence. Furthermore, it gave way to conspiracy theories that showed up
in popular discourse especially among the Fulani community as I witnessed
on several occasions. Many Fulani think that the elections had been flawed,
or in the words of a young Fulani man ‘the elections were democratically
manipulated’ (field notes, 17.11.2011). In mid-2013, such thinking still per-
sisted: “Many Peulh to this day do not accept Condé’s victory” (IRIN 2013).
During our interview, Fodé Sow, a blind Fulani and a former craftsman born
in the early 1960s, explained at length how in Guinea – like in all former
French colonies – the French were indirectly still in power:
FODÉ SOW: France installed the current President, we know that. The one
who has won the elections is not President. We know who has won …
CAROLE: So, you say that the French manipulated the elections after the first
round?
FODÉ SOW: Yes, of course, everybody knows this. For those who know the
truth, this wound is still there. (Interview, 17.10.2011)
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That the so-called ‘International Community’, especially France, supported
Alpha Condé is a widespread belief among the Fulani (Kohl and Schroven
2014, 10). Others, mostly Manding, claim that the first poll has been
manipulated, but this has not been the case during the second round. Oumou
Diallo, a female Fulani vendor at Dibida market, told me of the rumours she
had heard, namely that the Manding of Siguiri, Kouroussa, and Kankan
mobilized the dozo, a hunter’s association, and together they went to Conakry
to see Sékouba Konaté. They told him that if Alpha Condé would not win the
elections, there would be violence throughout the country. According to
Diallo, that is why Konaté made Condé President instead of Diallo who had
more votes than the former (interview, 08.11.2011).
The Association of Female Leaders
As we have already seen in the case of Bangaly, only parts of the adminis-
tration engaged in the politicisation of ethnicity. At the same time, different
religious, political, and social actors helped to appease the tense situation at
the individual and collective levels. In Kankan, especially the religious and
‘traditional’ leaders and the chefs de quartier have been involved in – to use
the emic notion – sensitising the population. The local government had asked
these male leaders to tell the population in their sermons and during meetings
not to react violently to tensions within the community. Djénabou recounted
that these authorities first sensitised the city’s youth. When this did not bear
fruit, they started talking to their parents, especially the mothers, because it is
they who know their children best, Djénabou emphasised. Thierno also
mentioned women’s role during conflict: ‘When enough is enough, when the
situation gets too tense, people deploy women for the sensitisation’ (field
notes, 30.11.2012). Additionally, well-known people and journalists talked
about the issue of ethnic cohabitation and reconciliation on the radio.
National and international NGOs also trained men and women as media-
tors during the electoral period. One organisation that profited from such a
training was the Association of Female Leaders. The Association of Female
Leaders was established after a workshop on female leadership at the end of
Conté’s reign. Its members are all middle-aged or elderly, well-educated
women of different ethnic background and various political affiliations. At the
time of research, subgroups of the Association of Female Leaders are present
in all major Guinean cities and are officially organised along the same lines as
any sort of formally acknowledged associations: They have a president, a vice-
president, a treasurer, one person who oversees the communication, one for
social affairs, one for the external and one for the internal relations.
Madame Bah, one of the members of the Association of Female Leaders,
told me that their first intervention was during Lansana Conté’s reign when a
conflict between Kankan’s local government and the ‘traditional’ authorities
caused by cattle thieves. Madame Bah stressed that the successful resolution
of this disagreement brought her organisation recognition and momentum
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and, as a result, they were often consulted when conflicts of minor or larger
scale emerged. The members of the association applied different methods to
resolve these disputed, she explained. Sometimes they used sweet words,
sometimes they sang, sometimes they cried, or they used ‘traditional’ methods
of conflict resolution.
At the time of the presidential elections, the Association of Female Leaders
played their role as mediators at different levels: After a consultation with the
Office of Women’s and Children’s Affairs, they talked to other key persons of
the local government, and they went to see the senior members (doyens) of
each ethnic group. Madame Bah stressed that this had not been an easy task
because usually women in Guinea do not get involved too much in politics.
But when they arrived, they presented ten kola nuts as the local customs
demand, they explained the reason for their coming, and, finally, their pre-
sence was appreciated. According to Madame Bah, the doyens of each ethnic
group then helped to stop the circulation of false rumours. In addition to
these visits, the members of the Association of Female Leaders spread their
words of peace in all of Kankan’s neighbourhoods, they sensitised the women
in the markets and went to other major Guinean cities where they held peace
fora. Lastly, they organised a peaceful march where they spread their main
message: Do not kill our children! The organisation’s two members I could
speak to, Madame Kouyaté and Madame Bah, were both very happy with
what their association had achieved during the tumultuous election period.
When I asked about their role as women with regard to conflict resolution,
Madame Bah and Madame Kouyaté answered similarly. The latter stated:
If there is anything irregular, we are here to put out the fire. It is our duty
as spouses, as mothers, because we are stabbed one way or the other. If it
is not our husband who is involved in troubles, it is our children, our
brothers. We women are more involved than those men. If you say to
your husband: ‘Do not go out, stay at home!’ If you say to your son: ‘I
do not want to see you outside the yard, you are not to make this or that
thing.’ If people listen to you, they will stay at home.
(Interview, 21.11.2011)
According to the prevailing image in Kankan – as in the whole country –
women only protest in case of emergency; if the situation becomes really cri-
tical, women start engaging. In quiet and peaceful times, many women do not
see any necessity to engage in what they name as politics (Dessertine 2019).
When I asked for more information on that issue, Djénabou explained:
We [women] are somehow indifferent, because if there is a political problem,
we do not get involved. Our concern is to find something to eat. It is only
when it becomes hot, women say: ‘If this continues that way, it is my child,
my husband, and myself who are in danger, thus we must intervene’.
(Informal conversation, 30.11.2012)
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Throughout Guinea’s history ordinary women who get involved in institutional
politics or protest publicly argue that they do so, due to the prevailing emergency.
They see it as their duty as wives, mothers, and sisters to help by appeasing
tensions or to do something about the harsh economic situations. This has been
the case during the general strikes of 1953 (Schmidt 2002, 2005). The same argu-
ment can be found in Rabiatou Sèrah Diallo’s statement regarding the general
strikes of 2006 and 2007 (Pauthier 2007; Jeune Afrique 25.02.2010). And as the
example of the Association of Female Leaders and Djénabou’s commentary
illustrate, women still allude to their roles as mothers or wives to legitimate their
political involvement during moments of political, social, or economic crisis.
Moreover, the Association of Female Leaders, an organisation that deliberately
cuts across ethnic boundaries, nicely illustrates that there are specific circum-
stances where women try to counter the predominant atmosphere, here by stres-
sing gender identity to overcome ethnic tensions.
Of Allegations and Reconciliation
Alpha Condé Talking about Ethnicity
Once elected, the issue of what the President labelled as ‘reconciliation’ was
immediately on Alpha Condé’ agenda. In an interview with France 24
(18.11.2010), he declared that his main goal was to reunite the Guinean nation:
“What interests me today is to speak of national reconciliation, to call Guineans
to unite so that we bring our forces together.” Condé liked to stress that his party
has gained votes from all ethnic groups, not only the Manding. Already during
the electoral campaign, he had emphasised – especially in the Guinean Coast
Region – that his mother is a Susu and he therefore speaks the language fluently
(International Crisis Group 2011, 6). Furthermore, the newly elected President
accused the international media of wrongly depicting the electoral competition
as a battle between the two main ethnic groups: “I do not know why you want to
reduce the elections [to an opposition between the] Manding and [the] Fulani.
You must stop demonising Guinea by opposing these two communities […].
That is extremely dangerous” (France 24 18.11.2010). In his inauguration speech
in December 2010, Alpha Condé stressed: “The change that we praise is not
directed against a political party or an ethnic group, nor against any social or
professional category. […] I will try […], at my modest level, to become Guinea’s
Nelson Mandela who will unify his country’s sons” (Guinée Info 22.12.2010).
With these words, Condé wanted to show that everybody was welcome in his
country, regardless of social, political, or ethnic background. The president was
aware that governing a divided population would be a very difficult task, especially
as the legislative elections were pending. However, by using the word ‘sons’, he
only addressed the male population. Alpha Condé compared himself with Nelson
Mandela, one of the most respected African politicians and presented himself as
the saviour of the nation. In a written interview with Radio France International,
the President used an image that emphasises national unity:
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I say that Guinea belongs to all Guineans. I like to say that Guinea is like
a car. A car has four wheels. If you take one wheel away, the car cannot
drive any more. Guinea has its four regions and these four regions must
go hand in hand. At the moment, the population is instrumentalised by
businessmen who know that they are more bootleggers than businessmen.
(Radio France International 06.20.2010)
This image of Guinea as a car, whereby every wheel represents one region
and one ethnic group, came up during fieldwork again and again. Condé,
thus, used an analogy most Guineans are familiar with. In this interview, the
President did not specifically mention the Fulani. By accusing the business-
men of being criminals, he chose to interpret the actual fault line as one of
class and not of ethnicity. To the Fulani businessmen, though, the president’s
reference was clear. It is not surprising that they felt targeted by the government
not due to their economic activities, but because of their ethnicity. The image of
the Fulani businessmen as ‘bootleggers’ is especially problematic as these retai-
lers generally supported Cellou Dalein Diallo. International observers also assert
Condé’s deviousness: The International Crisis Group (2011, 17–18) condemns
Alpha Condé’s regular accusations of rice importers, the majority of whom are
Fulani, of speculating and thus keeping the population hungry. And this argu-
mentation is not new in Guinea: Sékou Touré and Lansana Conté used similar
“populist-socialist rhetoric” (International Crisis Group 2011, 17).
Rumours reinforce such stereotypes. Similar to international observers
(IRIN 2011a, 2011b), I was told that the Fulani are setting lower prices at the
market for people of their own ethnic group. The statement of Néné Sagno,
an elderly Manding woman, is exemplary:
The Fulani are like chameleons. What they have in their hearts is bad, it
is bad! The Fulani are criminals. If we talk about criminals, we talk about
the Fulani. They do not like others, they just pursue their own interests.
(Interview, 15.11.2011)
When Thierno and I were sitting in a café in February 2012, we heard a Mand-
ing man recounting that there had been a power blackout during a soccer match
of the Guinean national team in Conakry. The following day a colonel, who was
being made responsible for the incident, had been attacked with stones on his
ways to work. Finally, the injuries caused his death. Another Manding man in
the café responded that he was sure the attackers were Fulani: ‘It is them who
make thinks like that,’ he said (field notes, 03.02.2012).
Through such stories, the population in Kankan reproduces the negative
stereotype of the economically powerful and egoistic Fulani, not mentioning
that the majority of them suffer from poverty just like the rest of the popula-
tion. Rumours spread rapidly and add to the increased mistrust between the
Fulani, on the one hand, the government and the rest of the population, on
66 Contested Presidential Elections in 2010
the other hand. Thus, the politicisation of ethnicity has, at least partially, led
to an “ethnicisation of everyday life” (Förster 2004, 26, author’s translation).
Governmental Reconciliation Events
During the first anniversary speech of his inauguration, Alpha Condé named
two of his political goals: unifying the nation but at the same time changing
it. He informed Guinea’s population about the establishment of a Provisional
National Commission on Reconciliation (Commission Provisoire de Réflexion
sur la Réconciliation Nationale, CPRN), co-presided by the Imam of
Conakry’s Big Mosque and the archbishop. The CPRN’s first step was to set
up dialogue groups in all prefectures in collaboration with national and
international reconciliation experts. According to the two religious leaders,
national reconciliation was already on the way (Guinée 24 20.12.2011).4
During the time of fieldwork, reconciliation was a major issue for the
Condé government. In the first months of 2012, Kankan’s local government
initiated several reconciliation events, for example a reconciliation soccer-
tournament and a reconciliation race. The mayor also summoned various
meetings with the chefs de quartier. The latter then had to identify different
groups, which would be able to communicate the issue of ethnic divisions and
reconciliation to the neighbourhood population. The research participants
responded positively to these efforts.
At the national level, the minister of sports used the national soccer team,
the Syli National, which played at the African Cup of Nations (Coupe Afrique
des Nations, CAN) in Gabon and Equatorial Guinea to represent the image
of a unified Guinea. He stressed: “You know, if you love your country, if it is
for a common cause; it is the Syli National, it is red, yellow, and green [the
colours of the Guinean flag]. It is not one political party or one ethnic group”
(Guinée News 15.01.2012). Similarly, Mister Nabé, the vice-mayor stressed:
‘The Syli National will be a determinant factor for reconciliation’ (informal
conversation, 31.01.2012).
The image of a sports team as the nation’s representative is not a Guinean
particularity; on the contrary, worldwide, politicians instrumentalise sports, as
sports and politics become more and more intermingled. One of the most pro-
minent examples in this regard is Nelson Mandela who used the (mostly white)
South African rugby team during the World Cup in 1995 for that purpose, and
in doing so demonstrated reconciliation (Nauright 1997). Discourse surrounding
sports reflect political or social issues in a particular society, as Andreas Mehler
(2006) illustrates with the examples of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. Soccer creates a
“feeling of belonging” and special events can influence a nation’s (self)image
(Schwier 2006, 44, author’s translation). This sense of belonging is fostered
through the display of national symbols such as flags, the singing of the national
anthem, and the wearing of the national soccer shirt. Crawford Young (2012, 43)
accurately notes that “[t]he national football team, through ritual combat in
international matches, performs the state.”
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In Kankan, large parts of the population – the youth and the elderly, men and
women, Fulani and Manding alike – cheered for the Guinean soccer team.
Thierno, who followed the call-in broadcasts on the local radio stations on this
issue, noticed that more women were interested in the performance of the
national team than ever before. To see young women on the streets wearing a
football dress was also common. Even elderly women addressed the topic of the
CAN during interviews: They mentioned that they prayed for the national team.
For a short time, the whole city felt united in their support of the national team.
The general atmosphere before and during the CAN’s group stage was, indeed,
very special. In the evenings, everybody sat in front of their TVs or listened to
the radio; I noted that the acoustic level was much higher than usual. After the
high victory against Botswana (6–1), Kankan’s streets were full of honking
motorbikes and cars. Even though men and women shared their enthusiasm for
the Guinean national team, their practices were quite different: While young
Figure 2.2 Supporting Banner for the Syli National in Kankan
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men liked to watch the match together with their friends in one of the numerous
‘video clubs’, these places were not frequented by young women. The latter
stayed at home or went to neighbours to watch the game.
In January and February 2012, a reconciliation-tour of different national
artists and of elders took place throughout the country. In Kankan, different
activities such as workshops and fora were held. These events took place in
the RPG main office and were of a minor scale, though; people outside the
ruling party were not informed about them. Furthermore, the issue of recon-
ciliation was discussed at the local radio stations during interactive broadcasts
or when moderators and invited personalities urged the population to forgive,
to reconcile, and to look ahead. The image promoted was a country where all
ethnic groups would peacefully cohabit. In public spaces such as cafés or
markets, the people also discussed these issues. I heard many examples of
peaceful coexistence and collaboration between Manding and Fulani. Time
and again people stated: ‘Everybody enters and leaves the world through the
same door.’ But I also had to listen to prejudices: People, for example,
claimed that Fulani are egoistic, violent, and dishonest.
On the last day of the reconciliation-week, a Mamaya5 took place and the
city’s market and boutiques had to close. Being organised by the governing
party, the event was not politically neutral. Nevertheless, it attracted especially
the city’s youth from different political backgrounds. Furthermore, many people
were dressed in yellow, the colour of the RPG. Overall, people within and out-
side the governing bodies talked much about unity, reconciliation, and forgive-
ness during that week, but they did not approach the issue of what exactly had
caused the ethnic tensions during the election period. Furthermore, they also
made no propositions regarding how to overcome existing cleavages.
People such as Bangaly and Mister Nabé praised Alpha Condé’s reconci-
liation efforts in general and the Mamaya in particular. Mister Nabe stressed
that ‘the fish rots at the head first’, meaning that if the head, in this case the
head of state, does not set a good example, the rest, the population, does not
follow. He added: ‘Alpha Condé is not the Manding’s President. He is the
President of all Guineans’ (informal conversation, 03.02.2012). Sarata Cherif,
the head of Sogbè’s market office and a member of the RPG, explained that
the Mamaya’s goal was as follows: “The aim of the event was to show the
whole world that today, Guinea is free. The aim of the organisation of this
manifestation was national reconciliation” (interview, 31.01.2012).
The event, however, could not convince people who were not affiliated to the
RPG. A Fulani woman selling on Sogbè market lamented that the instruments
for this Mamaya were expensive. She invited the government to build factories
and, thus, create employment for the youth instead of wasting their money on
happenings like that (informal conversation, 29.01.2012). I also heard an elderly
man uttering quietly to his neighbour in a café opposite the stage: ‘All intellec-
tuals are aware that this is just propaganda, nothing else’ (field notes,
28.01.2012). Amara Kamano, an intellectual woman who does not support any
political party, was even angry: “People say they organised a day of
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reconciliation. But reconciliation between whom and whom? In one word, this is
a campaign for the RPG, for the President” (interview, 15.12.2012).
At the time, political campaigning was officially forbidden. For that reason, a
Mamaya of the PEDN in Kankan more than a month earlier had been dissolved
with the use of teargas (Guinée Actu 12.12.2011). Masked by a discourse about
reconciliation and forgiveness, the Mamaya could draw attention to the govern-
ing party. Above all, young people of all ethnic backgrounds and with various
political interests enjoyed the offered distraction. Political tensions, however,
were fostered because of the organisers’ obvious political goal.
Conclusions: The Situational Politicisation of Ethnicity
In Kankan, social actors interact habitually with one another and therefore,
in everyday life ethnic identity does not play a pivotal role. At the same time,
I witnessed many occasions of scapegoating. For the local population, these
differences did not stand in opposition to each other; people actively take part
in and shape ethnic division at one moment and reconciliation at the next.
Nevertheless, since the 2010 presidential elections, ethnic belonging figures
centrally in the discourse of Kankan’s population – like elsewhere in Guinea.
The ‘other’ is discursively constructed as being a hindrance to reconciliation,
transformation, and construction of the country.
Politicians and ordinary people from different ethnic belonging politicise
the past. Especially the Fulani imagine themselves to be historical victims. As
they could never provide a head of state, they share a sentiment of being
politically marginalised. Consequently, the Fulani claim that it was now their
turn to provide a President, because the Manding, the Susu, and the people
from the Forest Region already had ‘their’ President. While the Manding are
politically quite powerful, at the economic level they are very much chal-
lenged by the Fulani who seek more representation and participation within
the government and the public administration.
The composition of Alpha Condé’s first government hints to the President’s
efforts to overcome ethnic division and to consolidate his coalition by appointing
members of all ethnic groups (International Crisis Group 2011, 8). Nevertheless,
Human Rights Watch (2011) accuses the President of favouring Manding when
appointing new members to his administration. This is a lamentation I repeatedly
heard in interviews and informal conversations with Fulani research participants.
Aissata Silla, a young Fulani woman, deplored for example:
Today, the President’s ethnic group commits acts of ethnocentrism, even
racism. This is not good. The President should work with everybody. We
must stand together to ease things, because one person or one ethnic group
alone cannot develop the country. But if people say: This specific ethnic
group is in power and only members of this group benefit from it instead of
the whole population … In this case, can it work? No, it cannot.
(Interview, 02.11.2011)
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Political parties, on the one hand emphasised that they represented all ethnic
groups. Local party boards in Kankan appointed for example, members of
different ethnical groups and stressed that their party welcomed members of
all ethnic backgrounds. On the other hand, Guinea’s population imagined
political parties to represent just one major ethnic group (Bah 2016, 10)
Furthermore, “Guinean politicians and intellectuals […] are eager to privately
manipulate ethnic difference for selfish reasons” (Camara 2014, 451). Some
research participants were very much aware of the manipulative role politi-
cians and their parties played in the whole matter and therefore were not
interested in their speeches and practices of reconciliation. A male Fulani,
who had recently retired from the military, spoke exemplarily for those:
“Reconciliation is only between the leaders, not between us. We among the
people from the military, we are fine, there is nothing between us” (interview,
22.02.2012). Worldwide, such manipulations of ethnicity are typical when the
political and economic competitions are fierce, such as during Guinea’s first
‘democratic’ presidential elections of 2010.
Asked what they understand by the term, many research participants said
that reconciliation will come ‘naturally’ because of inter-ethnic marriages that
are common in Kankan and elsewhere. In Kankan, myriad associations exist,
such as youth-, community-, work- or faith based groups, age-set groups,
NGOs, or women’s organisations. With the exception of groups formed on
the basis of origin that are popular among students, none of them is founded
on ethnic or regional criteria. Lived realities thus demonstrate that political
manipulation of ethnicity does not always bear fruit. Still, many people talked
negatively, sometimes even aggressively about the ‘other’.
Due to its reconciliation attempts, the local government could make the
population think and talk about these issues. At the same time, people were
angry with the RPG for misusing the reconciliation event as a platform for
campaigning. The launch of the government’s reconciliation and unity efforts
was not a coincidence. As legislative elections were scheduled for December
2011, then delayed until June 2012, and finally took place in September 2013,
the President tried to rally the population behind him. At this time, it was
politically not wise to stress ethnic difference; as, for example, the Manding
Lansana Kouyaté’s PEDN had left Condé’s coalition and joined the opposition
(Open Society Initiative for West Africa 2012). We have thus seen that Alpha
Condé uses both ethnic divisions and reconciliation to achieve his political goals.
If Condé follows Alpha Amadou Bano Barry’s words (25.12.2013), he would
make the peaceful cohabitation of the Guinean population one of his main
priorities, not only rhetorically, but also practically. Bano Barry warns emphati-
cally: “We life in a paradoxical country: Our political elites make everything to
cause civil war and the population refuses that, until when?”
Lastly, some remarks on how gender and ethnic identity are interlinked in
Kankan. In everyday discourse and practices, I did not notice any difference
between men and women when it comes to the issue of ethnicity: Both interact
habitually with people of different ethnic backgrounds and claim that the elite
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politicises ethnicity; it is not an issue of contestation in everyday life. At the
same time, men as well as women of all ages and educational backgrounds
produce and reproduce prejudices of the imagined ‘other’. However, when the
social and political atmosphere becomes very tense, Guinean women have the
image of mediators; they are regarded as well suited to appease conflicts due to
their experience as household diplomats who hold their families together. The
government and female politicians, too, promote this image of women as
guardians of peace (e.g. République de Guinée 2014, 14). In the words of
Ibrahima Kourouma, an elderly male griot: “To live in harmony, we need three
persons: An Imam, a griot, and a female leader” (interview, 24.11.2011). The
Association of Female Leaders is a case in point. These well-educated women
deliberately used their femaleness, especially their roles as mothers, to be able
to enter the ‘traditional’ male political sphere where they negotiated with ‘tra-
ditional’ authorities. Furthermore, they emphasised their common identities
with non-formally educated women, namely in also being mothers, to co-opt
them in their struggle for peace.
To sum up, several of the characteristics of identity politics mentioned by
Thomas Hylland Eriksen (2010, 194–197) are relevant in the Guinean case:
Firstly, Guineans compete over scarce resources such as access to secure and
well-paying jobs. While the Fulani have the image of being economically
better off than the rest of the population, they feel excluded from the admin-
istration. As Eriksen (2010, 194–197) stresses, ethnicity typically comes into
play when people consider wealth and resources to be distributed unequally.
Secondly, identity politics leads ethnic groups to consider themselves as a
homogenous category where cultural similarity overrules any other social
identities. This factor was clearly visible in Guinea. While some of the
research participants, especially those who have some degree of formal edu-
cation, explained in detail the different subgroups among the Manding, this
was never an issue when ethnic politics came into play.
Thirdly, the imagined ‘others’ are branded through stereotypes. In this
context, they are used to “justify privileges and differences in access to a
society’s resources” (Eriksen 2010, 30) and in doing so, help bring and bind
together one’s own group. We have clearly seen how people of the Manding
ethnicity denigrate the Fulani in general as rich traders that are dishonest and
egoistic. The government also upholds some stereotypes, for example, when it
creates statistics and documents, thereby using categories such as ethnicity,
territorial, or economic characteristics. Moreover, the Fulani are frequently
accused of violent acts and they often portray themselves as being the victims
of state power. Since the presidential elections, every decision by the govern-
ment – be it political, social, or economic – is seen by the Fulani to go against
their ethnic group, which can be detected in local newspapers, comments in
blogs, and in popular debates.
Fourthly, memories of past suffering and injustice are activated through
myths and cultural symbols for one’s own group for political purposes. In
Guinea, the past is constantly reworked, especially the Touré era. The Fulani,
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on the one hand, stress that they have been the main target during that time
and suffered most from the autocratic President. The Manding in Kankan, on
the other hand, emphasise that they were chased out of the administration
after the ‘Coup Diarra’ and that the Fulani economically profited during the
reign of Lansana Conté. I could not put it better than the International Crisis
Group, which states that the presidential elections:
gave new impetus to the idea that Guinea’s history is a struggle
between its four major ethno-regional blocs. In the first round, most
politicians started by organising their own communities. The second
round – during which ethnic rhetoric built steadily on all sides – was a
scarcely disguised debate on supposed Peul domination, with [Alpha]
Condé, a Malinké, attributing hegemonic ambitions to that commu-
nity from which his opponent and the main opposition party leader,
Cellou Dalein Diallo, comes. Although the security forces were
responsible for the worst violence, political mobilisation along ethnic
lines sparked clashes and claimed victims.
(International Crisis Group 2011, 1)
Notes
1 Minor parts and earlier versions of this chapter have been published in a joint
article with Andrea Kaufmann: Ammann, Carole, and Andrea A. Kaufmann.
2014. “Politics of Ethnicity in Monrovia, Liberia and Kankan, Guinea – A
Comparative Analysis.” Mande Studies (14):57–97. Printed with the permission of
Mande Studies.
2 Bernard Charles (2010, 147–150) confirms the above-mentioned ethnic favouritism
under Touré and Conté through an analysis of the ethnic background of the min-
isters, governors, and prefect between 1958 and 2008. According to Charles, the
Fulani were politically underrepresented during that time.
3 Camara’s statement turned out to be right once again: Alpha Condé and his
RPG won the legislative elections in September 2013. For a detailed account
of the credibility and transparency of these elections, as well as their outcome,
see the final report by the observation mission of the EU (Union Européenne
2013).
4 The CPRN was formed in August 2011. Five years later, it submitted its final report
to the President Alpha Condé (CPRN 27.06.2016). The long report addresses
human right violations since the country’s independence up to 2015. According to
one of the main findings, the Guinean population welcomes reconciliation that is
based on what is locally considered as ‘traditional’ coping mechanisms. The report
makes twenty-two recommendations which should be implemented by an institu-
tionalised Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission.
5 “The regional and colonial-era metropolis Kankan has since the 1930s enjoyed a
reputation for being the birthplace of a musical movement that has touched all
corners of the Mande diaspora. Known as Mamaya, this movement represents
the innovations of Maninka youth working within the confines of their centuries-
old cultural traditions” (Kaba and Charry 2000, 187). Colloquially, the notion of
Mamaya is used when referring to a musical event in line with this cultural
tradition.
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3 Expectations of the New President
Introduction
Guinea did not move forward. Then Alpha [Condé] came. He said: ‘Change!’
But it is not easy to change the Guinean mentality.
(Field notes, young man in a café, 19.01.2012)
Kankan’s population has many expectations of the state: It should build up
infrastructure; deliver basic services, such as education, health, water, and elec-
tricity; provide micro credits; and create jobs. For the female research participants,
affordable food was the most important issue the state should ensure. People see
the state as omnipotent and expect it to redistribute wealth among its citizens just
as a parent should do among family members. Or to put it in Michael Jackson’s
(2007, 44) words “the state is imagined […] as a protoparent.” Jean-François
Bayart (1993, 261) describes the functioning of African states “as a rhizome of
personal networks […]. [The state] assures the centralisation of power through the
agencies of family, alliance and friendship […].” This attitude, however, is not an
African particularity but can be found on other continents as well.
When referring to the state, Kankan’s population in fact often means
Alpha Condé. In Guinea – like in other African countries – the head of the
executive has extensive powers, compared to the legislative and judiciary. The
President is imagined as the nation’s father (Schatzberg 2001) who is con-
sidered personally responsible for the well-being of its citizens. The hero of
independence, Sékou Touré, also fostered the image of himself as the embo-
diment of the nation. However, the phenomenon can be observed in other
African countries and beyond. In Bruce J. Berman’s (2010, 14) words: “[…] in
state after state, the political and cultural construction of the ‘nation’ turned
into a cult of personality around the president or leader as the embodiment of
the nation and the father of his people.”
Alpha Condé is a controversial figure. His supporters praise his educational
background and the fact that he has never been in a Guinean government
and, therefore, was not part of the undemocratic First and Second Republics.
They call Alpha Condé the ‘historical opposition leader’ or simply ‘le prof ’ or
‘le professeur’ (the prof(essor)) (Camara 2014, 440). The President’s oppo-
nents, however, blame Condé for his policy of ‘divide and rule’ – not least
regarding ethnicity, as Chapter 1 has illustrated. Besides, they accuse him of
misusing public funds, profiting personally from the mining sector, and of not
consulting the opposition concerning the electoral process (Camara 2012,
2014, 441–451).
Alpha Condé’s main stronghold is the Upper Guinea Region. In the region
of Kankan, he gained 71.8 percent of the votes during the first poll and 92
percent during the second poll of the presidential elections in 2010. When I
first arrived in Kankan at the end of August 2011, people were very enthu-
siastic about Guinea’s future. They saw in the election of Alpha Condé a
major break with the dictatorial periods of the past. According to the EU
(Union Européenne 2011, 5, author’s translation), the ballots of 2010 have
“taken place under generally satisfactory conditions” and the research parti-
cipants who are in favour of Alpha Condé referred to them as Guinea’s first
democratic elections. Mohamed Silla, a young teacher remembered: “I went
voting and it was good, because I was proud to see a democratically elected
President. Guinea had never known democracy before” (interview,
17.10.2011). Mohamed Saliou Camara (2014, 440) writes that “the swearing
in of Alpha Condé on December 21, 2010, marked a turning point in the
political history of Guinea. In addition to bringing to a relatively peaceful
end the dangerous crisis inherited from the Conté-era and exacerbated under
the CNDD junta, it enabled the Guinean state to regain some of the national
and international legitimacy that it lost as a result of the chronic instability
and malgovernance […].”
Kankan’s population expected that the coming into power of ‘their’ leader
would facilitate their access to state resources, enhance the building of the
city’s infrastructure, and provide job opportunities, especially for the youth.
Representative of the general atmosphere is the statement of Mister Cissé, a
local state employee, who explained: “For the moment we have hope. I have
hope. We can say: God helps us. We will do everything for this President. In
the past, we have already suffered a lot” (interview, 08.02.2012).
Once elected, Alpha Condé proclaimed to appease the situation in Guinea after
tumultuous years and to change its political, social, and economic landscape for
the better. One of his preferred catchwords was ‘change’. With this notion, Alpha
Condé built on the most used slogans during the general strikes of 2006 and 2007:
changement (change) and nous voulons le changement (we want change) (Human
Rights Watch 2007). However, the postulation of change is not a Guinean parti-
cularity; on the contrary: Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf (2009, 398), for example, in her
inaugural speech welcomed the change Liberia’s citizens had summoned with her
election as the country’s new President. Most prominent and successful in this
regard was obviously Barack Obama’s election campaign in 2008 with its famous
slogan ‘yes we c(h)an(ge)’. Furthermore, Alpha Condé’s discourse of change is in
line with postulation of development and modernity put forward by NGOs and
international institutions such as the UN or the IMF.
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In the following sections, I illustrate how the President, his party members,
and ordinary Guineans fostered the notion of change. In his addresses, the
President repeatedly mentioned women and youth. Thus, I analyse how Alpha
Condé refers to these two segments of society. Further, I investigate the issues
of government practices women talk about and what kind of normative
assumptions about the state they have. Throughout this chapter, I am won-
dering why Kankan’s population continues to hope for the state’s assistance,
even if these expectations have not been met in the past.
The President Proclaiming Change
Guinea has experienced major political transformations in the 2000s, in par-
ticular since the general strikes of 2006 and 2007 and President Lansana
Conté’s death in 2008. When Alpha Condé came to power, he had to tackle
many problems if he wanted to meet the expectations of a population plagued
by poverty, which was also caused by decades of political mismanagement.
Condé had to stabilise and enhance Guinea’s social, political, and economic
situation. In addition, the President needed a broad coalition to win the
upcoming legislative elections. By addressing the ‘International Community’
and the Guinean population, Alpha Condé explained his vision for Guinea in
his speeches and interviews with international news agencies. Usually, local
media took both up and reproduced them in French and in various national
languages. A great deal of Condé’s communication followed a similar pattern:
Firstly, he mentioned the many difficulties he had taken over from his pre-
decessors, for example by saying that he has “inherited a country without a
state” (Jeune Afrique 16.07.2012). Secondly, he illustrated his intentions to
bring change about, namely by listing the many programmes his governments
had initiated in the last couple of months. Thirdly, the head of state envi-
sioned a prosperous Guinea with a bright future.
At the beginning of 2013, the President accused his ministers of not work-
ing properly and being corrupt (Guinée News 06.01.2013). In Kankan, this
speech has been widely discussed and even people supporting the opposition
have welcomed its content. However, habitual bureaucratic practices do not
change swiftly. Local bureaucrats often remain in office for many years; they
outlast different presidents and swiftly adapt to new forms of rule as Michelle
Engeler (2015, 90–91) describes when she illustrates how Guéckédou’s prefect,
by adjusting to the current political situation, repeatedly changed uniforms
between 2008 and 2012. Similarly, Gerhard Anders (2009) compares Mala-
wian state employees’ behaviour to chameleons who adopt their environ-
ment’s colour. During my research, I met some local state officials who had
already started their professional career during the First Republic, and who
have been highly successful in adapting to the specific political situation.
In his inauguration address, Alpha Condé emphasised his goal to put
Guinea back on track, namely to lead the country out of international isola-
tion, to leave poverty behind and, finally, to become one of this planet’s
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emerging countries (Guinée Info 22.12.2010). On the occasion of the inde-
pendence celebration in October 2011, the President precisely enumerated the
launched projects, specifically in the field of mining, agriculture, education,
sanitation, health, road-building, energy, judiciary, and security (Blog de
Sylvie K. 02.10.2011). Thus, the President “evidently nourish[ed] big ambi-
tions for his country,” as the International Crisis Group (2011, author’s
translation) states. In a speech addressing the nation after his first year in
office, Alpha Condé said:
I promised you change. With your help, I will create conditions for a
decent life for everyone without discrimination. And I will particularly
give hope to our sons and daughters to live better than we have done, in a
reconciled Guinea – reconciled with itself, its history, a prosperous and
solitary Guinea. […] I profoundly believe that the long-awaited change,
to be concrete, must manifest and be settled in the everyday life of Gui-
neans. […] For a long time, I have fought for change, liberty, and pros-
perity of our country.
(Guinée 24 20.12.2011)
In an interview with Jeune Afrique (16.07.2012), the head of state acknowl-
edged the Guinean population’s difficult living conditions. The population
had to tighten its belt for two years, Condé explained. Furthermore, he plea-
ded the people to be patient and promised that they would soon reap the
benefits of their deprivations. Here, a connection to the early Touré-period
can be drawn when “the government’s economic and political policies
demanded many sacrifices from the population” (Kohl and Schroven 2014,
17). In October 2011, the Condé government took a drastic measure to fill the
empty treasury: It raised the petrol price from 7,500 to 9,500 Guinean francs
per litre (from about 0.75 euro to 0.95 euro). It argued that this was a neces-
sity to attain the goal of a debt release by the IMF (Guinée Press 23.10.2011).
The rise of the petrol price had far-reaching consequences as it led to a
general price increase of basic commodities. Unsurprisingly, the issue of the
petrol price was controversial, and was debated throughout Kankan for a
couple of weeks. Mister Cissé, a man born in the 1960s and working for the
prefecture, supported the governmental decision to raise the petrol price even
though he was aware of its negative consequences for ordinary citizens.
However, the positive result, namely the partial debt release, was more
important for him (interview, 08.02.2012). On October 26, 2012, Alpha
Condé reached this major milestone: The IMF relieved Guinea of two-thirds
of its foreign debt (IMF 28.09.2012). Some hours after the IMF’s announce-
ment, the President visited a centre for women’s promotion in Conakry.
There, he thanked Guinea’s female population for its support in achieving this
envisaged debt release by tightening their belts (L’express Guinée 26.09.2012).
There is a further indication that Guinea has been successful in regaining
international credibility. The EU had suspended all development cooperation
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with Guinea when the CNDD had seized power in 2008. In December 2012,
Guinea and the EU finally signed a treaty to re-launch their cooperation
(Commission Européenne 21.12.2012). Referring to the above-described
achievements on the international arena, Condé’s New Year’s Address for
2013 was quite enthusiastic:
The striking successes of the year 2012 are intimately tied to the deep-
rootedness of democratisation in our country. […] Change is on the way.
Our country has already successfully crossed an important stage of
transformation. Step by step, we catch up. I welcome your patriotism as
well as your efforts and sacrifices to put our country on the track of
change. Your courage bore fruit. With the work and the determination of
the government, we have been successful in bringing about large pro-
gresses on the social, economic, and political level.
(Guinée Juristes 2013)
The image that Guinea has – for all too long – been standing apart from the
international arena is widespread and therefore, Alpha Condé’s slogan
‘Guinée is back’ (Ammann and Engeler 2013) fell on fertile ground among
Kankan’s ordinary people, but also among intellectuals such as Paul Kamano
(2015), who wrote a book called Guinea. A portrait of change under Alpha
Condé. Others are much more critical about whether Guinea is indeed this
“spearhead of change” (Knierzinger, Engeler, and Ammann 2016). Not so
Madame Sakho and Mister Nabé, the two vice-mayors. They reproduced the
President’s notion of change:
Actually, Guinea has changed on the national and international level.
During the military regime, the governments did not go outside Guinea
to participate in big meetings. Therefore, Guinea was negligible. If you
have debt at this level, then you are not allowed to speak and not allowed
to vote. Thus, it is useless to come to the meeting. That is why, in the
past, Guinea has been forgotten. With the arrival of the President Alpha
Condé there is a change. As he said: ‘Guinea is back’.
(Interview, 22.11.2011)
Guinea: A Love and Hate Relationship
During fieldwork in Kankan, the general atmosphere amongst the research
participants was somehow contradictory: On the one hand, Condé’s suppor-
ters were enthusiastic about ‘their’ President’s election. They were convinced
that Guinea’s ongoing democratisation would have beneficial effects. These
research participants praised the new possibility to express themselves freely
without fearing negative consequences, such as beatings or confinement.
Interestingly, supporters of the RPG simultaneously complained about the
misuse of democratic achievements: They blamed the opposition for ‘saying
whatever they wanted.’ Especially intellectuals and young people anticipated
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positive changes for their country once international sanctions would have
fallen, that is, after peaceful and transparent legislative elections. According
to their ideas, NGOs – together with the government – would set up projects that
would help develop the country and create job opportunities for the (educated)
youth. Altogether, they hoped that these political changes would lead to an
improvement of their own everyday life. Christoph Kohl and Anita Schroven
noticed a similar atmosphere: “While the development industry has not reached
the intensity known in other African countries of similar social-economic con-
ditions, there is a prevalent attitude that these organisations are in Guinea to
deliver services the population is entitled to” (Kohl and Schroven 2014, 13).
At the time of fieldwork, the government and the opposition were struggling
over the execution of the pending legislative elections. As the transitional period
had not yet ended, the international partners did not completely resume their
collaboration. According to the research participants, this explained why the
country’s development was put on hold. I have also perceived some suspicion
whether Guinea’s democratization process would, indeed, move forward. This is
not surprising considering the population’s experience with the country’s last
Presidents regarding the gap between their democratic discourse and their
undemocratic practices.
The idea of Guinea ‘being back’ as a player in the international arena fuelled
hope among Kankan’s inhabitants. They had a precise idea of the outcome of
Guinea’s development whereby other West African countries, the United States,
Europe, but also China served as role models. In the emic perspective, it was just
a matter of time until Guinea would make major steps and catch up with its
neighbouring countries. At the same time, (young) men usually described the
current situation in harsh words, especially with regards to infrastructure. Telling
is a conversation I witnessed at a café. A man in a suit complained: ‘Guinea is
not even a construction site; it is a dustbin! Compared to Burkina Faso we have
no hygiene here. Côte d’Ivoire is also better developed than Guinea.’ Another
man agreed. He talked about Abuja, Nigeria’s capital city, where every building
was made of concrete and no corrugated iron – contrary to Guinea. ‘Guinea is
backwards,’ he lamented (field notes, 18.01.2012).
Neither the economic decay nor the civil war has changed Côte d’Ivoire’s
image as the sub-region’s Eldorado, where every aspect of life was imagined to be
better than in Guinea. Interestingly, the images for war-torn Liberia and Sierra
Leone were similar. People who had lived there for some time told me enthusias-
tically about these countries’ educational system, people’s way of looking after
their children, the ease of gaining money, and women’s position in society. In
Kankan, people often compared their country to neighbouring Mali whose
border is only some 260 kilometres away. In this regard, the research participants
were astonished that a country, where it does not rain as much as in Guinea, still
manages to export agricultural products. Furthermore, the Malian government
was praised for the construction of major dams that allowed the production of
electricity. Finally, Mali was particularly applauded for its democratic structures.
Obviously, this image crumbled after the coup d’état of March 2012.
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One day in November 2012 – Alpha Condé’s second year in office was coming
to an end – Thierno and I sat on a bench beside a café. There, one of the female
research participants sold food. Three students, whose names hint at their Mand-
ing origin, discussed the state of their nation. One of the young men ironically
proposed to sell the country and thereby earning money if the situation did not
improve. They could then settle in Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, or Ghana. He stressed
that everywhere was better than Guinea, especially Ghana. And he continued:
‘There is no democracy here; it is a “mafiacracy”. The President and the opposi-
tion do not want the country to move forward.’ An elderly man, who had listened
to the debate, echoed the student’s words; he wanted to sell the country, as well.
The female food vendor, however, did not like the negative way those men talked
about their country. Playfully, she threw a pebble after the elderly man. Unper-
turbed, one of the young students resumed the talk: ‘The majority wants to sell the
country, especially the youth; we have been unemployed for all too long. We are
losing the hope we have had with Alpha [Condé]. Without a national assembly,
nothing moves forward’ (naturally occurring talk, 23.11.2012).
Alpha Condé Putting an Emphasis on Women and Youth
In his speeches during the electoral campaign and the first years in office, Alpha
Condé put a special emphasis on women and youth. The President was aware
that these two segments of the population were an important voter base for him
and his political party. Repeatedly, Alpha Condé promised to create job oppor-
tunities for the young people and to provide affordable and stable food prices on
the local market. He stressed that these two segments were at the core of his
preoccupations; thus, youth and women would profit from the envisaged change.
Alpha Condé’s declaration of June 2013 in Conakry stands symbolically for this:
“Our problem is how to bring change for the young and the women in our
country and in Africa” (Africa Guinée 30.06.2013).
On several occasions, the President stated that women and youth would lay
the foundation for Guinea’s change. At the beginning of his presidency,
Condé said in front of his partisans: “I have told everybody: Guinea became
Guinea. That means everything that will be done in Guinea is due to women’s
and youth’s initiatives” (AfricaLog 26.01.2011). In the speech on the occasion
of his first year in office, the head of state’s words sounded similarly: “Guinea
has experienced fifty difficult years. In these moments of test, together with
the young people and the women, we have struggled to transform our present
into a prosperous and free future” (Kamano 2015, 89). In the same speech,
Alpha Condé explained what kind of specific initiatives his government has
taken to help women and youth:
In our country, where 70 percent of the population is below thirty, the
young people are the first architects of development. Then again, women,
who traditionally are the household’s pillars, have proofed their entre-
preneurial capacity and their capacity to redistribute their income for the
84 Expectations of the New President
well-being of the community. That is why I have set up the Women’s
Solidarity Fund and the Youth’s Solidarity Fund. […] and very soon, the
first part of these funds will be defrosted to encourage female entrepre-
neurship and to favour youth’s employment.
(Kamano 2015, 99)
When I asked the research participants how they had experienced Alpha
Condé’s first months and years in office, the President’s supporters praised his
initiatives. They were confident that their daily life would soon change for the
better. Many women hoped that the President would personally improve their
living conditions. In an interview, Madame Sakho and Mister Nabé, the two
vice-mayors, underlined the head of state’s engagement for women: “Alpha
Condé even said once: ‘When I will be in power, I will help the women’”
(interview, 22.11.2011). Sarata Cherif, responsible for Sogbé’s market office
and the RPG vice-president of her neighbourhood, explained:
President Alpha Condé will succeed in helping the people. But for this, I
ask the almighty God to give him a long life, that he can assure the state’s
survival. Because one of the President’s fundamental worries is to help
women. The President of the Republic wants to help women because
women suffer a lot.
(Interview, 31.01.2012)
These quotations illustrate that, at the time of research women took the Pre-
sident at his word and were convinced that he was serious about his engagement
for the female population. Simultaneously, they were closely watching every
measure he was taking, especially with regards to food prices. Further, Sarata
Cherif ’s statement illustrates how closely people in Guinea connect the state’s
well-being with that of the President.
In Kankan, the notion of change goes hand in hand with three factories
that have not operated since the time of Lansana Conté. Throughout field-
work, I heard people expressing their hope and sometimes even their convic-
tion that these factories – a cotton, a fruit, and a brick factory – or at least
one of them, would resume its or their work soon. The female minister of
industry at the time, Ramatoulaye Bah, fuelled the population’s expectations
during a Development Forum in November 2011, a one-day workshop during
which the performance of the Kankan’s prefecture was evaluated. Asked
whether the factories would restart shortly, she answered positively. The min-
ister of industries also informed the population that a firm was interested to
relaunch the cotton factory and that there were prospective buyers for the
other two factories. She added: “We will make a public tender for all the
factories in the country soon. During the campaign, the President promised
to create work, therefore we are working on it. And we also want to create
new factories” (recording, Development Forum, 13.11.2011). Sidiki Doum-
bouya, a graduate in his early thirties, was convinced that once the problem
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of electricity will be solved, the three factories would create many jobs. Juli-
ette Traoré, an elderly woman, said in an equally convinced manner:
Alpha [Condé] has also said that he will renew the cotton factory and the
brick factory. He says to all the youth to wait until the deputies’ election.
Once the deputies’ election is over, they will renew those two. That is why
Kankan’s young people are very happy now.
(Interview, 18.01.2012)
Alpha Condé’s discourse illustrates that the President constituted Guinea’s
population into broad categories, in this example women and youth. He con-
sidered women as being a homogenous group that has similar experiences,
habits, and dreams for their future. For Condé, these two segments of society
faced just two problems: unemployment and high food prices. Such a simplifi-
cation is exactly what James Scott (1998, 3) describes: According to him, state
representatives do not even aim at giving an overall, representative picture.
They only depict that part of society they are interested in. Condé’s images of
women and youth are taken up and reproduced by local authorities. Mister
Nabé, the vice-mayor, for example, said during a conference in which the
municipality’s performance has been evaluated: “We have to listen to the
population, especially to the women and youth” (recording, 20.12.2012).
Generally, the research participants were torn between hope for a better
future and everyday life’s hardship. Contrary to Kankan’s women, male
youths were not always patient, but expected immediate changes. Whenever
people were marching on the streets protesting publicly, young men, especially
pupils and students, have been at the forefront. At his first visit to Kankan as
President in August 2013, Alpha Condé was strongly criticised by young
men – also by those who had voted for him. The President was not prepared
for such a verbal attack in his stronghold Kankan and reacted by heavily
accusing these young men. The journal Guinée Libre (16.08.2013) wrote
about the incident: “Almost three years in charge of Guinea, confronted with
weak results and facing a population that does not seem to keep quiet any-
more given the accentuated misery in the country, the disinterest of donors
and international and national investor, the President Alpha Condé always
clumsily walls up behind his past as ‘the historical opponent against the
former governments that destroyed Guinea’s economy’.”
The ‘Train of Change’
In December 2012, the Guinean government initiated a soccer tournament in
the honour of the President’s second year in office. The government diffused
the notion of change on huge posters announcing the tournament’s final.
These posters were hung at popular places in central Kankan. The picture of
Alpha Condé, properly dressed in a suit, was prominently placed on the
poster. Besides him were pictures of two other powerful personalities: Nantou
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Cherif, the coordinator of the RPG coalition and the party’s first woman, and
Mohamed Lamine Fofana, the mining minister. Central to the whole com-
position was a train on whose side was written “train of change.” A rainbow,
the RPG coalition’s logo, was placed at the train’s front, indicating the source
of this change, namely the President’s party. This poster also hinted to one of
Condé’s promises, namely to rebuild the train that once connected Kankan to
Conakry. Taking into consideration the extremely bad condition of the road
at the time, the idea of a swift connection between Kankan and the capital
Conakry was very appealing and symbolic.
When I saw the poster, I decided to observe the people’s reaction to it.
While some were just passing by, many stopped, looked at it, and made
comments. A couple of women started praising their President. One waved to
him on the poster and said to her companion: ‘That is Alpha and the train.
Ah, our President.’ And the other women responded: ‘This is the picture of
Figure 3.1 Poster of the ‘Train of Change’
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our President Alpha. It is the train behind him, professor Alpha Condé, our
President.’ Another woman clapped her hands, started dancing and singing a
praise song for the head of state. And two men commented: ‘The train of
change has started. Those who want to jump on it can do so, the others stay
behind.’ And his friend added: ‘The train goes, change cannot be stopped
anymore. Now we support the soccer tournament.’
Despite the incident that occurred during the President’s visit to
Kankan, he has been quite successful in creating the image of a bright
future for his country. A future where the President, as the nation’s father,
will take care of his population; women will not suffer due to high food
prices and young people will find employment. The example of the above-
mentioned poster highlights that the President’s message was well received
by the population.
Considering the population’s support for the President in Kankan, it is not
surprising that Kankan’s women’s expectations in ‘their’ leader were enor-
mous. Sakoba Bérété, an elderly female vegetable vendor, said illustratively:
‘The country has been suffering for fifty years. Now Alpha will rebuild it’
(informal conversation, 08.02.2012). Especially (young) intellectuals expressed
their hope that with the help of women and youth, their country’s situation
would change for the better. Jeanne Konaté, a historian and lecturer at the
university, responded to my question what she would do if she was Guinea’s
President:
Me, as a woman, if I had the power, the first think we must face is the
problem with positions and embezzlement. As I want change, I will rely
on youth and women. For me, these two social strata can change the
situation.
(Interview, 12.12.2012)
In a nutshell, people in Kankan shared the hope for change. However,
how to achieve a bright future for Guinea and a better life for its inha-
bitants was strongly contested. Mohamed Saliou Camara (2014, 440)
points out that “purposeful change in today’s Guinea means different
things to different groups.” Alpha Condé’s supporters for example,
praised his efforts to ‘bring Guinea back’ onto the international arena.
They called for patience, like Mister Djakité, a bureaucrat working for
the prefecture who said: “Change will arrive slowly, not within one day”
(interview, 29.11.2011). Ordinary people but also the elite knew, that
when Alpha Condé came to power in 2010, “everything […] [was] a
priority” (Camara 2014, 440) in Guinea. When I asked Sakoba Mara, an
elderly woman, about what the local government should do for its inha-
bitants, she reacted jokingly: ‘Do not incite problems, because if you say
I should talk about all the things Kankan’s authorities should do, there
will be a problem, I have so many things to say in this regard’ (informal
conversation, 04.02.2013).
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Women Hoping for Change
Acting ‘Normally’
The government says: We will help the women. But you know it all too well,
that is not how it is. The government favours only a small group, that’s nepo-
tism. Only personal interests count, too bad for the others.
(Djénabou, informal conversation, 26.11.2012)
Embezzlement, nepotism, and corruption are topics that preoccupy many of the
research participants, regardless of their backgrounds. Alpha Condé too,
regularly promotes the fight against corrupt practices within his governments
and the administration. It is also a major concern of international donors. Peo-
ple’s ideas of how the government should function and how its numerous civil
servants should behave are quite precise. When the research participants talk
about governmental practices, they often use the term normalement (normally)
or dans des conditions normales (under normal circumstances) indicating their
normative understanding of how things ought to work against the background
of everyday experiences, what Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan (2008) calls prac-
tical norms. Representative is Safiatou Dramé’s statement, a young soon-to-be
doctor, who said: “Normally, the government should send an inspection on the
ground to check whether things work or not. But as long as this does not exist,
things are not easy” (interview, 14.11.2011).
In Kankan, stories and rumours about misappropriations of public funds
and other corrupt practices are widespread: They show up amongst others in
the local media, in men’s everyday discussions in cafés, women’s conversations
on the markets, and male youth’s gatherings around tea. In such conversations,
corruption at the local level as well as the national level is addressed: Missing
street lamps and unfriendly policemen in Kankan, the misappropriation of
public funds for the independence celebrations in Boké 2012, or corruption at
Conakry’s port. In the following, I illuminate some of these stories and explain
what kind of practices are regarded as legitimate or illegitimate, respectively, by
whom, and why. I also analyse what the research participants understand by
the notion normalement, for example by claiming that ‘the administration
should work normally’ (student, naturally occurring talk, 23.11.2012).
Corruption must be considered as “one mode of governance among
others,” as a part of “real governance” (Blundo and Le Meur 2009, 22–23). It
is routinised and notorious in African administrations and every citizen
encounters it on a daily basis. Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan (1999, 27) names
all illicit practices through which people enrich themselves illegally ‘corrup-
tion complex,’ which includes “nepotism, abuse of power, embezzlement and
various forms of misappropriation, influence-peddling, prevarication, insider
trading and abuse of the public purse […].” In emic terms, people throughout
francophone West Africa name corruption bouffer, literally eating. These
practices of petty corruption, in which practically everybody is involved, are
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usually not sanctioned. They are embedded in local habits of bargaining, gift-
giving, and solidarity networks. Petty and large-scale corruption are ambiva-
lent: On the one hand, people condemn the embezzlement of public funds for
private means, on the other hand, one’s own corrupt practices are typically
not considered as such, thus “corruption is someone else” (Olivier de Sardan
1999, 34). Christoph Kohl and Anita Schroven note that “Guineans felt
ashamed when in 2006 Transparency International ranked the country
amongst the most corrupt countries. While this sad news was transmitted on
public radio, it was widely commented on as a practice everyone may be
implicated in somehow. Having the ‘International Community’ alerted to the
fact was, however, even more shameful” (Kohl and Schroven 2014, 15).
In Kankan, the local police cause a lot of anger. The policemen and (to a
lesser extent) policewomen are considered lazy and illiterate, or as this market
woman expressed: ‘They do nothing but eating our money’ (field notes,
16.01.2012). The police’s practices are repeatedly a topic during call-in
broadcasts of the local, private radio stations. The research participants con-
sider the existence of such a public critique as a sign for the ongoing demo-
cratisation process. However, such transmissions are not just about criticising,
Bouba Sakho, a locally renowned radio journalist, explained. The call-in
broadcasts must be constructive, so that, for example, the traffic regulations
will finally improve. At the same time, Bouba Sakho lamented:
The policemen do not give any instructions, they only eat money, but that
is not their role. When they whistle, people turn around and this causes
accidents. They are especially mean to village people. I made this experi-
ence myself when I arrived in Kankan for studying.
(Informal conversation, 12.01.2012)
I had encounters with the traffic police several times and could observe their
practices repeatedly. Traffic policemen and policewomen, for example sit in
ambush at a crossroad. When a motorcycle drives by, they lose no time to
whistle and to bring the driver to a halt by positioning themselves in front of
the motorcycle. If they are fast enough, they remove the key from the ignition
switch, so as to leave the driver with no other option than to bargain his or
her way out. The exact same thing occurred to me when I was driving
through the city centre on Diaka’s motorcycle with Djénabou behind me at
the beginning of my field stay in Kankan. The policeman revealed that I did
not possess a valid insurance for Diaka’s motorcycle, as was probably the case
with most motorcycle owners in Kankan. Either you pay the bargained fine
or you are lucky enough to establish a personal connection to the policeman
or policewoman in question before he or she lets you go.
Once I noticed how a moped driver gave a policeman 2,000 Guinean francs
(approximately 20 euro cents). Thierno explained that the number of policemen
responsible for the traffic in Kankan is rather low. Thus, if you give a small
amount of money to one of them on a regular basis, they would later let you pass
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whenever you commit a major driving error. Thierno confirmed Bouba Sakho’s
observations concerning the difference in the policemen’s practices regarding
villagers or townsmen: While the former fear the traffic policemen, the latter
make fun of them by calling them clétamansa, literally meaning ‘head of the key
taker,’ because as described, once they stop you, they immediately take your key
to hinder you from driving on without paying a certain amount of money.
The same day, I saw how two policemen stopped a motorbike taxi with two
clients, a practice the government had recently forbidden. Nevertheless, one of
the policemen let them continue. Therefore, his boss wanted to know why. The
former responded that he knew these people; they were working for a locally
well-known person. The policeman’s boss, however, became furious and said:
‘It is not good to let people go if they have disregarded the rules. You have to
follow the law; you should not have let them pass’ (field notes, 25.01.2012).
This scene is typical of several civil servants’ ambivalent feelings: They are torn
between how they ought to behave ‘normally’ according to the law and the
reality of everyday corrupt practices. On the one hand, they denounce their
own behaviour, but, on the other hand, they justify it with references to pity
and personal connections, as Mister Djakité, working for the prefecture did:
In principle, in the memorandum of the public function, a cadre should
not serve five years in a row at the same place. If you exceed this, you
become automatically linked to this city. Then, you cannot behave law-
fully as you should. Me for example, I lasted here for all too long. If
someone comes or I see someone offending the law, I cannot correct him
or her because we see each other every day. We are connected, we know
each other. If I think of needy people, I cannot act as I ought to act.
(Interview, 29.11.2011)
From the emic perspective, the general condemnation of corrupt practices
does not contradict the expectations that state employees should profit from
their position if they do not want to become the subject of mockery. This can
be illustrated with the story of Mister Bah, a man who occupied a high posi-
tion at the gendarmerie. In early 2012, he had been retired even though he
was, according to Thierno, not old enough to be retired. This issue caused
heated debates amongst the men sitting in front of a shop we regularly vis-
ited. On the one hand, the men felt sympathetic; they said that Mister Bah
had done a good job and claimed that his retirement was due to his ethnic
identity: The government wanted to get rid of all Fulani in strong positions.
On the other hand, they criticised him for neither having built a house nor
having set up any kind of business that would enable him to lead a decent
life. ‘He hasn’t achieved anything!’ the men judged. This example reinforces
the notion of the “moral economy” (Olivier de Sardan 1999), the expecta-
tion that a civil servant, holding a lucrative position, should take advantage
of this and redistribute the profits among his or her network, especially
among the family.
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People in Kankan regularly discuss local and national civil servants’ cor-
rupt practices. While women rather complain about missing services, con-
versations among men in cafés frequently turn to the subject of state
employees’ big houses or fancy cars. Obviously, none of the low or middle
rank civil servants can afford such objects of prestige with their mere salary.
The following extract from a debate between two elderly men in a café is
illustrative. They were discussing whether a certain minister under Lansana
Conté was embezzling public funds or not:
A: Everybody embezzles money. All Guineans are thieves, even the chefs de
quartier. In Conakry, they have beautiful cars. With whose money do
they pay for them? That is the proof that they all embezzle money.
During the time of Conté, everybody was an authorised thief but if you
say this in front of the crowd, they will beat you. The whole country is in
default and you still defend the government.
B: Everybody who steals and invests abroad is a thief. If, however, they do the
same thing in Guinea, they are no thieves. (Field notes, 27.02.2012)
This conversation shows that while certain practices, such as misusing public
funds that are reinvested in Guinea or the small-scale embezzlement of public
funds for private means, is appropriate for some, but illicit for others. The way
of looking at corrupt practices depends on who commits these acts, the scale
of embezzlement, who is harmed, and who profits.
Common to discussions about corruption is a general mistrust vis-à-vis politi-
cians, intellectuals, and people holding public offices. They are considered as
‘living on another planet,’ as leading a life very detached from the ones of ordinary
people in Kankan. The research participants, regardless of their background, reg-
ularly lament about politicians who just talk without keeping their promises.
Nantènin Nabé, a female petty trader said for example: “What politicians say is
not correct. Generally, we say politicians lie. Because they do not succeed in doing
what they say” (interview, 08.11.2011). People in Kankan not only complain
about corrupt practices, they also mention, whenever someone from the local
government ‘fait quelque chose de bien’ (does something helpful) for the city’s
inhabitants. This could be simply listening to the population’s daily concerns, not
being particularly evil, or settling disputes in a way that is satisfactory for all
involved parties. However, local state employees are usually denounced for being
selfish. Djénabou once explained this with the help of a metaphor:
If you appoint a person as governor, he will do what the minister does: The
personal interest counts. If you appoint him as governor, he will not think of
the whole population. Likewise, if the thunder rumbles, everyone covers his or
her own head. If it rains, everyone covers his or her own head. Even the two
of us, everyone protects just herself. That is to illustrate that the governor does
not try to help others, everyone is just looking for his or her own interests.
(Informal conversation, 04.02.2013)
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Have Corrupt Practices Changed?
Not only ordinary people in Kankan but also Alpha Condé complained about
corruption: On several occasions, he accused Guinean state employees in general
and the members of his own government in particular, of being corrupt; a fact he
wanted to change. In an interview with Jeune Afrique (16.07.2012), the President
said: “One of our biggest problem is that certain civil servants only see their own
interest and plunder the country. Our chance is that they will soon be retired and
we hope that the younger generation will act differently.” Such a discourse
against corruption, however, does not say anything about the head of state’s
actual practices. As Jean-François Bayart (1993, 226) notes “there is no real
paradox in seeing all new presidents start off their terms in office with a severe
critique of corruption, only to allow their own factions to help themselves to
wealth before even their first term is up.” And indeed, Alpha Condé himself is
repeatedly accused of being involved in corruption within the mining sector.
Nevertheless, many of the research participants, especially supporters of the
RPG, believed in the declared change and saw first improvements regarding
corruption, namely in the educational sector. In former times, people who
had enough money could bargain with their children’s teachers for the latter
to pass exams or be promoted to the next year. At the time of fieldwork,
many research participants – also those who do not support the President –
told me that this has strongly diminished. Djénabou noticed revision groups
during the evening all around the city, something that had not been so wide-
spread before. And Sala, Madame Fofana’s foster son who still went to
school, told me that nowadays they had monthly exams. Further, the parents
were to sign every result at the end of term and they had to fetch the school
reports personally. Due to this new rigorous policy, the results of the bacca-
lauréat (school leaving exams) at the end of term in 2011 were a catastrophe.
An elderly man, holding a high position within the governorate, explained
that even his own son had failed it – and he, his father, had been happy about
it; he was aware that his son did not have the necessary level of skills (inter-
view, 16.11.2011). The research participants made two persons responsible for
this change: The President and the minister of education. Mama Kandé, a
woman born in the early 1970s and long-distance trader, said:
The studies are normal now and I appreciate that. This change at the
educational sector is positive. It came about because a professor is the
head of state, this type of professor who lived in the West and studied
there. He cannot accept corruption in this sector.
(Interview, 01.10.2011)
However, people do not evaluate changes in every sector as positive; in fact,
some persons are quite sceptical. Doussou Sherif, a woman born in the mid-
1940s who had actively been fighting for the RPG during the Conté era, saw
in Alpha Condé’s entourage the cause for the lack of amelioration. How can
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people become honest from one day to the next, she asked me rhetorically. If
the President, for example, imports rice for the benefit of the whole population
and only intellectuals profit, this is because the President surrounded himself
with dishonest people, Doussou Sherif determined (interview, 18.10.2011).
According to the research participants, corrupt practices could cease only if the
population’s spirit in general and that of civil servants in particular changed.
Hereby the research participants used similar words to Alpha Condé, who
said: “Slowly, we will change things, but changing the Guinean mentality will
take time, I do not delude myself” (Jeune Afrique 16.07.2012). Many research
participants share the idea that a change at the highest political level does not
necessary lead to changes in everyday practices because the corrupt system
remains the same. Therefore, change is difficult to achieve; it does not come
overnight. Alpha Amadou Bano Barry (25.12.2013), a Guinean sociologist,
approves. According to him, state employees do not work properly but just
profit from the work done by others. Bano Barry leads this behaviour back to a
lack of honesty and modesty. Asked whether she has seen any change during
the last years, Madame Kouyaté, a low civil servant, affirmed:
What is changing now is the Guinean’s mentality. I appreciate Alpha
Condé’s attitude a lot. Change must start with the authorities. They must
proof that the abnormal things that have happened do not reoccur.
Change starts with behaviour; it is in the heart.
(Interview, 21.11.2011)
As noted, the President as well as ordinary people imagine women and youth
as agents of change the President tries to promote, while they consider the
elderly generation of (mostly male) civil servants as impeding factors. The
research participants noted some positive changes, notably within the educa-
tional sector. However, everyday corrupt practices remained a constant issue
of contestation at the national and local levels.
Delivering Services
Women’s everyday political articulations circle around issues of huge impor-
tance to their daily lives: By which means of transport do I reach the market?
Do I have enough money to buy the ingredients for today’s meal? Is there
enough water for our needs in the well or do I have to pay extra money for it
at the public pump? These themes are at the core of women’s daily conversa-
tions. Once, I asked Thierno and Djénabou in which areas, according to
them, the state should intervene. Thierno mentioned that the government
must build roads and bridges, deliver basic infrastructure such as electricity
and water, build football pitches, and provide security. In case of strikes, the
government should appease the population peacefully, and not react violently.
Further, the police must arrive immediately in case of accidents, and the fire
brigades in case of fires (field notes, 26.11.2012).
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While I have twice observed members of the police making investigations
at accident scenes, Kankan does not have a fire brigade. I became drastically
aware of this deficiency the day I was sitting beside Djénabou in front of their
house while she was preparing the evening meal. Suddenly we heard screams
and, from a distance, we could see smoke rising from a hut. Djénabou rose
quickly and rushed to where the shouting was coming from; I followed her. A
large crowd had already arrived and organised: People were fetching water
from nearby wells. They lined up and handed the buckets filled with water
from one person to the next until the burning hut. Like this, the people
could prevent the fire from spreading to neighbouring buildings and finally
to extinguish it altogether. Even though the fire had destroyed the hut and
the furniture in it, nobody was injured. A woman from the affected family
wept and thanked the neighbours for their help: ‘I would not know what to
do without you, thank you! I do not have any money, but God will com-
pensate you. Thank you and thanks God for our spirit of solidarity!’ (field
notes, 18.01.2013). Some days later, Djénabou told me that many persons
from the neighbourhood had given clothes, money, or blankets to the affec-
ted family. This incident illustrated what people expect from their govern-
ment, namely its assistance in case of need. The lack of a fire brigade caused
displeasure and was deplored after every major incident. However, if such
governmental support is paltry or completely absent, people just depend on
each other.
As Djénabou argues, the government must assure food security, reduce the
high costs of living, create jobs, and provide high quality health care and
infrastructure. In addition, governmental support is essential in the field of
education, Djénabou stressed. The government must also reinforce peace and
assure equal development within all communities. Lastly, it must implement
the rule of law and assure human rights, especially those of women (field
notes, 26.11.2012). I have heard similar expectations repeatedly. This under-
lines Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan’s (2014, 400) findings, according to which
“public or collective goods and services are first and foremost goods and ser-
vices that are perceived by the vast majority of users as a social necessity, and,
either directly or indirectly, as coming under the state’s duties towards these
users.” The (local) government’s achievements in Guinea are always evaluated
against these normative expectations of service delivery. However, realities are
different, as Djéné Sakho’s statement, a woman in her forties who sells food
to the students in a café, accurately stated: “People in Kankan have too many
needs” (interview, 15.11.2011).
Kankan’s population is convinced that the city’s infrastructure does not
do justice with regards to its size in terms of inhabitants. Thomas
O’Toole and Janice E. Baker (2005, 121) echo this feeling that Kankan is
“more a large cluster of Maninka villages around an administrative and
commercial core than truly urban area” (O’Toole and Baker 2005, 121).
Mister Khalil, a high civil servant, agreed. He said on the occasion of
the Development Forum:
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Kankan has a huge economic potential and important natural and
human resources for a prosperous economy, but it is still totally under-
developed. […] The deficit is very big. I welcome everyone to invest so
that Kankan finds again its real value of this country’s second city as the
professor Alpha Condé has recently expressed well.
(Recordings, 12.11.2011)
Since Alpha Condé came to power, the population in Kankan hopes that
their city will finally profit from different infrastructural projects. One such
project, namely the asphalting of Kankan’s main roads, had already been
launched at the time of Dadis Camara’s rule. The old roads, locally referred
to as Sékou Touré’s roads, are full of potholes and do not reach the more
recently established neighbourhoods. How many kilometres of newly tar-
macked roads a city gets and which neighbourhoods profit is a highly political
issue. Amadou Condé, a young graduate who has good relations to the local
RPG elite, explained why one particular road within a neighbourhood in
central Kankan has been asphalted. According to him, two elderly men who
are holding high positions within the local RPG reside there. In addition, the
Kaba Guiter’s secretary, the Guinean company that has overseen the road
construction, also lives there. Amadou Condé confirmed my conclusion that
it is very helpful to have good networks in a place like Kankan (informal
conversation, 19.12.2012).
In Kankan, water supply is a major problem, especially during the dry
season. While some families in the city centre have taps, the majority fetch
their water from private or public wells. As fetching water is a female task,
this issue bothers women more than men. Before mid-2012, electricity depen-
ded on private generators. Then, public electricity became available during the
night, but its availability was very unreliable and from time to time it stopped
working completely. Contestations over Guinea Electricity (Electricité de
Guinée, EDG), that was responsible for electricity allocation in Kankan,
could be heard everywhere. Some said EDG did not pay its employees so the
latter sold the connection for an exaggerated price to earn some money;
others claimed that people stole the poles’ wires. The local EDG director
typically responded to the accusations by explaining on the various local
radio stations why electricity was not working by hinting at the lack of fuel
(Guinée News 07.12.2014). Here, the director rejects all kind of personal
responsibility and makes the state accountable for the problem. This kind of
argumentation is also used by other individuals such as policemen and
policewomen or teachers, who transfer the guilt up the hierarchical ladder
and thereby whitewash themselves.
The partial availability of electricity, however, had a major impact on the
city centre: While it had usually been quite deserted after sunset in late 2011,
it was much more animated in November 2012. People – mostly men – met at
illuminated places; they sat in front of shops, in newly established food stands,
or in maquis, local cook shops. But women, too, greatly welcomed the
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electricity as Néné Sagno’s statement, a woman born in the early 1950s, indi-
cated: “Everybody talks about change. But what will bring change about? It
is electricity. If there is electricity, factories will come” (interview, 15.11.2011).
While people from the local government as well as Kankan’s population
praised their President for such changes, his supporters seldom made him per-
sonally responsible if something did not work properly. A case in point is the
issue of the solar-powered street lamps that were said to be financed by the
Chinese. When the first of them started operating in the Sogbe neighbourhood,
the private radio station spread the news. ‘Everybody congratulated the pro-
fessor,’ Thierno and Djenabou, who had been on the spot, reported. According
to the emic perception, these solar-powered street lamps implied an image of
modernity and security. But soon after their installation, the controversies star-
ted: In the cafés, on the markets, and during call-in radio shows, people sus-
pected the local government, especially the prefect, to have taken some of them
for their own purposes: Why were there some street lamps at remote places
where rich and well-connected people live, such as the First Lady’s family? Why
were there not enough for all major roads? Who has taken them? One prominent
radio journalist was asking these questions publicly until the prefect justified
himself and the matter was more or less settled (field notes, 21.11.2012).
Reducing Food Prices
Food prices have been the most frequent and most hotly debated issue
amongst the female research participants. This does not come as a surprise
considering economic problems and tight family budgets. As women are
usually responsible for buying aliments and for cooking, many of their con-
cerns circle around this matter. When I asked about whether they saw any
change since the arrival to power of Alpha Condé, most women responded by
hinting at the alimentation prices, especially of rice. The female research par-
ticipants recalled exactly how much one had to pay at the local market for a
specific amount of rice, sugar, or oil in comparison to some months or years
before. When I asked Nantènin Nabé, a bonbon vendor and a mother of five
children, about women’s main preoccupations, she answered: “Women say:
‘Kankan is difficult, Kankan is tough.’ That is essentially what women have
in their minds: Life is very expensive at the moment” (interview, 08.11.2011).
Throughout the world, food prices are root causes of demonstrations,
strikes, and riots. Thus, they easily turn into a highly politicised issue or as
Donald M. Nonini (2014, 394) puts it “food and politics are inextricably
connected.” This particularly holds true for Guinea, where the rice price, the
population’s staple food, is a very delicate matter as it is highly intermingled
with the political sphere: “In Guinea, rice alimentation has become linked to
the state performing its care for the public’s welfare. As the primary staple
food, rice has long played a particular historic and ceremonial role and still
does today, when the majority of the country lives on subsidized rice imports”
(Schroven 2019: 157).
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One such riot caused by the population’s dissatisfaction with the high living
costs took place in Kankan on March 21, 2011, just a few months after
Alpha Condé’s inauguration. The demonstrators made demands for the local
government to leave, with the slogans, amongst others, ‘zéro gouvernement’
(worthless government) and ‘zéro changement’ (no change) (Guinée Actu
26.03.2011). Since the rice price rose remarkably compared to the period
before the presidential elections (IRIN 2011a), such demonstrations occurred
in other Guinean towns too, especially in the capital city. However, the prices
for staple food were particularly high in Kankan. “Ironically, as Guinea loses
its pariah status and attempts to become a functioning democracy, living
costs are increasing and patience is being severely tested” (IRIN 2011a).
Problematic in this regard is – as we saw in Chapter 2 – that the population’s
suffering due to the high living costs easily translated into the accusation
towards the Fulani traders. In view of the population’s impatience, Alpha
Condé called Guinea an “agricultural scandal” (Kamano 2015, 108, author’s
translation) and announced he would make food self-sufficiency one of his
key priorities. Interestingly, the President here uses the same discourse as
Sékou Touré during the socialist era. In a speech one month after his inau-
guration, Condé declared: “We will give them [the women] rice to sell. If there
is some benefit in there, it will be the women who profit” (AfricaLog
26.01.2011). By this promise, the head of state addressed the core of women’s
daily concerns.
People in Guinea generally judge past and current Presidents by the food
situation they faced at the time. Néné Sagno, an elderly woman, explained her
support of Lansana Kouyaté’s PEDN by referring to the period he had acted as
prime minister. According to Sagno, Kouyaté had helped the poor, especially the
women, by reducing food prices (interview, 15.11.2011). Interestingly, I heard
very contradictory statements of whether the food prices increased or whe-
ther they rose since Alpha Condé became Guinea’s President, perhaps
because Kankan’s population’s expectations in ‘their’ President have been
tremendous. Condé’s supporters, on the one hand, applauded the govern-
ment’s efforts to make the country food self-sufficient and, on the other hand,
laudably mentioned how the imported rice helped in reducing the prices.
Doussou Sherif, an elderly woman who has actively supported the RPG from
its beginning, was full of hope: “With Alpha [Condé] we have noticed a
massif arrival of rice. Does this not make us dream of a change? With Alpha
there is hope that things will change” (interview, 18.10.2011). Opposed to this
supportive voice of Condé’s policies are statements such as the following by
Oumou Diallo, a Fulani vendor and the mother of six children who lives in a
polygamous household:
OUMOU DIALLO: I did not see any positive change and I do not think change
will come; it is extremely tough. I do not think Guinea will move forward
because things are too expensive and the prices rise ceaselessly.
CAROLE: Whose mistake is this?
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OUMOU DIALLO: Since Alpha [Condé] is in power, the prices rise all the time,
they do not come down. Alpha has sought power for twenty years. He
should start working as soon as he becomes President: The prices of the
ingredients, the rice, the food in general must cost less. But he was seek-
ing power for twenty years, then he became head of state and he still
increased the prices. It cannot work like this. (Interview, 8.11.2011)
Whether one judges the changes regarding food prices that occurred under
Alpha Condé as positive or negative, both sides make the President and his
government responsible for the current situation. Thus, the conviction that
Guinea’s President is responsible for the rice price is widespread. As men-
tioned above, the research participants presented the head of state as an
omnipotent person who should care for its people. Mike McGovern (2007,
134) sees in this attitude a legacy of the Guinean socialist period when the
population expected the state to solve their (personal) problems. Furthermore,
ordinary people are depicted as innocent victims without any possibility to
influence their situations. Women, especially, did not mention the times when
their actions visibly influenced the government’s practices, even though they
told me about women bargaining with the local government regarding food
circulation or public protests against harsh living condition. Thus, Kankan’s
citizens see the state as “the [reciprocal] morality of the family” (Jackson
2007, 45). Similarly, Andrea A. Kaufmann (2016, 131) writes regarding
Liberia: “Many see the president as the decisive authority holding ultimate
responsibility of what happens or does not happen […].”
To sum up, the research participants, especially the female ones, consider the
food prices in general and the rice price in particular, to be an indicator of whether
or not the proclaimed change has taken place. This judgment, then again, depends
on a person’s attitude towards the President, thus whether she or he supports him.
Typically, this support is linked to ethnic identity: While Manding people in
Kankan by and large voted for Alpha Condé, the Fulani generally supported his
counterpart Cellou Dallein Diallo. Both sides made the head of state ultimately
responsible for the food prices. If they do not decrease, this is taken as a sign that
Alpha Condé does not have “the people at heart” (Kaufmann 2016, 134).
Women do not consider their complaining about high food prices as a
political act. Even though they see it as the President’s responsibility to take
their daily concerns seriously and, finally, to do something about it, these
forms of political articulations are thought of as being outside the political
sphere. Thus, they are perfect examples of everyday politics. The concluding
statement by Amine Kouyaté, a young mother of three children who com-
pletely covers her body when leaving the house, nicely illustrates how Kan-
kan’s women typically depict their sphere of influence:
If women have problems, they must talk about it on the radio, at the TV,
in public places more generally. They must mobilise and go there to say
what they have to say. At the same time, they can talk about it to men.
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Because if women suffer, men also suffer. It is vice versa. Women must
say a little bit everywhere that they suffer and that things do not go well.
(Interview, 25.11.2011)
Conclusions: Between High Hopes and Disillusions
When Alpha Condé came to power, he was in a similar situation as many
other (African) Presidents: He had taken over a country that was facing many
political, social, and economic problems. His main strategy for calming the
population in this tumultuous transitional period was by promoting the idea
of change. However, the expectations of the President’s supporters were high;
they wanted to see immediate changes. The image of Guinea as a dustbin
shows that the population was aware of the difficult situation it faced – also
compared to neighbouring countries. Jokingly, some students even wanted to
sell their homeland to lead a better life elsewhere funded by the proceeds of
the sale. The President tried to foster confidence and disseminated the notion
of change among a population he wanted to win over, for his projects and as
voters for the upcoming legislative elections.
Alpha Condé promoted change mainly through his speeches, which were
aimed at two groups of addressees, namely the Guinean population and the
‘International Community’. By underlining the positive changes his country
had undergone since his empowerment, especially regarding democratisation
and good governance, the head of state addressed an international audience:
the ambassadors and the government they represent, NGOs, private investors
(mainly in the mining sector), and international organisations such as the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union
(AU), the EU, and the UN. As his numerous visits in foreign countries further
point out, Alpha Condé made an enormous effort to ‘bring Guinea back’
onto the international political arena. Thereby, he mainly wanted to attract
foreign investment.
The President’s emphasis on youth and women was, to some extent, also
directed at his international audience along similar interests, in line with the
international donors and development industry’s discourse. Alpha Condé
tried to show that he was concerned about the population’s well-being and
that the NGOs’ and international investors’ future engagement would fall on
fertile ground. The research participants applauded the President’s efforts in
this regard. They proudly told me about the democratic transformations the
country had recently gone through. And they were convinced that the Gui-
nean population would profit once ‘Guinea was back’ on the international
arena. Especially Kankan’s students and graduates were persuaded that
sanctions would fall after the legislative elections and, therefore, foreign
investors would enter the country and help rebuilding its infrastructure.
One important element related to change was corruption, that is, how
people ought to behave ‘normally’. In his speeches, the President urged the
state employees at every administrative level to work properly and not to get
involved in corrupt practices. The theme of corruption was also constantly
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present in interviews, informal conversations, and naturally occurring talks I
listened to. Rumours and stories about misappropriations circulated fast. By
and large, the local population did not welcome corruption but nevertheless,
taking one’s share or bouffer (eating) was a widespread practice which was
accepted to a certain degree. At the same time, the research participants
expected the government and its (local) employees to set a good example. As a
local saying goes: ‘When the head is well made, the body follows.’ Especially
after the country’s first democratic elections, at least some change should
become visible, they stated. After all, a democracy is not a ‘mafiacracy’.
Kankan’s population share the idea of how statehood should look like in a
positive future to come: The state’s representatives, especially the President
who embodies the state, should care for its citizens by delivering services,
providing basic infrastructure, and reducing the prices for staple food, espe-
cially rice. The head of state should act as a good and responsible father who
takes care of his children. As Sakoba Mara, an elderly woman, put it: ‘Our
leaders should do for the whole population the same things they do for their
families, without exceptions’ (informal conversation, 04.02.2013). If the Pre-
sident or local state employees do not act accordingly, they do not love the
country’s inhabitants, the research participants claimed. However, I also heard
the opposite views. Mostly intellectual voices accused Kankan’s inhabitants of
expecting too much from the state. Aissatou Diakité, a female graduate,
exclaimed: “People remain with folded arms, asking everything from the gov-
ernment” (interview, 08.10.2011). Saa Daffé, a male graduate working for Kaba
Guiter, also condemned the local population’s passiveness; the government
cannot do everything for its citizens, he stressed (interview, 14.12.2011)
Alpha Condé’s election was accompanied by high hopes and expectations on
the part of Kankan’s inhabitants. He should especially care for women, the female
research participants claimed. Their expectations were fuelled by the President’s
discourse according to which he wanted to make women and youth his priorities.
For the female research participants, the notion of change was directly linked to
food prices – a topic which was one of the most prevalent in all their conversa-
tions. The idea that the President can do something about food prices is not made
up out of thin air: Sékou Touré and Lansana Condé (at least until the 1990s) set
Guinea’s rice prices. Now, Alpha Condé should do the same, the female research
participants stated. This expectation is shared amongst ordinary and intellectual
women of all ages alike. Generally, women made the President personally
responsible, if they could hardly afford their evening meals. Especially those who
did not support Alpha Condé liked to invent new nicknames for him: They named
him the ‘power of the yam’ or ‘Alpha konkon’ (literally: Alpha hunger). Such
nicknames illustrate how closely the economic and the political sphere are inter-
linked when it comes to female claim-making.
The research participants evaluated the notion of change produced by the
head of state against the backdrop of everyday life, which remained difficult
and complex; in Kankan, all too many commodities were sparse and basic
infrastructure was lacking. Many research participants shared a feeling of
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being forgotten by the Guinean state. Regardless of this experience, they still have
numerous expectations of statehood. As Begona Aretxaga (2003, 394) writes:
“The desire of statehood continues to be intense in many parts of the world, in
spite, or perhaps because of, the hollowed-out character of the state.” Why do
normative expectations regarding infrastructure and basic service delivery vis-a-vis
the (local) government prevail, even if it has been disappointing its population for
decades? The expectations of the male, but especially the female, research partici-
pants hint at the success of statehood practices in self-staging an image of a strong
state, so that its citizens would still believe in its capacities.
Change does not occur rapidly and always goes in multiple directions;
hence, change may be contradictory. This can also be detected when super-
ficial change occurs suddenly, for example when a new President is elected:
The everyday difficulties of the population’s majority persist. Similarly,
governmental practices and institutional routines do not change swiftly.
Proclaimed changes in this regard are all too often of rather symbolic value,
because significant administrative reforms are difficult to carry out (Hansen
and Stepputat 2001, 29). Due to the many existing complexities, “change does
not generate shifts from one coherent formation to another” (Warren 2002,
378). Therefore, Franz Benda-Beckmann and Keebet Benda-Beckman
prompt anthropological research not to focus too much on normality nor on
change but rather to look for everything in-between such as uncertainty and
insecurity, which “link the present with the past and the future” (Benda-
Beckmann and Benda-Beckman 2000, 7).
Till Förster (2013, 7) notes that “[c]harismatic leaders disseminate their
images of an alternative social order among their followers, who would then
adopt them and make them their own.” Even though this might hold true for
rather apparent and tumultuous transformations, I argue that long-term change
can also be brought about by segments of a society that remain hidden and
whose actors are rather invisible for outside observers. Women are one such very
important segment of society, and long neglected in historical research.
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4 The Guinean State Doing Gender
Introduction
Gender relations are also bargained over within state institutions, which not
only produce and reproduce relations between men and women, but also
those between other groups within a society, based for example on ethnicity
or age. In this chapter, I aim to analyse the official state discourse regarding
women. Questions are raised dealing with such issues as: How is the gender
discourse expressed in officials’ speeches? What do official practices in relation
to gender look like? What policies are directly aimed at women? Why does the
President want women to form associations and what are ordinary women’s
reactions in this respect? I answer these questions on the one hand, by analys-
ing the local and the regional Office of Women’s and Children’s Affairs, and on
the other hand, by paying close attention to how the President’s wife, Djènè
Kaba Condé, interprets her role as First Lady.
In 1982, Guinea ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 2012, the country also ratified the
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa.1 The Guinean government has revised the constitution in
order to eliminate all discrimination based on gender in 2001 (OECD 2015, 1).
Still, the Guinean Civil Code, that was valid at the time of research, contained
discriminatory articles: Article 284 for example, declared that people under the
age of twenty-one needed the consent of their fathers before marrying. Further-
more, the husband was the head of household (article 324) and had parental
authority (article 396). Women were obliged to live in their husband’s house
(article 331). Regarding divorce, women did not have equal rights compared to
men either (articles 341 and 342). In 2016, the Civil Code was revised to eradi-
cate those discriminatory articles and to be in line with the CEDAW. Both par-
ents now have parental authority (article 475). While polygyny was officially
forbidden (but was a widespread practice) by the former civil code (article 315),
the current one officially gives the husband the choice between monogamy and
polygyny (article 282) (République de Guinée 2015, 2016).
In 2014, the Guinean government published a report to provide an over-
view on its objectives regarding gender equality and the obstacles concerning
its implementation. Generally, these goals are in line with the MDG launched
by the UN, especially number three, the promotion of gender equality and
women’s empowerment. The report lists many issues the Guinean government
wants to tackle: The fight against gender inequalities, the fostering of
women’s (economic) independence, the promotion of girls’ school enrolment,
the reduction of women’s poverty, the increase in their access to high-quality
health infrastructure, and, lastly, the elimination of violence against women;
and there, especially, the eradication of female genital mutilation (République
de Guinée 2014). According to this report, the promotion of women’s asso-
ciations and NGOs is an important tool of increasing gender equality in
Guinea. Additionally, “fora, workshops, public holidays [and] international meet-
ings” are considered as means to sensitise the population in this regard (Répub-
lique de Guinée 2014, 6, author’s translation). Yet, the report names socio-cultural
factors that hamper the implementation of the government’s objectives. Besides,
the legal texts that protect women are not applied due to the lack of financial
resources and general poverty (République de Guinée 2014, 36).
In Guinea, gender equality is locally understood as the promotion of
women. The Guinean government and its employees frame the female popu-
lation especially the not ‘formally’ educated women as the needy, immature,
and vulnerable part of society, who are devoid of agency. There are various
official policies aimed at women, but not at men. Such state activities in
relation to gender have been categorised by scholars through the concept of
state feminism (Mazur and McBride 2007). One way in which state feminism
is implemented is by concentrating the different efforts concerning gender and
women within one ministry. The goal of these women’s ministries, which are
stereotypically headed by a woman, is to coordinate and implement the state’s
policies concerning the female population. The discourse and practices of
women’s ministries often fall in line with the perception of the ‘International
Community’ of gender (in)equality. They do not necessarily change the status
quo, but they can also reinforce the male domination of the state. Therefore,
their utility is contested: “It is argued that women’s ministries are often ‘ghet-
toized’, as they are often conceptualised as essentially welfare structures,
incorporating concerns of children and disabled persons. Further, that the
existence of such a ministry discourages the integration of gender into broader
national policies because women’s concerns are relegated to the ministry of
women’s affairs” (Mabandla 1994, 25; see also Tripp 2003, 252).
In view of such critics, South Africa, for example, did not opt for a women’s
ministry but created a “national machinery for gender equality that encom-
passes all levels and spheres of government” (Britton 2006, 70). In Guinea, on
the contrary, there exists a Ministry of Women’s and Children’s Affairs (con-
cretely named: Ministère de l’Action Sociale, de la Promotion Féminine et de
l’Enfance), a fact that Filomina Chioma Steady (2011, 62) considers as part
of “some progress toward greater equality.” The ministry has its branches at
every administrational level, namely the national, the prefectural, and the
mayoral levels. The interactions between the (female) population and state
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employees at a local Office of Women’s and Children’s Affairs will be dis-
cussed in the first section of this chapter. Overall, I argue that the govern-
ment’s official way of handling women complies with the international
discourse on gender equality and women’s promotion. In reality, however,
ordinary women have difficulties accessing the different administrative units –
also those of the Women’s and Children’s Affairs – which further enhances
gender inequalities.
I then look at the First Lady Syndrome, that is, how the wives of (African)
Presidents, thanks to their position, campaign for gender equality and women’s
rights (Ibrahim 2004, 1). First Ladies typically represent the government’s
human and ‘soft’ side by officially taking care of matters regarding healthcare,
education, and women’s economic empowerment, while their husbands’ duty is
to deal with the daily challenges of ‘hard’ politics, that is, with economic and
political issues. Through their discourse and actions, the First Ladies try to
illustrate how much the Presidents care for their populations, especially the
women and children. By creating NGOs for the benefit of ordinary women and
participating in congresses that deal with subjects such as human rights,
women’s political and economic participation, and health issues, First Ladies
tune into the international development and gender discourse. However, the
commitments and actions of Presidents’ wives mostly serve their cliques’ own
interests and not the broader female population (Mama 1997, 41).
Djènè Kaba Condé, Alpha Condé’s wife, is no exception. As soon as she
became Alpha Condé’s wife, she started campaigning for her husband and
promoted gender equality and women’s rights. Djènè Kaba Condé presents
herself as a representative of the country’s female population, even though she
has little in common with an ordinary Guinean woman who is not highly
educated and does not have a permanent and well-paid position. In this
chapter, I will analyse how Djènè Kaba Condé interprets her role as First
Lady. What do her actions tell us about the gendered Guinean state and how
it imagines the female population? Then, I describe the controversial staging
of Djènè Kaba Condé’s arrival in Kankan and her stay in the city.
The Office of Women’s and Children’s Affairs
As mentioned above, in Guinea, all issues concerning women are bundled in the
Office of Women’s and Children’s Affairs. At the time of the research, Hadja
Nantènin Cherif, who later acted as the coordinator of the party-coalition RPG-
arc-en-ciel and was one of the most influential women in Guinea, headed the
women’s ministry. Hadja Nantènin Cherif had nominated the regional director
of the Office of Women’s and Children’s Affairs in Kankan. The regional direc-
tor, a woman, did not want to participate in this research, thus I here focus on
the Local and Prefectural Office of Women’s and Children’s Affairs. The position
at the prefectural level had been vacant for three years until Madame Konaté
was appointed and took office in 2012 (informal conversation, 22.01.2013). She
is an impressive lady, not only in terms of her weight, but also in terms of her
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dresses and jewellery.2 Madame Konaté was quite sceptical about me asking
questions and she did not want to give an interview. But whenever Thierno and I
visited her office, we were asked to sit down and we had a short, casual con-
versation. During these visits, we got a glimpse of who came and what kinds of
interaction took place in her office. Madame Kanté, the director of the Local
Office of Women’s and Children’s Affairs who agreed to participate in this
research, in contrast, does not have an office at the municipality.
In terms of their fields of duties, there are not many differences between
Madame Konaté and Madame Kanté. Obviously, the former has more respon-
sibility and decision-making power than the latter as she is placed higher up on
the hierarchical structure. One of their scopes of functions is to organise special
events such as the International Women’s Day or the International Girls’ Day.
There, the procedure resembles other state orchestrated events such as the
independence celebrations: Various women and girls’ associations’ parade. Its
members typically wear shirts with slogans or a uniform dress, called sobi. In
2012, the slogan on these sobi read: ‘Women at the heart of change; 8 of March
International Women’s Day in Kankan, Ministry of Social Affairs, of the Pro-
motion of Women and Children’ (field notes, 12.03.2012). This resonated the
national motto: ‘The Guinean woman in the dynamic for change and national
reconciliation.’ Here, once again, Alpha Condé’s emphasis on change and
reconciliation are reproduced. At these Women’s Days, middle ranking and high
state employees enumerate the government’s actions regarding gender equality
and especially women’s economic promotion. The content of these talks goes
hand in hand with the international gender discourse. According to two female
state officials, the goal of such events is to unite women and to make it a joyful
day, as a recompense for women’s daily struggles (informal conversations,
19.01.2012 and 12.03.2012). Additionally, fora are organised where issues such
as violence against girls and women, their legal situation, or the problem of
female employment are addressed. Additionally, the local and national media
interview (local) Big Women about these topics.
Madame Konaté and Madame Kanté are also implied whenever major
problems with women emerge in Kankan, as it has been the case when the
market women had to unblock a road besides Dibida market in February
2012. Another duty is to stay in contact with women’s associations and to
accredit them. According to Madame Konaté, there are three types of
women’s associations: Those who are officially accredited and active; those
who are officially accredited but inactive; and, lastly, those who are active but
not officially accredited. The regional director told me that she tries to get in
contact with the presidents of all those associations. Then, she asks what kind
of activities they have been doing in the past, what kind of problems they are
currently facing, and lastly, she motivates those who are not accredited to do
so (informal conversation, 23.02.2012). Madame Konaté complained that all
too many women’s associations have lost confidence in her office, as her post
has been vacant for three years. Now, she ‘sensitises’ them to regain their
trust, Madame Konaté explained (informal conversation, 22.01.2013). She
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furthermore lamented that many of her intended projects could not be exe-
cuted due to the lack of a budget. Madame Konaté hoped to get more money
the following year ‘to realise my dreams’, as she stated (informal conversa-
tion, 18.01.2013).
Madame Konaté’s official discourse and her actual practices are not necessa-
rily congruent. All the associations’ members I spoke to explained that it was
their duty to approach the prefectural director of the Office of Women’s and
Children’s Affairs if they want to collaborate with her. The persons coming to
Madame Konaté’s office are usually the women’s associations’ presidents. They
strive to accredit their organisation, they ask for financial aid, they want to take
part in the festivities of the International Women’s Day and buy the sobi, or their
goal is simply to get in contact with Madame Konaté – a Big Woman – and
inform her about the existence of their association. The presidents of such orga-
nisations are women and men, typically over forty years of age. They have
gained their posts due to their educational, religious, or family background, or
due to their personal behaviour that makes them trustworthy. At first, I was
puzzled by the fact that so many men head women’s organisations. But
considering the low level of women’s ‘formal’ education in Kankan and its
patriarchal society, such paternalistic behaviour does not come as a surprise.
Ordinary association members, however, do not visit Madame Konaté on
their own accord. If they have something to discuss with her, they arrive as a
group; an ordinary woman would not go to her office on her own if she has
no connection to the prefectural director. For the people, their action has
nothing to do with politics but rather with social and economic issues.
Nevertheless, they chose to talk to the prefectural director of the Office of
Women’s and Children’s Affairs and confront her with their claims.
There are several factors which negatively affect the relation between
Madame Konaté and ordinary women. Firstly, her post has been vacant for
some time. Therefore, the prefectural director had to start building up a good
rapport with them. Secondly, Madame Konaté does not stem from Kankan.
Consequently, she is only partially familiar with local (gendered) norms and,
upon arrival, did not have a large local network. Thirdly, due to Madame
Konaté’s physical appearance and her fluency in French, ordinary women
might feel intimidated. Lastly, it is unclear to ordinary women what the exact
aims of the Office of Women’s and Children’s Affairs are.
Promoting Women’s Associations
The government and its employees stressed that the population, especially
women and youth, should form associations if they wanted to profit from the
state’s or international donor’s financial aid, for example in the form of
micro-credits. Some months into his presidency, Alpha Condé announced that
he had allocated a fund over 100 billion Guinean francs (approximately 12
million euros) reserved for women.3 Many of Kankan’s women, who are
organised in one or several associations, have heard of this but they had no
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precise idea how to get access to this money. When Hadja Nantènin Cherif, the
Minister of Women’s and Children’s Affairs, stayed in Kankan for a Develop-
ment Forum in November 2011, she had to answer various questions in this
regard. One woman wanted to know how much of these 100 billion Guinean
francs were available to women in Kankan. The minister could not respond to
this question but stressed that the female population in the rural area would
especially profit. Moreover, she informed them that the women must constitute
an officially acknowledged group. The minister specified:
We will not give the money like this, we will organise management
trainings. We cannot give these groups the money anyhow. It is necessary
that they show their records. Afterwards, we will control what they have
done with the money.
(Recording, Development Forum, 13.11.2011)
Madame Cherif further alluded that the goal of these microcredits was to
increase the women’s capacities in the techniques of their domains and regarding
administrational tasks. Lastly, she emphasised that every group that would profit
from the fund must, in the end, pay the money back – a fact that the women did
not understand and tended to forget. In an interview, Hadja Aissata Daffé, the
president of the national women’s wing of her party, the Union of Republican
Forces (Union des Forces Républicaines, UFR), requested that the government
send inspectors into the field to control these associations, “otherwise, some of
them can raise false projects. You will see, we will never be able to pursue them,
especially because they are women” (Ramatoulaye 31.03.2013). More than a
year after the Minister of Women’s and Children’s Affairs had visited Kankan,
Madame Konaté was still telling the women to form associations and to hand in
their projects (informal conversation, 18.01.2013). For example, she advised the
female president of an association to discuss with her group, firstly, how to use
the money, and secondly, how the process of reimbursement would take place. In
this way, quarrels around money issues could best be avoided, Madame Konaté
added (field notes, 22.01.2013).
To understand this kind of discourse is easier for a woman such as
Madame Diallo, an elderly well-educated woman who is the president of the
local UFDG women’s wing. She explained to the members of her women’s
NGO that the governmental fund is not a gift but a kind of microcredit that
must be reimbursed. At the time of the research, Madame Diallo was hopeful
that her group would get financial assistance because the prefect’s wife was
the NGO’s president. Simultaneously, she stressed that no association had
received any money so far (informal conversation, 25.01.2013). Neither did I
hear of any group that had received money from the fund. In May 2014, this
fact evoked women from Boké to claim their share of the fund reserved for
women, during a visit of the Minister of Women’s and Children’s Affairs
(Guinéenews 01.05.2014). Others, too, complained about the tardiness of the
procedure (cf. Kaloum Press 10.03.2014).
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Interestingly, all the associations I spoke to were striving for an official
accreditation even though most of them very rarely profited from the gov-
ernment or a donor in form of money, expertise, or training – if at all. To get
an accreditation one needs time, endurance, money, and a lot of knowledge.
For the associations, it is obligatory to have statutes and persons who occupy
the positions of president, vice-president, administrative secretary, treasurer,
secretary for external relations, secretary for information, organisational
secretary, secretary for social affairs, secretary for sports, and, lastly, secretary
for arts and culture. The members of these associations typically have no idea
about the meaning of such posts – apart from the role and function of a pre-
sident and the vice-president – and therefore they are ‘just for the paper’ as
the local population used to say. The importance of an association’s status
and posts can be analysed as a continuation of state structures outside the
state’s sphere. Djénabou more than once lamented:
The government should facilitate the administrative tasks. We pay for it
and then we must walk and walk before getting an accreditation. It is
especially difficult at the national level: If you have no relatives at the
concerned ministry, you are lost. Without connections, nothing works.
(Informal conversation, 28.11.2012)
Djénabou is not alone with her complaints. I heard similar criticisms repeat-
edly, even from groups whose members are highly educated and have good
connections to the local administration. That is why Giorgio Blundo and
Pierre-Yves Le Meur talk about “a real process of initiation” based on cor-
ruption and trust, before someone understands how bureaucracy functions: “In
contexts in which the public is rarely familiar with administrative laws and
rules, the monopoly of technical-bureaucratic knowledge combined with a low
degree of accountability enables the daily negotiation of the powers of the
administration” (Blundo and Le Meur 2009, 20). Such obscure procedures are
not adapted for women who can neither read nor write – the majority of
Kankan’s women. They necessarily need an intermediary who understands and
speaks French, is familiar with the administrational language, and knows how
to set up projects. These intermediaries must be paid and then, if a project gets
financed, they take their share again. As different authors note (e.g. Gupta
1995; Mama 1997, 41; Blundo and Le Meur 2009, 29–32; Bano Barry
25.12.2013), there is the risk that the population in general does not profit from
such funds or the work of associations. I argue that this is very much the case in
Kankan where a small, highly educated elite benefits from governmental
support, while ordinary women do not or only sparsely profit.
The people take up the government’s idea of well-organised and institu-
tionally acknowledged (women’s) associations. I was repeatedly told that
women and groups of young people should get together, form an association,
and jointly start some income generating activities. Representative of that is
Jeanne Konaté’s statement, a female historian who teaches at the university.
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She figuratively explained: “Wewomen have understood the importance of being
together. Then, we have more power. One finger alone cannot take an object.
One single wing does not make any noise” (interview, 12.12.2012). Therefore, the
government and the population share the hope that thanks to such associations,
people would in the long run be able to generate revenues without the state’s
support. Finally, this would lead to Guinea’s ‘development’.
Without economic, educational, and social capital, associations are not
able to get officially acknowledged. Such accreditations are a means for the
state to generate money. Djénabou’s and Jeanne Konaté’s statements above
are true: An ordinary person, who does not have the necessary social net-
works, can hardly achieve his or her aim when dealing with the local or
national administration. Therefore, forming what Asef Bayat (2010) calls, a
‘passive network’ and jointly making claims is a successful strategy, which
women make use of. In Kankan, the organisational degree of women’s asso-
ciations varies: While members of some associations meet regularly, set
activities, are officially accredited, and have thus followed the state’s call to
‘formally’ organise, other women ‘are just together’, without much of a
formal organisation, ‘because they have more power’ as a group than alone,
as Jeanne Konaté put it (interview, 12.12.2012).
With the fund for women that the national government set aside, the govern-
ment demonstrated that, in its eyes, women require special treatment. Nantènin
Cherif repeated the President’s intention to help the female population “because
they are suffering a lot.” The minister summarised Alpha Condé’s actions con-
cerning women as follows:
Regarding human rights, many people of the Guinean population are
excluded from the process of qualification, decision-making, and economic
development. This is especially the case for women because of the invisibility
of their contribution, the lack of statistical data, and the informal character
of numerous economical organisations that they guide and manage. But
women are important actors of development. Therefore, the government
wants to adjust this imbalance by a national policy of female promotion.
This includes women’s concerns and puts the accent on the economic
dimension. The government wants to facilitate the access to credits, develop
women’s entrepreneurship, their organisational level, and their capacity in
the management of developmental projects. The government has elaborated
a new strategy for a greater visibility of women’s actions for their own
promotion.
(Recording, Development Forum, 13.11.2011)
This statement, once again, depicts women in the role of the population’s
needy part, which requires the state’s support. Local state employees also
stressed the importance of listening to women and their concerns (field notes,
20.12.2012). At the same time, the bureaucrats portrayed women as particu-
larly difficult to handle. Madame Kouyaté mentioned that while some women
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reacted very positively to her intentions, others responded with suspicion. She
continued that ordinary women did not easily understand why they should pay
back the money allocated by the government. Madame Konaté described
women as stubborn, as harsh, and not well-educated. According to the head of
the prefectural Office of Women’s and Children’s Affairs, women do not, for
example, comprehend what political parties are about. Madame Konaté was
convinced that if a woman supported party A and another woman supported
party B, this could cause trouble; it could lead to problems between the two,
and finally they would not go to the baptism of the others’ child, for example.
It should not be like this, Madame Konaté stressed, because all women are
sisters (informal conversation, 12.03.2012). This was a typical language when
talking about women, but not about men. It was considered as normal that
men disagree at various levels. Regarding women, however, people expected
them to speak with one voice; cleavages among them were not regarded as
normal. The statement of Hadja Aissata Daffé, the head of the UFR’s women
at the national level, echoes this idea: “[…] I ask all my sisters to unite and to
overcome our cleavages” (Ramatoulaye 31.03.2013).
The Office of Women’s and Children’s Affairs is vital for the analysis of
how the official state is addressing gender issues. Another insight is provided
by the First Lady. As Jo-Ansie van Wyk (2017) notes: “The First Lady is
more than often the symbolic representation of women’s role in a particular
society. Closely related to this is her relation with the media, and vice versa.
The representation of the First Lady in the media often reinforcing certain
gender stereotypes, and her involvement in her spouse’s political agenda con-
tributes to her role as a political symbol.” Djènè Kaba Condé, the President’s
wife, is thus subject of the next section.
The First Lady Syndrome
Academic research has so far not been interested in the roles of African First
Ladies (van Wyk 2017; van Wyk, Muresan, and Nyere 2018) – in contrast to
American First Ladies, who have received considerable attention from social sci-
ence (e.g. Watson 2000; Parry-Giles and Blair 2002), and also from a feminist
perspective (Erickson and Thomson 2012). Exceptions are four articles: Firstly, a
contribution by Amina Mama (1997) that focuses on Nigeria by looking more
generally at women in institutional politics. Secondly, an article by Jibrin Ibrahim
(2004) that draws on the examples of Ghanaian and Nigerian First Ladies.
Thirdly, two recently published contributions on Southern African First Ladies
and their roles in domestic politics and international relations, the first by Jo-Ansie
van Wyk (2017) alone and the second by Jo-Ansie van Wyk, Arina Muresan, and
Chidochashe Nyere (2018). Regarding Guinea, the role of the First Ladies has not
been explored.
Sékou Touré’s wife Andrée was born in Kankan. Before Guinea’s independence,
she became the secretary of the Association of the FrenchWomenUnion (Camara,
O’Toole, and Baker 2014, 289). Lansana Conté lived a polygynous life and was
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married to four women: Henriette Bangoura, Kadiatou Seth Camara, Asmaou
Baldé, and Mamadie Touré. Henriette Bangoura was committed to the fight
against HIV/Aids.4 It is known that she and Kadiatou Seth Camara became more
and more influential as the President’s health deteriorated in the 2000s. The
two of them were fierce rivals, not least due to their different religious back-
ground (Chambers 2004, 131–132; Camara 2014, 397–398). Mamadie Touré’s
name appears in investigations into the illicit affair around the Simandou mine
(Radden Keefe 2013).
In many African countries, the First Ladies headed the largest women’s
organisations during the period of the one-party rule up to the mid-1980s.
With the democratic opening of the 1990s, they turned towards the newly
emerging NGOs (Tripp 2003, 235). These NGOs typically represent women’s
interests. They for example advocate women’s rights, and therefore, the First
Ladies “arrogat[e] to themselves the right to represent and lead women” as
Amina Mama (1997, 40) puts it. In reality, however, First Ladies’ organisa-
tions serve, rather, as a means to campaign for their husband’s ruling party
and to generate votes. Additionally, they are misused for personal enrichment
(Ibrahim 2004, 1–2). Amina Mama (1997, 41) calls this phenomenon
‘femocracy’ which she understands as “an anti-democratic female power-
structure which claims to exist for the advancement of ordinary women, but is
unable to do so because it is dominated by a small clique of women whose
authority derives from their being married to powerful men, rather than from
any actions or ideas of their own. Femocracies exploit the commitments of
the international movement for greater gender equality while actually only
advancing the interest of a small female elite, and in the long-term under-
mining women’s interests by upholding the patriarchal status quo.”
Jibrin Ibrahim (2004, 1–5, here 5) also mentions positive impacts of the so-
called First Lady Syndrome: Through their promotion of gender equality, First
Ladies can create opportunities for women at the political, economic, and
social levels: “By bringing their influence to bear on the placement of women
into positions of power, First Ladies can be said to have helped increase the
pool from which women could be recruited into positions of power.”
The First Lady Syndrome can be traced back to the 1990s (Ibrahim 2004, 1). It is
still very much in vogue, as for example the African First Ladies Summit in Dar es
Salaam of 2013 indicates. This conference, initiated by the George W. Bush Pre-
sidential Center in partnership with ExxonMobile, had the title ‘Investing in
Women: Strengthening Africa’ andwas attended byMichelle Obama, Laura Bush,
and nine African First Ladies. The official video proclaimed that a “First Lady has
an unmatched and unique platform to affect positive change for society. As an
advocate for women and girls, she can raise awareness for pressing issues, support
effective best practice programs and champion public-private partnership that lead
to sustainable results.”5 In brief, First Ladies reproduce the international discourse
of development andwomen’s empowerment not least because their organisations –
and therefore they personally – profit from the financial support of international
donors. Here, Djènè Kaba Condé is no exception.
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Djènè Kaba Condé, Guinea’s First Lady
Djènè Kaba Condé, Guinea’s First Lady since 2010, was born in Kankan where
she attended primary school. After High School in Conakry, she went to France
and studied sociology in Paris. Subsequently, Djènè Kaba first worked for
the Agence de la Francophonie and later for the National Employment Agency.
In May 2010, just a month before the first round of Guinea’s presidential elec-
tions, she married Alpha Condé. Originating from the popular Kaba family in
Kankan, she is said to have heavily contributed to the massive victory of her
husband in that region. In September 2011, Djènè Kaba Condé launched her
own foundation in the presence of the media, diplomats, members of govern-
ment, and Sékou Touré’s widow, Andrée Touré. According to its website, her
foundation promotes women and children’s health, reinforces the capacities of
marginalised, poor, and disabled people, and stands up for peace.6 Djènè Kaba
Condé is often present at launching events of NGOs, as a speaker on occasions
such as the International Women’s Day, and takes part in international meetings
discussing deadly diseases. She is also a member of the First Ladies’ Organisa-
tion for the fight against HIV/Aids that was created in 2002.7
When asked in an interview how she interprets her position as First
Lady, Djènè Kaba Condé answered that this was a huge opportunity for
her to help others. Thanks to her position she could be in touch with
ordinary women, who were all too often in difficult situations, and listen
to their sorrows. Therefore, she saw her role to accompany the head of
state’s politics “socially and humanly.” Djènè Kaba Condé stressed that
her husband “makes a lot for women” by mentioning his initiatives, such
as micro-credits that should enable the female population to become eco-
nomically independent and to lead a better life. With her foundation,
Djènè Kaba Condé fights against premature marriages of young girls.
Further, she stands up for girls’ school attendance. Concerning women’s
status in Guinea, the First Lady said:
If I compare the situation of women with those in other countries, Gui-
nean women are very active, far-sighted, and very dynamic. History
shows it very well because during the First Republic, women were hon-
oured everywhere. Further, there is a tradition that makes women fight.
Generally, they are responsible that their families get something to eat.
(Seneweb 20.05.2013)
The actual Guinean First Lady represents very much what Amina Mama
(1997) and Jibrin Ibrahim (2004) describe in their articles. Djènè Kaba Condé
performs the social side of her husband’s government. Thereby, she rein-
forces local gender duties: While men provide for their families, women take
care of the children and the household. Djènè Kaba Condé created her own
foundation that focuses on women and children. Her journeys at home and
abroad as well as her presence at so-called humanitarian events guarantee
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her media presence, which she also uses to campaign for her husband and
his RPG. The First Lady depicts women as suffering and needy, but at the
same time courageous.
When I asked the research participants which Guinean women are well-
known, they often mentioned Djènè Kaba Condé. Some female hairdresser
apprentices stressed that the First Lady ‘helped women and children’ for
example by financing wells in one neighbourhood (field notes, 11.11.2012).
However, Alpha Amadou Bano Barry (25.12.2013) criticises associations like
hers. He said in an interview with a national newspaper, not only referring to
women’s organisations: “We must stop with the creation of NGOs which
become ‘Individuals Non-Governmental’, entrepreneurial NGOs that misuse
this label to bypass taxes.”
She Brought Just Dust: The First Lady’s Arrival in Kankan
Djènè Kaba Condé came to her hometown Kankan on November 29, 2011,
after her pilgrimage to Mecca, thanks to which she earned the respectful
name Hadja. I learned of the First Lady’s visit to Kankan when I took part
in a RPG meeting at the local party office two days before her arrival. During
that meeting, the mayor announced the closure of the local markets and
asked the people to appear in great numbers to welcome Djènè Kaba Condé
and her ‘Arabic delegation’. Perhaps the latter would invest in Kankan, the
mayor added. Additionally, he stressed that the RPG members should dress
in white – a religious symbol – and not in yellow, the party’s colour, nor in
shirts with Alpha Condé’s portrait, because this event was not about politics
but to celebrate Djènè Kaba Condé’s pilgrimage to Mecca. Lastly, the mayor
explicitly invited women to welcome the First Lady; ‘it is a joyful event for
them,’ as he said (field notes, 26.11.2011).
The arrival of the First Lady has been announced for 10 a.m. on a soccer
pitch beside the local military basis. Thierno and I decided to go there not
earlier than 11 a.m. to avoid spending time waiting. However, at eleven
o’clock, there were just a few festively dressed persons, most of them elderly
women, standing in the shadows of the trees. When I returned at 12.30 p.m.,
the crowd had grown: The military and the police were present and parading,
the military music played, the comedians made their jokes, and some big cars
were standing there, hinting to the presence of some important individuals.
Therefore, I was confident that the First Lady would arrive soon. At 2 p.m.
there was still no sign of the helicopter transporting Djènè Kaba Condé. I felt
especially sorry for the elderly women, who were members of the same sèrè as
the First Lady. They had spent all these hours in the hot sun without a place to
sit and without food or water. As Thierno and I had an important appointment
that afternoon, we decided to leave and catch up on her arrival later on.
At 4.15 p.m., we learnt that Djènè Kaba Condé had not yet arrived
because she had made a stopover in another city. After having finished our
duties, Thierno and I returned to the football pitch. This time, the governor,
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again dressed in his white uniform, the prefect, and some other people from
the local authorities were present. In the meantime, it was 6 p.m. and the sun
had set. We got hold of a standing place on the little four-level tribune when
we noticed the humming of a helicopter far away. ‘Finally!’, we thought. But
when the helicopter came into our field of vision, it flew over the pitch and
hovered in the air slightly away from where we were waiting. ‘He does not
find us’, people from the crowd around us muttered. As the designed landing
site was not at the airport, there were no lights indicating where the helicopter
should land. And indeed, it turned and flew away in search of the Milo River
that would help the pilot to orientate. To the amusement of the bystanders,
people from the local RPG started contacting the persons in the helicopter
and instructing them where to find us. Finally, it flew back and slowly des-
cended onto the football pitch. The spectators – me included – had never seen
such a huge, impressive helicopter.
Throughout the day, a car from Kaba Guiter, a company that was recon-
structing Kankan’s roads and belongs to one of the First Lady’s brothers, had
watered the dusty football pitch and the road alongside it. But as the heli-
copter descended, it raised such an amount of dust that, suddenly, a wall of
sand was approaching us. ‘This must be how it feels like being in the middle
of a desert storm’, I thought, while clinging onto Thierno’s arm. We could
not see twenty centimetres ahead when we were trying to hide behind the
tribune. The policemen, the military, the governor, and his entourage were all
crouching and coughing nearby. As the dust slowly began to settle, they tried
to wipe it off their uniforms. Like the people around us, we could not stop
laughing: What a sight, the governor’s previously white uniform! And the
nicely dressed ladies who bewilderedly sat in their chairs, covered with dust!
Moreover, the black car that the First Lady was supposed to take: All efforts
to make it shine again were fruitless!
The governor tried to maintain control of the situation. He ordered the
military to snap to attention and the music to play even though we could
not see them through the dusty air. The door of the helicopter opened and
Djènè Kaba Condé, together with her entourage, stepped out. Initially, she
wanted to board the waiting car directly, but some people urged her to at
least briefly greet the women of her sèrè. After having done so, she
immediately left the scene: The First Lady’s appearance, for what some
people had been waiting the whole day, lasted not more than ten minutes.
‘She arrived with a boat full of dust as a gift’, was Thierno’s comment
(field notes, 29.11.2011).
According to Djénabou, the opinions regarding the First Lady’s visit
varied. While for some it was unnecessary and a waste of money to fly to
Kankan, others – most of all members of the RPG – considered it Djènè Kaba
Condé’s duty to visit her family after having made the pilgrimage to Mecca.
However, the manner of her arrival was not endorsed: Letting people wait the
whole day is not nice, they said. Members of the government should, by their
behaviour, set an example and punctuality cannot be learned like this, said the
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research participants who were asked for their opinion. Especially, the market
women were discontent as they lost a whole day’s income. One of Djénabou’s
neighbours, for example, was therefore unable to give her children something to
eat that night (field notes, 02.12.2011).
The First Lady stayed in Kankan for two days. When she was not busy
meeting her family, the Sotikemo, and other members of Kankan’s not-
ability and the local government, Djènè Kaba Condé received different
associations in a nice, big house near the old airport. Tents were set up
outside the house’s wall, under which people waited in plastic chairs until it
was their turn to access the yard. Two bodyguards at the door controlled
the entrance. Inside the courtyard were sofas, on a small table stood plastic
flowers, and on the wall hang curtains and two pictures of the President.
Thanks to contacts with a former vice-mayor, Djénabou got an audience,
along with other board members of an NGO that fights against mortality
during childbirth. Judging by their dresses, jewellery, and hairstyle, these
board members must have had quite some money and influence. They were
all wearing a shirt and carried a poster with the slogan of their organisa-
tion. Djénabou gave a short speech that the vice-mayor had written for her
and a cameraman was filming. First, Djénabou praised the President and
the First Lady, then she presented her NGO and its goals, and lastly she
put forward the organisation’s pleas. Several days later, the speech was
broadcast on the national TV and the whole neighbourhood where Djéna-
bou lived applauded her for the performance. After having listened to her
talk, the First Lady promised to support the NGO and to sponsor a
motorbike-ambulance – an announcement that attracted applause. Besides
this group, there were other NGOs and associations present, such as the
disabled and some ordinary women who had named their children after the
First Lady or the President (field notes, 02.12.2011).
To sum up, the arrival of Djènè Kaba Condé in Kankan in November
2011 was not well organised. The people who welcomed the First Lay
complained about the discourtesy of letting them wait a whole day and
finally just catching a glimpse of her. A change in the population’s atti-
tudes cannot be achieved if the leaders do not set a good example, they
claimed. At the same time, the whole performance made people laugh.
The symbols of power – the governor’s white uniform and the black, big,
shiny car were covered with orange dust, thus undermining the image of
the state’s power and capacity. Even RPG members criticised Djènè Kaba
Condé’s behaviour, which illustrates that they do not blindly follow her.
Similarly, when she was in Kankan in May of the same year, the RPG
militants reminded Djènè Kaba Condé of her husband’s promises
throughout his electoral campaign (Guinée Actu 23.05.2011). Despite her
awkward arrival in Kankan, Djènè Kaba Condé once again tried to
spread an image of herself as a caring person who listens to the sorrows of
her hometown’s ordinary population. However, her promises were not
much more than lip service.
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Conclusions: The Ambiguously Gendered State
In Guinea, according to the official discourse which also echoes in Djènè
Kaba Condé’s speeches, gender equality becomes equal to women’s promo-
tion at the social, economic, and political levels. This illustrates that the state
depicts women (and youth) as the needy and vulnerable part of society. That
is the reason why the state bundles the different efforts labelled as ‘women’s
concerns’ within the Ministry of Women’s and Children’s Affairs. As noted,
the Guinean government and its employees consider the female population as
a monolithic bloc in need of special treatment. Especially, the women not
‘formally’ educated are framed as victims, and devoid of agency. State offi-
cials – that is, the President, the First Lady, from the top of the administra-
tion right down to the simple bureaucrats – on the one hand, depict women
as immature children, who must be taken by the hand. According to this
discourse, women are not completely responsible for their own actions. This
point of view is echoed in the declaration by Hadja Aissata Daffé, a female
politician at the national level, that especially because they are women, they
cannot be pursued by the state for their wrongdoings. On the other hand, the
head of state as well as state employees emphasise women’s economic role and
their importance with regard to their families.
The signing of international treaties regarding human rights in general and
gender equality in particular, does not automatically translate into better condi-
tions for women on the ground. One typical way in which the government tries to
foster gender equality is through workshops and fora. On account of the inter-
nationally promoted and funded approach, ordinary women should profit. As
illustrated, this is not necessarily the case as the target groups of these workshops
are mostly the country’s intellectual elite. The government’s way of handling
women complies with the international jargon of gender equality and women’s
promotion at the social, political, and economic levels. The state’s gender efforts
are concentrated within the Office of Women’s and Children’s Affairs. Its duty is to
collaborate with ‘civil society’ organisations and to strengthen their capacities. One
way of doing so is by distributing the money of the fund the government put aside
for women (and youth). Women should form associations, formally register them,
and as a consequence launch income-generating activities. Because of these, they
would become better off and could improve their living conditions. This focus on
(women’s) associations also echoes the international development discourse that is
highly influenced by a neoliberal do-it-yourself paradigm. At the time of my
research, however, I did not know about any women’s association that benefitted
from these credits.
For the members of such associations, it is unclear under what circum-
stances they may profit from the state’s or international donors’ support.
When ordinary people must deal with the local or, even worse, the national
administration, this can be depicted as a process of initiation. Women who do
not speak French and who have little ‘formal’ education have difficulties
understanding the bureaucratic language. For them, the women heading the
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Office of Women’s and Children’s Affairs are intellectuals who have money
and prestige. Ordinary people without personal relations in the concerned
administrative unit have difficulties accessing them. The local administration
in Kankan, as elsewhere, is highly clientelistic and builds up obstacles through
which it can partially avoid responding to the population’s demands. Having a
gate keeper, as I had with Djénabou’s NGO that enabled me to meet the First
Lady during her stay in Kankan, is essential when addressing the local
authorities. Generally, the gap between ordinary people and state employees
widens the higher the latter’s administrative rank is. However, there are also
exceptions because much depends on a bureaucrat’s personality. While many
are hardly available to ordinary people and enrich themselves thanks to their
posts, there are also bureaucrats who are committed to their tasks and able to
establish “pockets of effectiveness” as Michael Roll (2014) puts it.
As I have shown with the ethnographic example of Djènè Kaba Condé,
the Guinean First Lady’s behaviour can aptly be categorised using the con-
cept of the First Lady Syndrome described by Jibril Ibrahim (2004) and of
femocracy defined by Amina Mama (1997). As soon as Djènè Kaba Condé
became Alpha Condé’s wife, she started campaigning for her husband.
Additionally, she promoted gender equality and women’s rights. She did this
by launching her own foundation. Or as Jo-Ansie van Wyk (2017) put it,
First Ladies such as Djènè Kaba Condé are the national “Social worker-in-
Chief [sic].”
The First Lady’s arrival in Kankan in December 2011 was staged as a
National Holiday: Firstly, the city’s markets and boutiques had to close that
day. Secondly, the local government and especially the members of the local
RPG invited the population to receive Djènè Kaba Condé. Thirdly, she was
welcomed with distinguished honour: All important representatives of the
local government were present and military music played. As described, the
plan to fortify the state’s power did not work. The First Lady and her ‘Arab
delegation’ did not arrive in the morning as scheduled. Then, the helicopter
did not know where to land. Bystanders witnessed how members of the local
elite had to guide the pilot to the football pitch. Finally, the helicopter stirred
up so much dust that the intended staging degenerated into a parody. Many
elderly women, who had known Djènè Kaba Condé from their childhood in
Kankan, had waited a whole day to welcome her. They were heavily dis-
appointed that the First Lady barely said hello.
By acting as their spokesperson, the Guinean First Lady acts as though she
knows, from first-hand experience, about the daily preoccupations of ordinary
women. However, to the contrary Djènè Kaba Condé has spent large part of
her life in France. Since her return to her home country, she is preoccupied
with the role of the First Lady and must consequently not suffer from any
shortages ordinary women are confronted with on a daily basis. By launching
her own foundation whose flagship interests are ‘women’s and children’s con-
cerns and empowerment’, Djènè Kaba Condé neatly fulfils the expectations of
the international development discourse. Through her foundation, she is able
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to get access to international money and state resources. However, only a
small segment of society profits from this capital, namely the country’s
(female) elite. Additionally, the official discourse and actual practices of these
NGOs are not congruent: In reality, male and female presidents of such
NGOs are all too often not interested in changing the status quo regarding
gender relations and men’s domination within the Guinean state.
The position of the First Ladies is victim to several gender biases, as Jo-Ansie
van Wyk (2017) notes: On the one hand, no constitution refers to this position
and thus undermines the First Ladies’ “democratic accountability” even though
they often yield power. On the other hand, the role of a First Lady is to fulfil the
expectations of a good “spouse; mother; care-giver and nurturer of the sick,
young, elderly.” Especially the state’s media portray the “First Lady in patri-
archal terms as a national symbol; the Ideal Woman; a trophy; and a trailblazer
for issues stereotyped and associated with women.” Consequently, they “remain
subordinate to the patriarchy in their societies” and at the same time, reproduce
the very same patriarchal system. Generally, to have a more profound knowl-
edge about the role and impact of African First Ladies and special women’s
ministries in Africa, much more social science research is necessary. This chapter





ICA.pdf (accessed on 05.08.2019).
2 In the local context, more weight is considered as beautiful and connected to
wealth; people congratulate each other when they put on weight. I would argue that
Madame Konaté’s weight, together with her dresses and jewellery, add to her
demonstration of power.
3 The government has also made available a fund of 30 million Guinean francs for
youth groups (Guinée 24 10.03.2011).
4 https://fondationmhc.pagesperso-orange.fr (accessed 05.08.2019).
5 http://www.bushcenter.org/first-ladies-initiative/african-first-ladies-summit (accessed
on 05.08.2019), Forbes (03.07.2013).
6 http://prosmi.org (accessed on 05.08.2019).
7 http://www.unaids.org/fr/resources/presscentre/pressreleaseandstatementarchive/
2014/november/20141124_PR_OAFLA (accessed on 05.08.2019).
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5 Women’s Limited Impacts on
Institutional Politics
Introduction
Women are marginalised in politics. Not only does society reject them, women
minimise themselves. Therefore, women do not pay attention to politics. They
tell themselves that even if they campaign, even if they present themselves,
people will consider them as crazy: ‘How can a woman govern us? How can a
woman lead us?’ People very much reject that idea. Thus, women themselves do
not have the courage to participate in politics.
(Aishatou Diakité, young female graduate, group discussion, 29.01.2013)
When asked about their relation to institutional politics, many ordinary women
in Kankan claim that they are not interested in politics. Firstly, because they
consider politicians as hypocritical. Secondly, women are occupied with many
household duties and therefore say they do not have any time left for politics.
Thirdly, they consider politics as a cause for the division of people. Lastly,
politicians in general and female politicians in particular have an ambivalent
reputation in society. Still, quite a number of women frequent one of the local
political parties which all have a women’s wing. During the last years, several
women even got hold of highly visible political positions, such as Fatoumata
Maty who, between 2006 and 2008, acted as Kankan’s first female mayor.
Further, almost all the female (as well as male) research participants voted
during the presidential elections of 2010, which they considered as mandatory
for a ‘good’ Guinean citizen.
In this chapter, I analyse women’s political articulations in institutional pol-
itics. I therefore ask how women’s presence in and influence on institutional
politics at the national and local levels looks like. I do this by, first, providing
an overview on women’s access to and presence in politics on a continental
scale. Here, I especially focus on characteristics of African political parties and
how they influence women’s access to decision-making positions. Then, I ana-
lyse women’s presence in Guinean politics over the last few years. Furthermore,
I show how women’s roles within political parties are constructed discursively
and what practical impact women have on decision-making therein. I discuss,
on the one hand, the ordinary female party members’ reputation and, on the
other hand, the reputation of those with highly visible posts. In brief, based on
portraits of women who have been or who still are actively engaged in politics,
I show characteristics of women’s political articulations within institutional
politics. I argue that in Guinea, institutional politics is not the sphere in which
women can enhance gender equality nor fight for better living conditions.
Female Politicians in Africa
Supporters of decentralisation point to its positive influence on women’s
access to and presence in local politics and the latter’s accountability regard-
ing gender equality. However, studies have illustrated that while this is the
case in the ‘Global North’, it is not necessarily so in African countries where
women are better represented in national politics than in local councils.
The examples provided by Josephine Ahikire (2009) and Jo Beall (2013) sug-
gest that the outcome of the devolution processes for women’s influence on the
local political sphere is ambivalent and thus, decentralisation is rarely the
magic bullet for an increase in women’s access to and presence within institu-
tional politics. Anne Marie Goetz and Shireen Hassim hint at specific reasons
for that: “First, traditional patriarchies can be more intense and immediate in
their repressive effect on women’s public engagement at the local level com-
pared to the national level. Second, the women’s movement’s capacity to sup-
port women in local politics and help develop gender equity policy platforms
can be fragmented by decentralisation” (Goetz and Hassim 2003, 21).
As already mentioned, but to remind the reader and to facilitate the argument,
women are not a monolithic block. They can for example, identify themselves in
class, educational, age, regional, or ethnic terms. Besides, such identities can partly
change and be adapted according to specific situations. Therefore, ‘women’s issues’
do not exist per se and, consequently, women’s mere representation within
institutional politics does not necessarily make a difference for all women.
Accordingly, scholars called for a move beyond numbers (cf. Ahikire 2009; Goetz
2009; Childs and Lovenduski 2013) and to make a distinction between descriptive,
mere numerical, and substantive representation. Scholars maintain that a critical
number (typically 30 percent) of women is needed to move from descriptive to
substantive representation (Bauer and Britton 2006, 4). To measure the latter is
rather difficult. Authors look at factors such as the political competition and party
affiliation, differences among male and female representatives, women’s wings,
institutional norms, representatives’ experiences and leadership qualities, the status
of women’s policy machinery, etc. (Childs and Lovenduski 2013, 506). Still, mere
female representation can have a positive impact as ordinary women might prefer
consulting women with their problems. Moreover, women in office act as role
models for the younger generation (Ahikire 2009).
In many African countries, the end of the Cold War led to the demise of
military rule. This enhanced democratic transformations, multi-party elec-
tions, and the hype of ‘civil society’. On the one hand, this change opened up
new spaces for women’s movements and female politicians, but, on the other
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hand, some of them lost the minimal protection that authoritarian states had
offered (Pankhurst 2002, 119–120). The political institutions adopted through
these democratisation processes are generally masculinist (Fallon 2008, 35).
Nevertheless, the number of female parliamentarians and ministers in Africa
has increased significantly over the last few decades. Generally, women are
more prominently represented within the legislative than the executive, whereas
in most African countries, the decision-making power lies within the latter
(Adjamagbo-Johnson 1997, 64). The advancement of female parliamentarians,
also occurred due to transformations of the electoral systems and quotas. As
women’s representation in parliament is not a mere indicator of women’s
influence on institutional politics, the application of quotas for women (and
other minorities) has been contradictorily discussed (Tripp 2013, 515).
Since the early 1990s, the number and influence of African women’s asso-
ciations grew. Supported by international women’s movements and donors,
they pushed for laws that inscribed gender equality and also engaged in
workshops regarding women and politics. Several scholars have demonstrated
that women can more easily enter the political sphere in countries that have
been affected by conflict followed by major political transformations; during
the war and its aftermath, women have taken up new responsibilities due to
men’s absences. Finally, more and more women completed secondary school
or even university and could profit from the new possibilities that the cell
phone and the internet offered (Pankhurst 2002, 119–123; Bauer and Britton
2006, 9–12; Irvine and Hays-Mitchell 2012).
The increase in female politicians is also ascertainable at the highest poli-
tical level: Mame Madior Boye in Senegal (2001), Maria das Neves in São
Tomé and Principé (2002), and Luísa Dias Diogo in Mozambique (2004)
became the first female Prime Ministers in Africa. In 2006, Liberia’s popula-
tion elected Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as Africa’s first female President. Therefore,
several of the male and female research participants mentioned Liberia as a
role model regarding women in politics. Nowadays, women regularly partici-
pate in presidential elections on the continent, however, far less successfully
than Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. Since 2003, Rwanda has the highest percentage of
female parliamentarians worldwide and there are other African countries with
a high number of women in national legislature such as Senegal, South
Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Angola, Burundi, and Uganda.
Likewise, women increasingly head political parties. Significant changes can
also be determined within the state bureaucracy as ministries, special depart-
ments, and commissions are primarily concerned with ‘women issues’ (Tripp
et al. 2009, 140–142). However and as mentioned, the effectiveness of such
women-specific ministries is contested (Tripp 2003, 252). At the regional level,
the trend of an increase in women’s representation is also visible: In 2004,
Gertrude Ibengwe Mongella from Tanzania became the AU’s first female
speaker of parliament. Further, the AU’s executive commission has reached
gender parity and each country’s commission must include at least one
woman (Adams 2006, 195).
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Women and politics in Africa have increasingly perceived scholarly attention
since the 1990s. Regarding Guinea, however, there is – once more – a major gap
in research. There exists only Filomina Chioma Steady’s (2011, here 23–24)
book on women and leadership in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea that offers
a short summary of women’s presence in institutional politics and gives examples
of female politicians. She describes that female politicians within these three
countries are often of a certain age because “[m]enopause transforms women
into ‘social males’ and ‘neutral persons’ and signals the end of their reproductive
roles, thereby making them more available for public and political roles”. For
Steady (2011, 21), the qualities of motherhood, “perceived as being nurturing,
compassionate, and protective,” are essential for female leadership. Motherhood
symbolises “creativity, caring, continuity, and peace.” Judith Van Allen (2009,
65) points to the long history of women’s political mobilisation as powerful
‘mothers’ too. She argues that, in contrast to female politicians in the ‘Global
North’, political leaders in Africa draw on that tradition and combine it “with
appeals to women’s rights based on feminist appropriations of liberal democratic
traditions, women can enter male-gendered political spaces as ‘equal rights
powerful mothers’ – as citizens, activists and leaders – and potentially transform
their societies.” The notion of motherhood is also a powerful rhetoric weapon
for female politicians in Guinea, as I illustrate. However, it comes with the
danger of gender essentialism: Women are, once again, reduced to a typically
subordinate, nurturing role that does not take into account other characteristics
nor differences among women.
Political Parties in Africa
African political parties have received little scientific attention. Especially,
empirical research outside party headquarters in capital cities is missing. This is
one of the research gaps this book aims at filling. There seem to be some
commonalities among African parties, namely “personalism, patronage, [and]
clientelism” as well as their basis along class and ethnic lines (Erdmann,
Baseau, and Mehler 2007, 12). Political parties in Africa are generally char-
acterised as having poor internal democratisation and no open debating
culture. Decisions are taken from the top down, without consulting the rank
and file. Political parties are often founded by so called ‘Big Men’, who are not
willing to give away their positions. Posts are distributed according to economic
potential and personal bonds. Political programmes resemble each other and
are of minor importance. Consequently, election campaigns focus on the party
leader and on his or her ability to ‘develop’ the country (Gyimah-Boadi 2007).
Furthermore, political transhumance is common (Gazibo 2006, 8).
As noted, women have been highly involved in the struggles for indepen-
dence in many African countries. But until the mid-1980s, they have typically
been side-lined in the single parties’ women’s wings and mass organisations.
Their role was to canvass, dance, sing, and cook for the parties’ dignitaries.
This marginalisation might be one explanation for women’s suspicion of
128 Limited Impacts on Institutional Politics
political parties (Goetz 2009, 11). Today, political parties still seem to be an
especially difficult sphere for women: Women are quite well represented in the
rank and file, but secluded in women’s wings where they are to support the
male party leaders. “Away from the international spotlight, political parties
have been able to resist calls for increased power sharing with women” as
Onalenna Doo Selolwane (2013, 144) in regard to Southern Africa notes.
Until recently, there have been almost no female party leaders in Africa.
Women’s difficulties to get into decision-making positions within political parties
in Africa originates from the parties’ lack of institutionalisation and internal
democratisation. Women must “exploit kinship resources, drawing upon their
relationship to prominent male politicians to secure leadership position” (Goetz
2009, 13). Consequently, female party functionaries typically do not challenge
male authorities within their parties nor advance gender equality. However, we
must note that women’s exclusion from decision-making positions within their
political party is not an African particularity but can be observed everywhere:
“Accounts of the experience of party women’s sections in western democracies
suggest that traditionally they [parties’ women’s sections] have been viewed as
essentially auxiliary bodies through which to recruit women’s support and in
which women have been expected to occupy themselves in ways echoing their
domestic role and concerns, rather than as a part of the party’s decision-making
machinery. […] women’s sections in African parties seem not to have been so
different” (Randall 2007, 98).
Due to the described difficulties, women from ‘civil society’ (but not exclu-
sively) are confronted with what Georgina Waylen (1994, 339–340) calls the
“autonomy versus integration” dilemma. The question is whether they should
integrate themselves into political parties and, thus, risk losing their autonomy
or stay outside but risk remaining marginalised and without influence, especially
because parties are “the gatekeeper” for women’s elections into parliaments
(Bauer and Britton 2006, 8). In summary, political parties in Africa are para-
mount for women’s election into decision-making positions, but due to their lack
of internal democratisation and their patriarchal hierarchies, they are a tough
sphere for female politicians.
Women in National Politics
Women and Political Parties in Guinea1
Until Sékou Touré’s death in 1984, only one political party existed in Guinea,
the PDG. This did not change under Lansana Conté’s first years in office.
After their legalisation in 1992, many new parties emerged which “tended to
form around personalities or ethnic identity rather than ideology” (Camara
2014, 241). Subsequently, the political landscape shifted constantly as new
parties emerged, existing vanished, and short-living coalitions were formed. In
2011, more than 120 political parties were officially recognised, but only a
minority of them were present throughout the country (Union Européenne
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2011, 10). In the first round of the presidential elections of 2010 and 2015, the
same three leaders of the corresponding political parties gained most of the
votes. In the legislative elections of 2013, the coalition RPG-arc-en-ciel gained
fifty-three seats (out of 114), the UFDG thirty-seven, and the UFR ten
(Union Européenne 2013, 94). In Kankan, Lansana Kouyaté’s PEDN is also
of some relevance.
The earlier described characteristics of African political parties holds true also
for Guinea. Discursively, the male party leaders devote to democratisation, pro-
mote gender equality, and deny any ethnical dimension of their party. The rea-
lity, however, looks quite different: Party leaders are a club of elderly men who
have often been in the political business for a long time already. Even though
most parties have local branches all over the country, decision-making takes
place in Conakry’s headquarters and the party leaders have the final say. The
debating culture and the internal democratisation are rather poorly developed:
People who contradict the (local) party leader(s) might face major problems.
Candidates are not primarily selected due to their abilities; personal connections
and one’s devotion to the party count. The parties’ political programmes
resemble each other; their main goal is the country’s ‘development’.
The Guinean sociologist Alpha Amadou Bano Barry (25.12.2013)
describes his country’s political parties in an interview as follows: “If you
want to say something, you have to create a party […] because the political
parties that we have are essentially individual enterprises that belong to lea-
ders.” He further accuses Guinea’s economic and intellectual elite of not
playing “the democratic game” because neither political parties nor NGOs
are internally democratised (Bano Barry 09.09.2013). Even Kankan’s head of
the PEDN admitted that politicians are just looking for money. He com-
plained that in Guinea nothing happens transparently (informal conversation,
20.01.2013). Sala Diawara, a teacher at Kankan’s university who holds an
important position within the local RPG, is very critical of political parties,
regardless of his RPG membership. He stated:
My conviction is that Big Men create a political party and that almost
99.9 percent of the people vote for a party due to the party’s head; they
just follow him. But they do not like the political parties because of their
programs. All parties are similar. If I will once have a lot of money, I will
also create my own party to increase my influence.
(Interview, 26.11.2011)
Local party branches are organised in accordance to the national party: all
have a youth and a women’s branch. The party members meet regularly,
typically on Saturday afternoons. Then, local party dignitaries praise their
leader(s) and the party’s achievements, badmouth other politicians and their
parties, call for cohesion, and talk about organisational issues. During such
meetings, women and men sit separately. Local party members send a dele-
gation to the national bureau in Conakry when they have an important issue
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to discuss. When asked about women’s presence and role within their party, male
party leaders hinted at important female figures within their parties. In addition,
they stressed the women’s branch and that women constituted a majority
amongst the ordinary party members. But they also lamented the lack of sui-
table, meaning well-educated women for leadership positions. To sum up, there is
a wide gap between the discourse of political parties’ function and their actual
practices regarding organisation and institutionalisation, ethnic inclusion, as
well as women’s and youth’s participation in the decision-making process.
Since 2000, the number of women within Guinean politics, especially in the
national assembly and as head of ministries, has slightly increased. Still, their
presence in committees at the national level is small and progress is rather
slow (Doumbouya 2008, 19; Steady 2011, 71). At the end of 2015, women
constituted 22 percent of the General Assembly, 13 percent of the ministers, 12
percent of the governors, 9 percent of the prefects, and 8 percent of the mayors
(Union Européenne 2015, 40). The research participants of both gender
noticed this gradual change regarding women’s presence in institutional poli-
tics as well. I have been told, for example, that it had been impossible to have a
female governor, prefect, or mayor some decades ago. According to Mike
McGovern (2007, 137, author’s translation), women are even “particularly
visible in the Guinean public sphere.”
In February 2010, interim President Sékouba Konaté signed the new elec-
toral code, which, for the first time stipulated that 30 percent on the candi-
dates’ list for the General Assembly shall be reserved for women (No 91/012/
CTRN, article 129). Thanks to this innovation, twenty-five women out of 114
were elected in 2013. And once elected, female parliamentarians must still
fight for their representation in the different commissions, so they complained
(Africa Guinée 16.02.2014). This electoral code also reserves a third of the
places in the district councils (article 103) and the town councils (article 115)
for women. But these legal texts have not been applied and political parties
that do not respect the quota face no consequences (UN WOMEN
10.05.2019). Male party leaders typically justify this by hinting to the diffi-
culty they apparently face when looking for suitable women (CENI Guinée
31.03.2016). On May 2, 2019, Guinea again adopted a new law that candi-
date lists for elective positions must be alternatively drawn up by men and
women (UN WOMEN 10.05.2019)
Female Presidential Candidates
In the presidential elections of 2010, the candidacy of a woman, Saran Daraba
Kaba, was a first (Union Européenne 2011, 68). Kaba had been actively engaged
in ‘civil society’, especially in the Mano River Union, an organisation that is
concerned with peace, security, as well as economic and social ‘development’.
She entered the political scene only after her children had grown up
(Steady 2011, 83, 89). However, Saran Daraba Kaba received merely 0.39
percent of the votes (Union Européenne 2011, 80). In 2015, there was
Limited Impacts on Institutional Politics 131
again only one woman amongst the eight presidential candidates. Marie
Madeleine Valérie Dioubaté occupied the last place with just 0.33 percent
of the votes (Union Européenne 2015, 50). Dioubaté, born in Kankan in
1967 and the youngest of all candidates, is a business woman who recently
entered the political sphere. During the elections, she ran for the Guinean
Ecological Party (Parti des Ecologistes de Guinée, PEG) (BBC Afrique
07.10.2015). In an interview (Vision Guinée 02.11.2015), she stated: “We
will fight so that women get interested in politics because it has been them
who contributed to the country’s independence. They are the pillar of
development, but they are pushed off.”
The male, well-educated research participants tended to make women
responsible for the poor performance of the female presidential candidates.
As women constitute a majority in Guinea, Daraba Kaba would have been
elected if all women had voted for her, they argued. Along that same line of
reasoning, women did not do so because they are too jealous of each other.
By regarding women as a monolithic block and neglecting the fact that men
do not vote collectively for the same candidate either, these men try to
preserve the status quo. In their reports on the presidential and parliamen-
tary elections of 2010 and 2013, respectively, the EU (Union Européenne
2011, 68; 2013, 34) determines several factors for the low participation of
female candidates: Lack of sensitisation, female illiteracy, patriarchy, impe-
diments of cultural and ‘traditional’ nature, economic factors, and, lastly,
the political institutions’ functioning. With the help of international donors,
a significant number of NGOs try to raise awareness of the subject of
women and politics.
Alpha Condé has, on several occasions stressed the importance of women’s
promotion within the political sphere. When listening to the politicians’ dis-
course, women’s presence in the political sphere is desirable and their promo-
tion is a fact. However, women typically occupy subordinate posts in
institutional politics, especially within political parties (Touré 2013, 94); their
promotion is superficial and mainly takes place through workshops and ate-
liers. However, party leaders do not question the basic problems, for example,
the patriarchal and non-democratic party structures. Furthermore, women
typically do not raise their voices during party meetings. Zalikatou Diallo, a
female parliamentarian, deplored the discrepancy between the politicians’
discourse and reality regarding female empowerment and involvement in
decision-making processes as well (Africa Guinée 17.02.2014). The EU
(Union Européenne 2015, 41, author’s translation) writes in this regard:
“Women [in Guinea] are […] not very present in the highest functions within
political parties. Often, they are the main focus of the candidates’ and the
political parties’ speeches during electoral campaigns; nevertheless, they
remain restricted to the female party wings and just rarely integrated into the
executive offices.” Generally, the image of female Guinean politicians is
ambivalent. The trade union leader and politician Rabiatou Sèrah Diallo, in
contrast, is rarely the subject of controversies.
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Rabiatou Sèrah Diallo, the Fearless
Rabiatou Sèrah Diallo, the mother of six children, was born in Mamou in
1949. Originally, she was a secretary, then she became a court clerk, and later
a magistrate. When she was young, she frequented different women’s asso-
ciations, but quickly preferred the rather male environment of the trade union
due to its debating culture, as she explained. Between 1985 and 2000, Diallo
headed the female wing of the National Confederation of Guinean Workers
(Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs de Guinée, CNTG) until she became
its general secretary. As the political and economic situation in the country
grew worse in mid-2000, Rabiatou Sèrah Diallo wrote several memoranda to
Lansana Conté, but the President did not act accordingly. Thus, Diallo as one
of the two leading and identification figures of the trade union helped to
launch general strikes that paralysed the whole country in 2006 and 2007.
During the confrontations between protesters and the police, she was heavily
beaten and shot in the leg. When Diallo was accused of setting the country on
fire, she explained her engagement in the general strikes with her mother role:
I am a woman and a mother of six children. If I light a fire it is under the
cooking pot for nourishing my children. But in Guinea, the cooking pot is
empty. Our children do not go to school anymore because the teachers cannot
pay the transport coasts any longer. That is what heats up the country!
(Jeune Afrique 25.02.2010)
Rabiatou Sèrah Diallo did not give in when Lansana Conté heavily intimi-
dated her and she finally reached one of her goals, to have a Prime Minister,
Lansana Kouyaté. When Moussa Dadis Camara became President, Diallo
kept her distance from the men in power. It was only after the massacre at the
stadium on September 28, 2009, that she re-entered the political scene and
participated in the negotiations in Ouagadougou. From February 2010
onwards, Diallo headed the CNT (Jeune Afrique 25.02.2010).
Rabiatou Sèrah Diallo, nicknamed Guinea’s Iron Lady, is known for her
outspokenness, her straight talking, and her political independence. The male
and female research participants in Kankan knew of her and many admir-
ingly said about Diallo: ‘Wow, she is a real woman!’ In a portrait in the
weekly news magazine Jeune Afrique (25.02.2010), Diallo is characterised as
follows: “[She] is an assertive trade unionist who is not faint-hearted. Due to
her long combat against Lansana Conté’s dictatorship, she achieved to
impose herself in a largely masculine environment.” The International Crisis
Group (2013) describes Rabiatou Sera Diallo as a “strong personality” and
the latest edition of the Historical Dictionary of Guinea (Camara, O’Toole,
and Baker 2014, 115) considers her as “one of the most respected leaders of
today’s Guinea.” In an interview with the International Trade Union Fed-
eration, Diallo took an unequivocal stand regarding women in institutional
politics:
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We [women] are used for production but when it comes to sharing posi-
tions of responsibility, we are pushed to the margins. We are not asked to
take part in making important decisions. And yet women are less reck-
less, for example in management. They analyse things better because they
think of their families first. […] We are raising women’s awareness; we are
motivating them so that they understand that we must stop simply being
seen and make ourselves heard, so that we are not just given posts such
as ‘head of social affairs’, because while the men are making the big
decisions, the women are serving the drinks! Women are not even given
the minutes of important meetings, to keep them equally informed.
(Cited in Steady 2011, 81–82)
Rabiatou Sera Diallo is a very exceptional figure within Guinean politics. She
has been involved in ‘civil society’ and had an important position within the
trade union. In the 2000s, when Diallo was in her fifties, she unmistakably
started engaging within the political sphere; ‘she said loudly what all the
others just thought’ as Thierno once put it. Diallo explained her central
engagement in the general strikes with her mother role (Pauthier 2007, 234–
237). This is very characteristic for Guinean women who raise their voices in
and outside institutional politics as it helps in enhancing their credibility.
Furthermore, Diallo focussed not only on political change, but also on
ordinary families’ everyday struggles. This facilitated women’s mobilisation.
Interestingly, the research participants perceived Rabiatou Sera Diallo as stand-
ing above politics, even though she presided over the CNT. This can be traced
back to her political independence as she does not belong to the governing party
or to the opposition.
Women in Local Politics – Highly Visible Posts
Fatoumata Maty, the Former Mayor
When the RPG won the local elections in December 2005, it was its turn to
appoint the mayor. During a party meeting, the RPG’s members were to
choose a new mayor and two vice-mayors amongst a list of twenty-six per-
sons. Only a small minority of the names on the list were women, but
Fatoumata Maty did not figure among them, Amadou Kaba, young male
graduate and an important RPG member, told me (interview, 16.01.2013).2
Two men on the list, Mamadi Kaba Kapo and Djénabou Moussa Diaré, both
wanted to become mayor. Heated debates about which one was to head the
list and, thus, take the post blocked the party for a long time. I have been told
that Alpha Condé was very displeased with this dispute: It had been the first
time for his party to beat the PUP in a local election and the RPG’s leaders in
Kankan were unable to decide upon a mayor. Finally, Condé summoned Kapo
and Diaré to Conakry. As they were still unable to agree, he decided to put nei-
ther Kaba nor Diaré in this post but, instead, a woman, Fatoumata Maty. Diaré
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became the first vice-mayor and Kaba the second vice-mayor. Thus, Fatoumata
Maty had been taken by surprise. I asked the research participants why Alpha
Condé chose Maty as mayor: ‘She had been a RPG party member from the very
beginning. Moreover, she had been to school for some years, and thus, knew the
basics of reading and writing.’ Mister Konaté, the local RPG coordinator,
remembered the reactions of Kankan’s elite after Alpha Condé’s decision:
We have been a little bit discomforted because Kankan is a religious city.
Thus, the RPG’s coordination in Kankan contacted the notabilities, the
Sotikemo and his staff, the Imam, as well as Kankan’s important per-
sonalities to tell them that the President wishes a woman to head Kan-
kan’s municipality.
(Interview, 21.01.2013)
According to Mister Konaté, everybody accepted Alpha Condé’s choice
because he, as the party leader, was regarded as legitimate to take all deci-
sions. Furthermore, by having a female mayor, they hoped to attract more
financial support from international donors. Mister Koivogui, a university
teacher, however, vividly remembered the reluctance within Kankan’s not-
ability to be headed by a woman (interview, 14.01.2013). When I wanted to
know how Kankan’s population reacted to their first female mayor, I received
different answers. Amata Camara, the head of Dibida’s market, mentioned
her pride of having a female mayor (informal conversation, 25.01.2013).
Koulako Cherif, an elderly man who was doing sensitisation programmes on
the radio for gender equality, told me that Fatoumata Maty became mayor
because many women threatened to march on the streets if she did not get the
post (interview, 17.12.2012). The dyer Oumar Koma remembered that the
women of an association he had trained were so happy that they had invited
Madame Maty to their reunion (informal conversation, 23.01.2013). Djéna-
bou and her friend Aishatou Diakité told me that the real news for Kankan’s
population was that the RPG had won the local elections, not that a woman
had become the mayor (informal conversation, 29.01.2013).
Fatoumata Maty has been Kankan’s mayor during the turbulent periods of
2006 and 2007, during which rioters attacked, looted, and destroyed many
government buildings. This also resulted in the destruction of the local
archive. According to US diplomatic sources, revealed through WikiLeaks
(19.02.2009), Fatoumata Maty remained in Kankan during that time while
the governor and the prefect fled the city. Twice, I have been told about
Fatoumata Maty’s initial efforts to clean Kankan’s roads and markets. How-
ever, her inglorious end is what people remember. Officially, Fatoumata Maty
had been suspended in 2009 due to embezzlement of public funds (Aminata
19.02.2009). Then, her vice-mayor Djénabou Moussa Diaré took the post.
The latter did not last for long either. He, too, has been accused of embez-
zlement (Mamby Bah, interview, 12.01.2013) and, finally, a so-called special
delegation from the RPG headed the city hall during the time of research.
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Amadou Kaba claimed that Fatoumata Maty had to leave her post because she
did not support the new President Dadis Camara (interview, 16.01.2013). Amata
Camara, who knows Fatoumata Maty personally, considered the reason for the
mayor’s departure to be her lack of experience and education, especially her
ignorance of arithmetic. Three other research participants did not blame Fatou-
mata Maty directly but rather her staff, who had been able to torpedo all her good
efforts. Due to her background outside Kankan, people also called Fatoumata
Maty ‘the imported mayor’. Ismael Drame, Djénabou’s elder brother, pondered:
ISMAEL: Has it been her who had eaten the money or the others? Only the
lady had to go. I do not say that it has clearly been her. Did the other
persons not profit from the lady’s weakness to eat money and say it had
been her?
CAROLE: Why do you say ‘the lady’s weakness’?
ISMAEL: The man is always more intelligent. You take a woman and you
place her in front of ten, fifteen, twenty men, that is not easy. And espe-
cially here in our place, she arrived recently, she did not know how things
are done here. (Interview, 24.01.2013)
When I learned, in December 2012, that Kankan had been briefly presided
over by a woman, I was puzzled. Not by the fact per se, but I was wondering
why I did not find out about Fatoumata Maty much earlier; I had been
gathering data on women’s political articulations for more than eight months
before I became aware of her. I came up with different explanations: It is
possible that some people preferred concealing the fact that ‘traditional’
Kankan had been headed by a woman. Besides, the way in which she received
the post revealed problems within the ruling party that its officials were
reluctant to disclose. Fatoumata Maty’s unglamorous departure could also be
a reason why people did not like to talk about her. I was also wondering
whether my interest in Fatoumata Maty and the local population’s obvious
lack of interest in her hints at a ‘Western’ female researcher bias. Lastly, it
could similarly hint to the lack of power the local government in Kankan has
and, thus, it is of minor interest who presides over it.
Fatoumata Maty’s case again reveals the decision-making structure within
Guinean political parties: It is the party leader who has the last word. Behind
the scenes, his decisions can be criticised; however, in the end they are
accepted. It also illustrates that Alpha Condé’s commitment to female
empowerment is sometimes more than just empty words. I suppose by putting
a female mayor in Kankan, the rebellious city, Condé wanted to create a con-
trast with Lansana Conté’s PUP. In addition, he hoped to attract national and
international attention. Problematic for Fatoumata Maty were her lack of
education and executive experience. Correspondingly, her two vice-mayors had
wanted the post and were therefore not interested in a positive outcome of her
reign. Besides her embezzlement, Maty’s initiative of cleaning-up Kankan’s
markets and roads is what people remember from her time as mayor.
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Keita M’Balou Kaba, Emerging From ‘Civil Society’
Yesterday, I was preparing my evening salad in the yard sitting beside Madame
Fofana and Diaka who listened to one of the local radio stations. Together, we
heard the news that fifteen persons had been appointed for the Prefectural
Independent Election Commission (Commission Electorale Préfectorale Indé-
pendante, CEPI). The commission was headed by a woman, M’Balou Kaba,
who represented the ‘civil society’. The RPG had appointed the vice president
and the PEDN, one of the opposition parties, had appointed the treasurer. I am
very excited about the fact that a woman presided Kankan’s CEPI for the first
time, however, it seems that not many of Kankan’s inhabitants share my
enthusiasm. Probably, the national public trial that takes place at the time is
much more important for them because men and women of all ages and back-
grounds debate headedly about it.
(Field notes, 26.01.2013)
M’Balou Kaba was born in the mid-1970s. She abandoned school after
having failed the final examination. Neither her parents nor her female
friends encouraged her to repeat them as they all considered it high time for
her to marry. Thus, Kaba got married at the age of twenty-one, had two
children, and stayed at home thereafter. When her husband died twelve years
later, in 2006, she found herself in a completely new situation, where she
could not rely on the income of anybody anymore. Hence, Kaba decided to
take her chance in a formation of one year to become a teacher. When she
finished the training, she started giving lessons, but could hardly make ends
meet as she was only temporarily employed. Finally, she was integrated into
public service: M’Balou Kaba became a member of a local women’s NGO
involved in gardening. Thus, she could plant her own vegetables and therefore
better nourish her children. After the death of her husband, Kaba refused to
marry her late husband’s younger brother and returned to her family. Then,
another man proposed to her and she accepted, even though she was his third
wife, whereas formerly she had been the only one. They had two children
together which makes Kaba the mother of four children.
In 2010, before the presidential election, M’Balou Kaba was elected to the
CEPI as one of two ‘civil society’ members. As rapporteur, her role was to
keep minutes. In preparation for the legislative elections in 2013, the bureau
had to be newly constituted and it was the ‘civil society’s’ turn to provide the
president. Kaba finally decided to present herself and was elected. She
recounted: “There have been two men and I was the only woman. The men
accepted that I became president due to my experience. The CEPI accepted
because it was told to favour women and experience and I represented both”
(interview, 15.02.2013). When I asked Sala Diawara, a tutor and one of the
RPG’s youth representatives, why his party had supported Kaba’s candidacy,
he explained that during the consultations in the run-up to the elections, they
had been informed about Alpha Condé’s advices: to encourage female candi-
dates (interview, 31.01.2013).
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For the first time in Kankan’s history, the CEPI had a female president.3
Kaba’s husband supported her activities within the CEPI because of his edu-
cational background, she explained. However, many women had advised her
against running for this post. They had tried to convince her that in Muslim
Kankan women should not become a head of a commission. At the same
time, some male friends had encouraged her:
People told me that this was not good for a woman. They gave so many
negative examples and intimidated me. They said all kind of things, but I
wanted to get this post. At least the elections would let me lose it, but I
wanted to give it a chance. Nevertheless, at a certain point, when the
elections drew closer, I did not sleep for three nights.
(Interview, 15.02.2013)
M’Balou Kaba took matters into her own hands. After the death of her first
husband, she decided to leave his family with her children and not to marry
his younger brother. Then she completed a professional training and started
working as a teacher. Furthermore, she accepted the proposal of her current
husband. Kaba was aware of his educational background and was sure he
would approve of her occupations, for example the frequenting of a local
NGO. As a committed member of ‘civil society’ she then gained an important
position within Kankan’s public sphere. Running for that job was not an easy
decision for Kaba, as she was aware of habitual gendered norms according to
which a woman in Kankan should not get such a highly visible post. Inter-
estingly, it was Kaba’s husband and her male friends who encouraged her to
present herself as the CEPI’s head. Her female friends were afraid that
M’Balou Kaba would be badmouthed once elected.
Ordinary Party Members
Néné Sagno, Temporarily Participating
Néné Sagno was born in the early 1950s in Côte d’Ivoire. Sagno started her
schooling in Côte d’Ivoire, but then came to Guinea and continued until the
tenth grade. After marriage, she again moved to Côte d’Ivoire because her
husband worked as a sculptor in Abidjan. Together, they had eleven children,
of which seven survived. At the time of the research, three of these children
lived in Japan and one in the Netherlands. Thanks to their remittances, the
family in Kankan did not complain about food shortages. Finally, Néné
Sagno and her husband had to return to Kankan. Néné Sagno proudly told
me about the many different things she had done to generate an income for
her family: She acted as a sewer, a hairdresser, made bonbons and cakes, sold
different items at the market, made soap, and embroidered sheets. Whenever
one activity was no longer profitable, she simply changed her strategy and did
something else. Néné Sagno repeatedly stressed the importance of work: “In
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Guinea, all women work, all Guinean women have courage. Men are differ-
ent: Even if he knows his work, men here are lazy; they do not want to work.
They only sleep, that’s no good” (interview, 15.11.2011).
When Néné Sagno’s husband died, his younger brother wanted to marry
her and her co-wife, but they both refused, because the latter did not want to
take care of their (her own and her co-wife’s) children. Néné Sagno explained
that widows who marry again face many problems. Because she feared that
her new co-wives would not treat her well, especially because they were older
than she was, she preferred to remain alone and in peace. Therefore, Sagno and
her co-wife remained in their late husband’s house, together with some of their
children and grandchildren. Néné Sagno and her co-wife collaborated well, she
told me; there was no jealousy. It had been the latter who had encouraged
Néné Sagno to frequent the PEDN party meetings two months before the
presidential elections in 2010. Like her co-wife, Néné Sagno emphasised that,
naturally, she liked Lansana Kouyaté, the PEDN party leader. She pointed to
his performance as a prime minister under Lansana Conté:
Kouyaté wants to work for the people, for all Guineans, for the young
generation, for women, and for children. As soon as Kouyaté took office,
he stood up for women when he massively reduced the prices.
(Interview, 15.11.2011)
Néné Sagno enthusiastically told me how she went to greet her party leader at
Kankan’s entrance. The crowd had been overwhelming, she emphasised. At
party meetings, Sagno did not raise her voice. She explained that her role was
to listen to what the local party leaders had to say. If ordinary women like
herself did not agree with that, they could say so. At these reunions, only
female leaders spoke, not ordinary women. For Sagno, participating in those
meetings was one way of catching up on news regarding her country and
Kankan. She did not profit from her party membership, she emphasised. Néné
Sagno further explained that the party leaders had encouraged women to join
the meeting and to bring other women along. Sagno exclaimed: “That is politics.
If you like politics, you must frequent party meetings. That is what shows that
you like the party” (interview, 15.11.2011). In November 2012, Néné Sagno told
me that she had stopped going to the reunions, because she disliked the quarrels
within the party for which, according to her, low-level party executives were
responsible. ‘If you are of a certain age, you should not get involved in certain
things anymore’, she explained (informal conversation, 30.11.2012).
Néné Sagno is a very self-confident woman. Throughout her life, she
adapted flexibly to new circumstances. When her husband died, she decided
not to marry his younger brother as she disliked his behaviour and was not
dependent on his money. Having children abroad through which she profits in
the form of remittances, Sagno has no need to bother too much about finan-
cial issues. The younger women in her compound are now responsible for the
many tasks in the household, so she has enough time to do things she likes:
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Chatting with her friend, knitting and embroidering sheets, and going to
party meetings. Even though she does not see herself in an active role during
these reunions, she openly commits herself to the PEDN. Néné Sagno
understands politics as joining a political party and going to its meetings.
Thus, she focuses on the institutional sphere, however, without acknowledging
ordinary women’s decision-making power. But her political articulation goes
much further. Sagno, for example, accuses Guinean men of being lazy. She
expects them to work as hard as women for their families. From the head of
state, Néné Sagno demands that he takes care of the population as a father
should of his children. He should do this by reducing food prices, the precise
task that Lansana Kouyaté had laudably accomplished as Prime Minister. At
a certain point, the quarrels within the local party branch became too
apparent and, thus, Sagno decided not to frequent the meetings anymore. She
thought that an elderly woman should engage in conflict settling and not
socialise in a sphere where quarrels are frequent.
Adama Diawara, Cleaning Kankan
Adama Diawara was born in the mid-1950s in a village near Dabola. The
family then moved to Kankan because her father worked for the railways.
Out of Diawara’s eight children, only one girl survived. At the time of the
research, the latter and her family lived together with Adama Diawara. Both
women did divination sessions thanks to which they earned some money.
Above Diawara’s bed hang a portrait of Alpha Condé and one of the leaders
of a popular faith-based group.
Adama Diawara told me that her sister had lost her job as a border guard
during the Conté-period because of her support for Alpha Condé. It was at
this point that Diawara started engaging within the RPG. She recounted: “I
fought with heart and soul for Alpha’s concerns so that he will become Pre-
sident of the Republic” (interview, 08.10.2011). Adama Diawara emphasised
that she had never campaigned for becoming a governor or a minister. Firstly,
she was already too old for such things, and, secondly, she was not formally
educated; she engaged within the RPG to create a better future for her chil-
dren, that is, for Guinea’s younger generation. Diawara stressed that she was
not a party member because she had financial interests. “I like the RPG and
Alpha Condé naturally, without any reason,” she explained (interview,
8.10.2011). During the presidential election campaign, she and many other
female RPG followers sang a song about their natural love for the actual
President. Sometimes, Diawara participated in the weekly party meetings.
When Lansana Conté was still in power, Adama Diawara and other female
party members started organising in a voluntary association called Fason
Sagnia, which means ‘cleaning up the homeland’. Their goal was to make
Kankan tidier and more beautiful. However, Diawara recounted that their
association had to stop all activities until Kankan came into the RPG’s hands
at the end of 2005. It was when Alpha Condé finally became President that
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Fason Sagnia was reactivated and, thus, powerful again, she recounted. For
the cleaning work, all members wore the same yellow shirt, the RPG’s colour.
Together they cleaned Kankan’s markets, the municipality’s offices, the main
hospital, the mosques, and some of Kankan’s streets. As they worked volunta-
rily and even had to pay for the material they used, they were looking for a
financial aid. Thanks to contacts they had due to their party affiliation, a
delegation of thirteen persons met Alpha Condé and the First Lady personally.
Djènè Kaba Condé was impressed by the women’s project and promised to
help them. Through that, the association was to receive funds and rubbish bins
from the government. According to Diawara, this financial support was a form
of compensation for their long-time militancy for Alpha Condé.
In February 2012, the association wanted to clean the ditches along Kan-
kan’s main streets which were full of rubbish. The women negotiated with the
municipality to use one of their lorries. Finally, they agreed that the associa-
tion had to pay 200,000 Guinean francs (around 20 euros) a day plus the
required petrol. But on the arranged day, the van’s chauffeur did not show up
which made the women very angry. They complained that they had to do the
municipality’s work and the latter did not even help them (field notes,
23.02.2012). Nevertheless, two days later I observed Fason Sagnia emptying
the ditches. They were well organised and had the help of three young men
who heaved the garbage onto the lorry. The men in the café where Thierno
and I were sitting congratulated the women and stopped passing cars and
motorcycles to facilitate their work. In addition, they insulted the local gov-
ernment for not meeting their obligations (field notes, 25.02.2012).
In January 2013, Adama Diarara told me that their group had not so far
received the promised funds. Thus, she and other women had visited the local
government where they had argued: “Look at us, we are mothers. We stand
up early every morning, we are the ones who suffer on the ground. You in
contrast just remain in your comfortable situations. So, you must help us”
(informal conversation, 11.01.2013).
Adama Diawara has been politicised due to an injustice her sister had
experienced. Since ‘her’ leader became President, she has clear expectations:
He should recompense the RPG party members for their engagement and
commitment. However, Diawara makes a clear distinction between those who
should get a post – the formally educated people – and those who should
not – ordinary women like herself. When I asked the research participants
about powerful women in Kankan, some mentioned Diawara’s association
Fason Sagnia, because they cleaned in spaces where decision-making takes
places, such as the municipality or the main mosque. The women from Fason
Sagnia purposely used their party affiliation and the thereby established con-
tacts to achieve their goals, namely to receive equipment. Promising this
association some financial support can have a positive effect for the party and
its President, because the women then again help canvassing. Furthermore, it
goes hand in hand with Alpha Condé’s commitment to women’s promotion
by means of forming associations. However, these women do not solely
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pursue the goal of networking; their engagement can rather be seen as an
expression of their love for their city which they would like to look nice.
The example of Adama Diawara and her association illustrates that party
affiliation does not hinder those women from following their own interests.
They bargained directly with representatives of the local government when
the promised money did not arrive. In their plea, they pointed to their long-
standing party engagement and focussed on their roles as mothers purposely
to legitimise their collective political articulation in the municipality. My data
demonstrates that women especially refer to motherhood when they want to
socially legitimise the fact that they raise their voices in public, just like
Rabiatou Sèrah Diallo. As noted, this strategic use of their roles as mothers
to make political claims can be observed in other African countries as well
(Tripp 2003, 241).
Doussou Sidibé, the Long-Time Party Member
Doussou Sidibé was born in the mid-1940s and was married at a very early
age. Her husband had other wives and their matrimony had not been happy.
The amount of work she had to do at that time was too much, she said.
Sidibé had to give everything she earned directly to her husband, nothing was
for herself. She gave birth to thirteen children, among which were two sets of
twins. Doussou Sidibé told me that she was an RPG member from the very
beginning. During the Conté period, she could not publicly stand up for her
political affiliation, and the RPG reunions had to take place secretly. Sidibé
recounted that during her twenty years of militancy for Alpha Condé, she
had never been discouraged. Every time one of the party members faced a
problem because he or she had been in opposition to the Conté government,
Alpha Condé had called and appeased them. Doussou Sidibé had presided
over her neighbourhood’s women’s branch. I was interested why she had been
appointed to this post and she explained:
I have been elected to become the women’s district RPG president
because of my courage. For example, I never failed to appear to party
meetings. Even if it rained, I took my little umbrella and I went to the
reunion just as I did under the heat of the sun. Like this, the people
already knew that I had the courage for the RPG militancy.
(Interview, 18.10.2011)
As an RPG neighbourhood president, Doussou Sidibé had several duties:
Firstly, she helped to accommodate partisans from the rural area who came to
Kankan for important reunions. She prepared beds and, if she had the financial
means, she also cooked for the guests. Secondly, she helped to settle disputes
among party members. Thirdly, she mobilised people for different party activ-
ities, for example for canvassing. However, her major task was to welcome
Alpha Condé when he visited Kankan (interview, 18.10.2011).
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Like Adama Diawara, Doussou Sidibé also expected Alpha Condé to
recompense ‘formally’ educated party members, among them women, when
he became the head of state. She made a clear distinction between those who
went to school and those who did not. The former should make decisions and
speak openly, but not the latter. Sidibé was elected to a representative post
due to her long-time RPG membership and her party commitment. Interest-
ingly, this did not enhance her decision-making power within the RPG. Her
role was rather based on her duties as a mother and wife: to prepare food and
sleeping possibilities for visitors, to clap, dance, and canvass, and to welcome
Alpha Condé as well as other party dignitaries. This illustrates that the
women’s branch is of no importance when it comes to decision-making within
political parties. The male party authorities, on the contrary, claim that
representatives of these women’s branches have a say in every major decision.
However, I heard that they do not meet regularly and are often not informed
about important issues, thus their decision-making power is rather weak.
Young women are also present within the youth’s branches. But its repre-
sentatives are – once more – mostly male, and I never met a young woman
who holds an important post within her party – contrary to young men.
Néné Sagno, Adama Diawara, and Doussou Sidibé are all elderly women.
This is a typical characteristic of female party members. Male party members,
in contrast, are mixed in age. Once women are less occupied with children
and household tasks, they have more time for other things, such as partici-
pating in party meetings. Additionally, as they have matured, they are less
exposed to sexual badmouthing than younger women. Lastly, elderly women
are socially more respected than their younger counterparts. The three exam-
ples illustrate, once again, women’s primary preoccupation with food prices.
These women chose their favourite political leader in accordance with his
(former) performance in this regard, and then because they liked him natu-
rally – for which they were disregarded by ‘formally’ educated women.
Ordinary female supporters of Alpha Condé like to say Alphako, meaning
that they would, under no circumstances, change their political camp. The
words ‘I love him or her naturally’ are frequently used in French, Maninkaka,
and Pulaar for expressing one’s profound attachment and love for another
person. By transferring them to the political sphere, they state that their
choice of political camp is emotional and does not need any further expla-
nation. This phrasing hints to the limitations of ordinary women’s political
articulations within institutional politics.
Ordinary female party members do not gain anything out of their party
membership and have no pre-determined goals, for example gaining an
important post. Furthermore, they do not talk at party meetings as their role is
not to influence the decision-making process. Rather, they are (mis)used for
canvassing and garnering votes, for dancing, clapping, entertaining, doing
voluntary work, and praising the leader. Ordinary women’s primarily motiva-
tion to become a party member is the social side of it. However, they can, at
times, profit from the acquaintances they make at party meetings. In brief, my
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data resembles to a great extent what Babacar Fall (2001, 215) noticed for
Senegal almost twenty years ago: “The dominant image of the woman parti-
cipating in political life is that of the socialite woman providing with folklore.”
Conclusion: Institutional Politics as a Male Domain
The Ambivalent Image of Women in Institutional Politics
Despite women’s active engagement in the struggle for independence and Sékou
Touré’s promotion of women, the institutional political sphere in Guinea is still
defined as a male domain “but women have played important roles through
holding political office, especially at the ministerial level” (Steady 2011, 71). The
image of female politicians in Guinea is quite contradictory – be it at the local
level or the national level. On the one hand, they are praised for being honest,
less corrupt, and ruling more transparently than men. People trace these positive
characteristics back to women’s roles as caretakers and nurtures: They are pre-
destined to play important roles within politics since they have the experience in
caring for the stability and peaceful cohabitation of their families, the research
participants claim. Some of the female research participants would like to have
more women in institutional politics as they know their problems better than
men do. Female politicians are also said to be very brave and ambitious. They
are praised for talking in front of large audiences, for being able to defend their
positions, and for imposing their interests. Because of such things, they are
congratulated on behaving like men.
On the other hand, exactly these characteristics are also seen negatively:
From this point of view, female politicians are accused of being ruthless and
evil. Some of the female, non-formally educated research participants of dif-
ferent ages think that politics is a male affair and therefore not for women.
‘Women are women, they cannot talk instead of men’, is a typical statement
in this regard. When a woman enters the political sphere, other women might
critically ask whether she has nothing better to do than that, meaning that
she must first care for her children and her husband. Several well-educated
elderly male research participants pointed to exemplary female politicians
who, even though they attend political meetings and travel a lot, are still able
to care for their husbands and to look exemplarily after their households. This
illustrates that, in their eyes a woman should still conform to locally expected
gender duties as a mother and wife, even if she becomes a (national) politi-
cian. Generally, female politicians are badmouthed to a greater extent than
their male counterparts: Accusations of sexual favours are frequent whenever
a woman, not only in the political sphere, obtains an important post.
Regardless of official statements, Guinean political parties are hierarchical
and rather undemocratic organisations; dissonant voices are not welcome.
This proved to be a problem for some well-educated women emerging from
‘civil society’ who held more or less important positions when they internally
criticised their parties and their local leaders. In Guinea, as in many other
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African countries, it is quite easy to bypass female politicians due to their
ambivalent image. This can also be illustrated with two notions in Man-
inkaka, musowkung and musowkriki. Musow is a woman, kung the head, and
kriki means brave. Both notions are used for a female leader, a woman in a
responsible position who can do things others can’t. Still, there is room for
interpretation as the notion musowkriki has a double meaning. On the one
hand, it refers to a fearless woman who is not afraid of bargaining with high-
ranking state employees and other important personalities. On the other
hand, it implies that the woman debauches, that she is too close to men. If a
woman has a high position in the army, for example, people might call her
musokriki, a woman who gained her position only because of sexual favours
to the generals. This badmouthing hints at a problem Mary Moran (2012, 61)
accurately describes: “Women seeking public office assert their right to hold
authority over unrelated males, which does profoundly challenge patriarchal
values.” The contested image of women engaging in the political sphere is not
new: Writing about the years before independence, Elizabeth Schmidt (2002,
293) notices that the RDA members “quickly gained a reputation as a haven
for prostitutes, loose women, and divorcées since their party engagement
caused tensions within the households.”
All these findings are not a Guinean particularity, though. Drawing on
data from Uganda and Nigeria, Aili Mari Tripp (2006, 116–117) and Jibrin
Ibrahim (2004, 10) notice that conforming to the local expectations of
motherhood and housewives is highly important for female politicians. Their
moral standings are always put into question. Men’s behaviour and dress
style, in contrast, do not matter. The data I gathered on women and institu-
tional politics in Benin show similar results: Female politicians are not to
neglect their household obligations. Furthermore, they are easily accused of
being prostitutes. To reduce such insults, women in Benin, like in Guinea,
enter the political sphere typically after menopause (Ammann 2010, 67–69).
Women in Local Political Parties
As highlighted, gender is a decisive factor regarding political articulations
within Guinean party politics. While the rank and file constitutes of men and
women, people holding decision-making positions are mostly male. But there
are also other important differences regarding the party member’s identities.
In Kankan, ethnicity is decisive for a person’s party affiliation: While the
Fulani tend to support the UFDG, the majority of the Manding vote for the
RPG and a minority for the PEDN.
Age is another crucial factor: I never saw a woman below her forties at a
party meeting, and most of them are in their fifties or even sixties. Men also
tend to be elderly, but there are also many, mostly well-educated, male party
members who are between twenty and forty-five years old. Ordinary, elderly
women are sought after for their abilities to mobilise different social groups
and for folkloristic purposes, not because the party leaders want to integrate
Limited Impacts on Institutional Politics 145
their opinions into the decision-making processes. By supporting their party’s
leader, they hope their children, that is to say, the younger generation would
profit if the leader ever comes to power. Besides, attending party meetings is a
socially accepted reason for leaving the house. In this way, elderly women, whose
main preoccupation is not to generate an income, keep themselves busy. They
not only show up to listen to the local dignitaries’ speeches, but also to chat and
exchange news with acquaintances and friends. As a consequence, they can
enlarge their network from which they might profit one day. Adama Diawara’s
group, Fason Sagnia, is a case in point. Thanks to the women’s party member-
ship, they had a direct contact to the actual President and the First Lady.
Lastly, there is also a major gap between well-educated and ‘non-formally’
educated women, which manifests at the discursive and practical levels: Intel-
lectual women derogatorily recount that ‘non-formally’ educated party members
cannot explain why they adhere to a specific political party. Moreover, the
former cannot understand why the latter are there just for canvassing and do not
strive after certain posts to increase their power within the party. According to
‘non-formally’ educated female party members, education is the decisive factor
as to whether one is supposed to make propositions at reunions.
During my time in Kankan, I was able to talk to four well-educated women
who had or still held an important position within their political party.
Interestingly, all of them claimed that they had not actively been looking for
the posts: They recounted that friends had suggested them for these positions
or they held destiny accountable for their achievements. Three out of these
four women mentioned problems they had with the local party leaders –
something I never heard of in relation to men. They deplored the bad orga-
nisation of their parties, especially the lack of internal democratisation. When
they directly criticised the party principals, they had a high price to pay: The
party’s local dignitaries internally mobbed and bypassed them and important
information no longer reached these women. Consequently, one of these
women decided to withdraw from her position as head of Kankan’s female
UFDG-wing. Others played the game and profited from their posts and per-
sonal connections, knowing the consequences they faced if they did not. I
never heard a non-formally educated woman criticising her party. However, as
the example of Néné Sagno, who stopped frequenting party meetings due to
constant quarrels, shows, they are not just mute clappers, but they consciously
decide whether to engage or to distance themselves from their party.
These four female politicians all mentioned the lack of women’s education
and political experience as obstacles for women’s promotion in politics.
Another problem is women’s lack of political experience once elected into
office. Further, they deplored women’s shortage of money, time, and self-con-
fidence. As Anne Marie Goetz (2009, 13) writes, the lack of funds for cam-
paigning seems to be a general problem for female candidates. Lastly, some
well-educated female research participants explained that they preferred
staying in ‘civil society’ and abstaining from political life as the latter has the
reputation of being ruthless.
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Emic Understanding of Politics
In this chapter, I have shown the characteristics of female political articula-
tions within the institutional political sphere. From the female actors’ point of
view, someone who is a member of a political party is in politics, even if he or
she only frequents party meetings. Thus, a politically active person supports a
political leader and therefore also his party. Voting, in contrast, is not con-
sidered as doing politics. I have been told that every person who loves his or
her country should vote. Electing a President is understood as a duty and not
as a political act. This emic understanding is noteworthy bearing in mind
Guinea’s history of electoral manipulation since 1993. Even though (some of)
their votes did not count in the end, these experiences did not change people’s
conviction of the importance to cast a ballot.
The research participants’ reactions to the question regarding politics
depended mostly on their experience and opinion of political leaders and,
more generally, on politics at the national level. Many, irrespective of differ-
ences regarding gender, age, ethnicity, and education, do not have much con-
fidence in politicians and their parties. Accordingly, the latter are not
regarded as capable of presenting solutions to ordinary people’s problems and
therefore improving their daily lives. The local expression ‘it has been made
politically’ hints to the rather negative image of politics. This notion is used
whenever something has not been done ‘normally’. Since Alpha Condé
became President in 2010, the political sphere has been marked by quarrels
between the ruling party and the opposition and their leaders, respectively. By
distancing oneself from politics, people state that they do not want to get
involved in these endless disputes.
However, this disassociating also has historical roots: During the First and
Second Republics, every form of dissidence could have severe personal con-
sequences. Thus, framing one’s political articulations as apolitical has, for a long
time, been a way of protecting oneself. Such habitual behaviour does not change
rapidly. The mistrust regarding political parties is one reason why they are just
rarely able to mobilise the masses in Kankan – something other organisations
are more capable of, such as the trade unions during the general strikes of 2006
and 2007. I have been told on several occasions that this extraordinary time in
Guinea’s history enhanced women’s political articulations within the institu-
tional sphere because, during the strikes, they were regarded as legitimate actors
who were allowed to demand political and social transformations.
Striking is the way women express their political activities as social and not
political articulations. As I have illustrated, especially well-educated women
such as Rabiatou Sèrah Diallo and also the women from the Association of
Female Leaders use their kinship identity as mothers and not their gender iden-
tity for making political claims. A mother is powerful; she must be respected,
and her words count – contrary to the wife who takes orders from her husband.
Thus, by drawing on the socially acknowledged moral authority as mothers,
women make sure their political articulations are taken seriously. Those research
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participants who claimed that women are better suited for leadership positions
because they are nurturing, caring, more peaceful, and less corrupt than men,
explained that in the context of their roles as mothers. This discourse of drawing
on women’s identification with motherhood is widespread in ‘civil society’ and
the political sphere throughout Africa. Aili Mari Tripp (2003, 241) argues that
due “to the historically cultural separation between women’s and men’s mobili-
zation, women have often used their position as ‘mothers’ as a basis of moral
authority from which to argue for their inclusion in politics. They have used it as
a resource with which to demand political changes not only in practice, but also
in political culture, demanding that the value of nurturing, caring and justice be
included in political practice and that corruption be rejected.”
As the image of strong mothers and motherhood has “emotive power” (Van
Allen 2009, 65), it is purposely and strategically used and manipulated to legit-
imise and strengthen women’s political articulations. However, we must not
forget that the problem of essentialising exists here also: Mothers are not more
equal than women are. During her campaign in 2005, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf
successfully played with local understandings of gender expectations in the social
and political spheres. On the one hand, she repeatedly emphasised that she is a
mother and a grandmother, hinting at the moral authority that accompanies
motherhood and seniority. On the other hand, her voting slogan was “she is our
man” (Moran 2012, 59). Mary Moran (2012, 54) argues that Johnson Sirleaf
“has successfully synthesized the authority-bearing role of female elder with the
claims to gender neutrality embedded in Western notions of liberal democracy.”
Summing up, within the sphere of party politics, with the exception of well-
educated women who hold important positions, women are not to express
their ideas, make propositions, or raise new issues to discuss at party meet-
ings. Once, during a party meeting, I witnessed a market woman complaining
about the lack of space in the market. Mister Konaté, the RPG coordinator,
brusquely rebuked her that this was not the place for such a complaint (field
notes, 26.11.2011). This example illustrates that political parties are not con-
sidered to take care of ordinary people’s immediate preoccupations. There-
fore, women are more likely to meet the chef de quartier, the treasurer, or the
mayor’s representative and not party dignitaries when they have a problem. I
come to the conclusion, as I have argued, that ordinary women’s political
articulation within parties is very limited. Therefore, women’s influence on
governmental practices is not bargained for in the sphere of political parties.
Notes
1 Minor parts and earlier versions of this chapter have been published in the follow-
ing article: Ammann, Carole. 2018. “Political Parties and Participation: Guinea.”
In Encyclopedia of Women & Islamic Cultures (EWIC), edited by Suad Joseph.
Leiden: Brill Online. Reprinted with the publisher’s permission.
2 I also tried to contact Fatoumata Maty personally. I was almost successful thanks
to a friend of a friend, but in the end, she did not want to talk to me, probably
because of the way she had been dismissed. I heard colloquial story of her
148 Limited Impacts on Institutional Politics
appointment several different times from different participants; however, I was
unable to verify the content through official sources.
3 Lansana Kouyaté later accused Keita M’Balou Kaba of manipulating the legislative
elections in favour of the ruling party (Vision Guinée 05.10.2013). For the pre-
sidential elections in October 2015, Kaba was confirmed as the CEPI’s president
(Guinée 360 12.06.2015). For the local elections in early 2018, she was still in her
position (Kankan 24 15.01.2018).
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6 Everyday Politics
Introduction: Daily Bargaining over Gender Relations
Norms of respectability and morality are gendered – in Kankan as well
as elsewhere. Norms are imposed through positive and negative sanctions
whose enforcement provides the individual, group, or institution with
power and authority. Such morality is not fixed but bargained and rein-
forced on a daily basis. Jean Pierre Olivier de Sardan (2008, 14) notes
that “on the one hand, norms change (sometimes rapidly), they adapt,
hybridize and are created, on the other hand, normative pluralism is the
rule and not the exception.” In this chapter, I analyse women and men’s
daily negotiation of social norms in Kankan. What is regarded as a male
or a female activity, demeanour, and duty and by whom? How do women
bargain over standards of dressing, speaking, courtesy, marrying, hand-
ling and sustaining a family? How do local gendered norms influence
women’s agency and vice versa? In brief, this chapter explores how and
by whom masculinities, femininities, and gender relations are constructed
and bargained over in Muslim Kankan. Even though bargaining pro-
cesses take place in the present, they are very much influenced by the
other two temporal dimensions of agency, namely habitual practices and
the imagination of the future (Emirbayer and Mische 1998). People
always compare their memories of past gendered moral behaviour – or
what they have heard about it – with their actual experiences and con-
victions in this regard.
I begin this section with a tale Djénabou told me. According to Djénabou,
this and similar tales are not only recounted to children by elder relatives,
they are also present in Guinean schoolbooks. Such folk tales, legends, and
proverbs are used to reinforce societal gendered expectations according to
which “the Mande woman’s most valuable roles are to bear and raise chil-
dren, care for her home and obey her husband” (Hoffman 2002, 5). By pro-
viding the example of Sakoba Mara, I then illustrate how women behave
according to social gendered norms in some regard, while having different
ideas of their own lives in others.
The Tale of the Three Princes and their Mother
“Once upon a time, there was a king with three sons. When the king died, one of
them was to succeed him. For this decision to be taken, the people went under the
parley tree to listen to the wisdom of the eldest. Normally, the oldest son was to
succeed his father. But when he started to speak, the birds on the tree made such a
noise that nobody understood what he was saying. After that, the second eldest
son started to speak. But again, the people could not hear what he was saying due
to the birds’ noise. Then, the youngest prince started to talk. Now, the birds
remained silent. When he had finished, the sons were wondering why the birds had
prevented the elder sons from talking. An elderly man stood up and said: ‘Princes,
go and ask your mother. She will explain the birds’ reaction.’ Thereafter, the
princes told their mother everything and the latter started explaining: ‘It was
planned that I should marry your father, but I rebelled, I wanted to marry some-
one else. It did not work and finally, I had to marry your father. Afterwards, I
contradicted everything your father said because I wanted your father to give up,
but he did not. It has been in this period of rebellion that I gave birth to you, my
first son. That is why when you started talking, the birds prevented you from
speaking. It translates directly in what I have done to your father.’ The second son
wanted to know whether this had been similar for him. The mother affirmed.
Then the youngest son wanted to know why the birds had led him talk. The
mother carried on: ‘The birds have not been mistaken. I rebelled when I had your
brothers, but then, I understood that your father would not let me go. Thus, I told
myself that the best thing to do was to respect my husband. In the end, he is
stronger than I am, he is the king. From that moment on, I did everything he
wanted”’ (Djénabou, informal conversation, 17.02.2013).
This tale illustrates the importance of female subordination in Guinea and
other West African countries. Submission is just one of women’s exemplary
behaviour; others are tranquillity, paying respect, dressing properly, and not
protesting publicly. Showing respect for Manding women is, according to
Saskia Brand (1998, 140), “to know how to greet, to know when to speak
and – more importantly – when to remain silent, to control one’s feelings, not
to disagree publicly, [and] to accept authority.” Throughout my fieldwork,
men and women repeatedly praised women who restrained themselves. A
popular Manding song goes as follows:
Awoman who does not behave properly will never have awell-educated child.
Awoman who does not subordinate herself will not have a strong child. The
child will not be able to do anything in its life. Everywhere people talk of
women’s suffering. But it is better to subordinate – for your children’s sake.
(Djénabou, informal conversation, 17.02.2013)
An elderly woman told me another proverb: ‘If a woman becomes a lion, her child
becomes a cat that cannot even crack an egg’ (informal conversation, 04.02.2013).
And Thierno explained that ‘like mother, like daughter’ is a popular saying in
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Kankan (informal conversation, 26.10.2012). In her article on gender ideology in
Manding societies, Barbara Hoffman (2002, 8) recounts similar proverbs. One
says: “The child of a good woman will not be spoiled. […] The child of a bad
woman becomes nothing.”Another implies: “If awoman crows over her husband,
[…] her son will cackle like a hen […].” The lesson of these proverbs is, in Hoff-
man’s (2002, 10) terms, that “conformity to the expectations of society leads to
happiness and prosperity; non-conformity leads to destruction.”
According to the local understanding – and by referring to the Qur’an – a
woman’s behaviour shapes her social destiny, that is, the future of her off-
spring. If a mother does not conduct herself properly, her children will be
cursed. Thus, a mother is held responsible for her children’s misbehaviour,
especially of her daughter(s) (Bano Barry, Diallo, and Camare 2006, 13). In
these tales and proverbs, the children stand metaphorically for a woman’s
success in the future. Both research collaborators saw this as one explanation
why some women do not divorce even if they quarrel constantly with their
husbands, their mothers-in-law, and other family members, get beaten, and do
not get any financial support. In brief, this menace is used as an effective
means of enforcing the status quo in Kankan’s patriarchal society. However,
as Anita Schroven (2019, 62) based on Sherry Ortner (1997) aptly notes
“compliance may be a strategy employed by people to achieve their aims.”
Sakoba Mara, a Resolute Woman
Sakoba Mara, one of Djénabou’s neighbours, was born in the year of Guinea’s
independence. She grew up in Sierra Leone and did not go to school. In Sierra
Leone, she was married, but due to her childlessness, the couple divorced.
During one of our conversations, Mara told me that no man has ever beaten
her, because she obeys their every command: ‘If he says “stop!”, I stop. That’s
good for you and especially for your children. If a woman climbs on the head
of her husband, her children will do the same’ (informal conversation,
04.02.2013). At the same time, Mara appreciated the fact that nowadays in
Guinea, women do the same work as men, for example becoming prefects.
At first sight, Sakoba Mara’s statement is not extraordinary at all. How-
ever, if we look closely at her special situation, it becomes clear that in her
daily life, she did not subordinate herself very often. Mara is the third wife of
her current husband and the favourite one, as she proudly stressed. With him,
she did not have children either, but she fosters two of her brother’s daughters.
Interestingly, she does not live with her husband and her two co-wives in a
village some 35 kilometres from Kankan, but stays in the city. From time to
time, her husband and Mara visit each other. She explained that this physical
distance had economic and practical reasons. Her husband, a farmer, does
not earn enough to nourish all his wives. Because of Mara’s weight, she
cannot fulfil the tasks a woman in a village must, such as fetching firewood. If
she got special treatment, this would not please her co-wives, Mara stated.
Thus, she remains in Kankan where she earns a living by selling her
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embroideries. Even though she has no biological children and does not live in her
husband’s household, two issues that can make life difficult for a woman in
Kankan, she is highly respected in her neighbourhood. Whenever there is a
social problem, people fetch the resolute woman to solve it. Due to her age, her
rhetoric capabilities, her support of her family, and her ‘good’ behaviour in gen-
eral, Sakoba Mara has gained an important position within her community.
Sustaining One’s Family1
I teach at the university. From there, I come to make the household chores, I
am near my children. At the end of the month, I get paid. If my husband does
not give me some money, I have something to say within the household.
(Jeanne Konaté, interview, 12.12.2012)
Figure 6.1 Women Refuelling their Motorcycles in the City Centre
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According to the Guinean Civil Code (article 329; République de Guinée 2015)
that was in force at the time of the research, both spouses are to subsidise the
household budget according to the economic capabilities of each spouse, but the
main burden lies on the husband’s shoulders. It also states that the women are
allowed to administer their own budgets. In accordance with local popular per-
ception, men should be the number-one breadwinner. The image of the man as
the family’s provider is widespread in many African societies (e.g. Cornwall
2002; Hunter 2006). However, because of economic hardship, women – some-
times substantially – contribute to the household budgets. Therefore, more and
more Guinean men, like in other West African countries, encourage their
daughter(s), girlfriend(s), and wife/wives to launch commercial activities, to
acquire a profession, or to complete higher education. Consequently, most of
these women have some degree of economic independence, such as the two
women portrayed below, who are even their families’ main breadwinners.
Nantènin Nabé, Selling Sweets in Town
Nantènin Nabé was born in the mid-1970s in Côte d’Ivoire where her
father was selling second-hand clothes on a large-scale basis. Due to this
lucrative business, the family lived well. Nabé’s father then had to go back
to his place of birth, a village some eighty kilometres from Kankan, to care
for his elderly parents. It was in this Guinean village that Nabé became
aware of, and personally experienced, what it means to be poor. She then
married her current husband, who is just a few years older than she is.
Until today, she is his only wife. In 2009, Nantènin Nabé and her husband
decided to move to Kankan, because they hoped their six children would
get a better education there.
When moving to Kankan, she did not generate an income. After one year,
Madame Fofana asked her whether she would like to sell bonbons (iced sweets)
for her. Since then, Nabé has installed herself at a strategically good place in the
city centre and sells the bonbons. Her husband was engaged in the transportation
of petrol, but one day, his lorries were attacked and, thus, he lost all his money.
At the time of the research, he helped in a friend’s boutique. However, according
to Nabé, he does not earn anything and is merely there while waiting for other
possibilities. Therefore, her husband no longer contributes to the household
budget. Nantènin Nabé stressed that she sells these bonbons because she has
nothing else to do and is obliged to gain her family’s income. However, could she
choose freely, she would prefer to own a small shop. Furthermore, she did not
like the way she had to leave the young children alone at home, “but what to
do?”, she asked rhetorically. “Here in Guinea, women are the ones who get their
children by” (interview, 08.11.2011).
When asked about decision-making at home, Nabé made clear that she
accepted whatever her husband demanded. She added: “If my daughter wants
to marry or if I want that she marries, my husband will accept this. But if I
say that she should remain at my side, my husband will also accept that. I try
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to convince him by talking to him until he agrees” (interview. 08.11.2011). It
seems that Nabé and her husband get along very well, something a woman
selling nearby confirmed. Nantènin Nabé explained that there are all too
many households in Kankan where the couples quarrel endlessly. This is
always the woman’s fault, Nantènin stressed: ‘It is necessary that the woman
forgets the quarrels. Even if her husband insults her or someone throws a
pebble at her, she should not say anything. Like this, the problems will end. If
she gets beaten, she must remain calm’ (informal conversation, 15.01.2013).
Ever since her husband lost his two lorries, Nantènin Nabé is her family’s
only breadwinner. As they are just getting by and sometimes cannot eat three
times a day, she does not like this responsibility. Nabé imagines a bright
future in which she owns a small shop and does not have to cope with the
actual financial problems. However, compared to the first year after arriving
in Kankan when she did not earn anything, Nabé feels she has already made a
first step due to her income-generating activities. According to her, God is
responsible for this change. Nabé could not tell us directly that she and her hus-
band have similar perceptions. In Kankan, couples typically do not show when
they are on good terms, as this would expose them to the mockery of others.
Nabé and her husband also exchange their ideas regarding family affairs. I
suppose that one reason for this harmony lies in their similar ages. If the hus-
band is much older than his wife – a reality for many couples in Guinea – the
woman subordinates not only because he is a man, but also because he is an
elderly person and thus deserves respect. Still, Nabé’s words illustrate that she is
habitually subservient to men. She makes clear that women should not contra-
dict nor defend themselves even if they get attacked physically.
Fanta Doumbouya, Heading a Hairdressing Salon
Fanta Doumbouya, born in the mid-1980s, grew up in Conakry and attended
school through to the fifth grade. In her teens, she moved in with her father in
Kankan. At one point, she became very ill, and it was not her father but a young
Ghanaian living next door who took care of her; in fact, according to Doum-
bouya, he saved her life, and fell in love with her as well, so she wanted to marry
him. But the people around her disapproved: He was not only a foreigner but
also a Christian. The Ghanaian encouraged her to learn a respectable profession
to be economically independent, in case he ever had to return to Ghana. Thus, in
2001, Doumbouya began an apprenticeship as a hairdresser. Because, in
Kankan, apprentices do not earn anything but, on the contrary must pay a fee,
she bought artificial hair whenever she visited her family in Conakry, and sold it
at a profit upon her return to Kankan. Thanks to this trade, she was able not
only to support herself, but even to set aside some savings.
The Ghanaian boyfriend did indeed depart, whereupon Fanta Doumbouya
met another young man, who declared that he intended not only to marry her
but also to move with her to the United States, where she could open her own
hairdressing salon. When her new boyfriend made this suggestion, Doumbouya
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found this idea so alluring that she did not hesitate to follow him on the first
stage of the proposed journey, to Bamako. There, he claimed to be arranging
their visas, but one day he disappeared – with all her savings. Her dreams shat-
tered, Doumbouya returned to Kankan, where she eventually married a man
who already had two children, whom she fosters. Nowadays, she also takes care
of a cousin’s two children; though not their biological mother, she does every-
thing she can for these four children.
In 2004, having completed her apprenticeship, Fanta Doumbouya opened
her own hairdressing salon. At the time of research, she complained about the
lack of clients. Sometimes, there were economically difficult situations like in
January 2012, when she had to pay the rent of her salon for six months in
advance. As Doumbouya had no cash, she had to borrow the money from a
friend. She explained: ‘People do not give me money easily, because I come to
work by motorbike every day and I have my own salon. They think, I am
luckier and wealthier than most of the people in Kankan’ (informal con-
versation, 21.01.2013). Doumbouya’s husband has no regular job. Thus, she
pays the family’s grocery bills – including those of her mother-in-law and
sisters-in-law. Asked whether being the breadwinner had an impact on gender
relations, Doumbouya said:
There is a change in gender relations, but men remain in power. Women
subordinate to men. They do so to make their children succeed and being
blessed by God. If they put themselves on a same level with men, only
because of their income, it would not be good for their children’s
benediction.
(Informal conversation, 15.12.2012)
When Fanta Doumbouya’s Ghanaian boyfriend encouraged her to start an
apprenticeship as a hairdresser, she heeded his advice. Because she and her
boyfriend were in love, marriage seemed to be the inevitable next step. How-
ever, she knew that marrying a man who was not only a foreigner but also a
non-Muslim was problematic. Having evaluated the possibilities at hand,
Doumbouya decided not to marry her Ghanaian boyfriend, who shortly
thereafter returned to his native land. Fanta Doumbouya has no children
of her own. Childlessness is, as a rule, a huge problem for a married
woman in Kankan, because she is not considered to be a ‘real’ woman.
Doumbouya, however – like many other childless couples in Kankan – has
chosen to rear foster children. Thus, she became a mother and therefore
achieved social adulthood. In addition, she is successfully preventing her
husband from using her failure to bear him a child as an excuse to marry
another wife. Doumbouya is economically independent of her husband,
being the family’s breadwinner. Having her own hairdressing salon
strengthens her independence. At the same time, Fanta knows that she –
like every other wife in Kankan – must remain subservient to her hus-
band, for the sake of ‘her’ children.
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Challenging Men’s Position through Breadwinning
Nantènin Nabé and Fanta Doumbouya are representative of women in Kankan
in many regards. They are both faithful Muslims whose submissive attitude is
embodied. Like Nabé, many women act as petty traders and earn just enough to
satisfy (parts of) their families’ basic needs. Doumbouya owns a hairdressing
salon, something many young women dream of. Thus, she is better off than most
of the other female hairdressers. The educational background of the two women
is also representative of the average woman in Kankan: Just a small minority of
them finish school up to the twelfth grade. Most women frequent school for just
a few years or none at all.
The fact that Nantènin Nabé and Fanta Doumbouya contribute substantially to
their families’ income has earned them the respect of their families, neighbours, and
peers. Regarding income-generating activities, these two women are not excep-
tional – nowadays, most women in Kankan somehow contribute to the family’s
grocery bills. Aurélie Godard, Barbara Meffe, and Véronique Petit (2007) describe
how women in the Guinean Coast Region help to pay for all kinds of expenses.
This is contrary to the popular discourse according to which they pay for only the
ingredients of the daily sauce,2 which is seen as a female duty, whereas buying cer-
eals is regarded as the men’s obligation. Because women’s responsibilities go far
beyond household chores, Lynne Brydon (2010), talking of Ghana, states that a
“feminisation of family responsibility” has taken place. M’Balou Bérété (2005, 51)
found out that 41 percent of the Guinean women pay more than half of their
families’ expenditures. Those who provide for all the household expenses are typi-
cally older than 35 years, divorced, or widows. The level of schooling, however, has
no impact in this regard. Nantènin Nabé and Fanta Doumbouya are two of these
women, even though the latter is younger than 35. Women’s substantial contribu-
tion to the household budgets is also acknowledged by local state employees.
Mister Nabé, the vice mayor, stated:
The Guinean woman is very brave. Nowadays, in eight out of ten
households women provide for half of the requirements. If there are chil-
dren, the man can travel, leave, and look for an income. But a woman
with children cannot do that. So, we must thank the Guinean women.
(Interview, 22.11.2011)
By looking at M’Balou Kaba, the CEPI’s president, Madame Fofana, and
Nantènin Nabé, it becomes clear that so called “vital conjunctures” (Johnson-
Hanks 2002) are crucial to understand why and when a woman starts or
changes income-generating activities. Suddenly becoming a widow, like
M’Balou Kaba and Madame Fofana, neither of whom gained an income
before, is an incident that changes a woman’s life course dramatically, not
least the financial side of it. The financial situation of Nantènin Nabé’s family
became very tight when her husband did not earn an income anymore. From
that point onwards, she became the family’s only breadwinner.
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Due to economic hardship, spouses must rely more on each other. Conse-
quently, they must “communicate more directly and more extensively” as
Saskia Brand (2001, 306) observes for Bamako. Nantènin and her husband
are a case in point: Together they decided to move to the city where the
educational possibilities for their children are better than in the village.
However, they say that it was him who made this decision, which is typical:
As women are officially under men’s authority, we must look at the hidden
and the silent in regard to women’s political articulations.
The described female participation in the labour market stands in contrast
to the local norms regarding economic gender division in Kankan. Hence,
even though men by and large welcome women’s financial contributions, they
have ambivalent feelings in this regard: Some men, younger and older ones
with different educational backgrounds, see their status as head of the
household threatened by an economically powerful wife. Thijane Sidibé’s
statement, a graduate who was born in the late 1970s and works as an
accountant for an international NGO, nicely illustrates this. On the one hand,
he encouraged his wife to start petty trade. On the other hand, it is out of the
question for him that she engages in long-distance trade. He explained:
When a husband has nothing, it is like a shock. In our traditions, the man
must be the family’s breadwinner. So, if a woman does what a man should
do, it is like the man does not take his responsibilities seriously. Conse-
quently and because the woman is not at home, the children are not well
educated. Divorce will inevitably follow or he becomes his wife’s slave.
(Interview, 26.01.2013)
This quotation reveals the disjunction between proclaimed gendered norms
and realities at the local level. The male discourse of how things ought to be
stands in harsh contrast to the actual practices. Many of those who have
failed to generate a decent income feel threatened. Saskia Brand (2001, 145)
confirms that “men’s fear of being overpowered by women […] is deeply
ingrained in Mande society.” The quotation also illustrates the fact that
women cannot travel alone without becoming the object of malicious gossip.3
Through gossip, local gendered norms and conventions are articulated. I was
often told that in Kankan, gossip is everywhere. Men confirmed that when it
comes to gossip, women are the main target. Hence, there are more societal
norms defining women’s behaviour than that of men. Men discourage their
wife’s or wives’ travels for two reasons. Firstly, if they have only one wife, they
do not want to be left in charge of the household, including the children.
Secondly, they fear that they will be perceived as less than masterful.
According to the female research participants, it makes no difference whe-
ther the breadwinner is the man or the woman. A woman who finds herself in
this role has no right to demand special treatment. Batamaka Somé (2013,
265) confirms this for Burkina Faso: “The head of the household who cannot
provide enough food for the members keeps a low profile, and his wife can
Everyday Politics 161
have more visibility, though she is normally careful not to overstep and be
branded ‘the man of the house’, a stigma that very few women would want to
carry […].” However, the fact of a woman’s being the breadwinner necessarily
has an impact on intra-household dynamics, since economic independence
gives room to manoeuvre. This becomes obvious when looking at Fanta
Doumbouya. She recounted, for example that when her husband complains
about the fact that she is still in contact with her former Ghanaian boyfriend,
she retorts that without him she would not be the successful businesswoman
she is today; would not have her own hairdressing salon and, thus, would not
be able to feed the whole family. If, on the contrary, a woman must constantly
ask her husband for money, this increases her dependence.
Becoming and Being a Wife
One woman told the other one about a gift her husband had given her: ‘My
husband really loves me, he gives me presents all the time. He adores me, he
does not go out without me.’ The second woman responded: ‘Lucky you! My
husband leaves me at home, he does not love me. In addition, he wants to
marry a second wife.’
(Field notes, 14.03.2012)
In Kankan, as elsewhere, many of women’s conversations circle around the
issue of men. Young women talk about their boyfriends and devotees. They
long for marriage and, thus, socially becoming an adult woman. At the
same time, young women fear leaving their homes and starting a new
period in life as a member of their future husband’s family. Many discus-
sions also circle around the different characteristics their husbands should
have. Married women talk about their relations with their spouses and
express their fear of becoming a co-wife. Wives who have severe marital
problems ponder the possibility of divorce. Lastly, divorced women and
widows consider remarrying.
Diaka Fofana and Mariam Bah Want to Wed
If I could choose between a job and a husband, I would not know what to take.
(Mariam Bah, informal conversation, 06.03.2012)
Diaka Fofana and her friend Mariam Bah spent many hours sitting and
chatting together in our courtyard. Marriage was one of their main issues of
conversation. Both young women are good looking, socially respected, and
well-educated. Diaka and Mariam told me repeatedly that they were ready to
marry but finding a ‘good’ husband was a delicate matter and they were
afraid of becoming too old for marriage. Besides, they knew that not every
man in Guinea wanted a highly educated wife. In brief, the two young women
spent a lot of time and energy thinking about their futures.
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Diaka was promised to Mory, a distant kin. Diaka told me that she
wanted to marry him and she regretted that he had not initiated the first
steps of the lengthy marriage procedure. At the same time, Aboulaye, a
young trader, regularly visited Diaka with his big motorcycle, always
bringing something to eat for the whole family. Madame Fofana told me
that she would like to have Aboulaye as a son-in-law: He was always
friendly and liked good discussions, just as Madame Fofana did. Important
was also his economic background – a fact that could not be neglected by a
widow who has four children and a foster child. Lastly, there was Lancéi
who seemed to be very close to Diaka. I often saw the two sitting on the
porch, discussing and laughing. When I asked Diaka whether marrying
Lancéi was an option, she said ‘no’. The latter stems from a Wahabia
family and Diaka could not imagine herself covering her body. At the end
of 2011, Lancéi became severely ill and he finally died in February 2012.
Besides Mory, Aboulaye, and Lancéi, there seemed to be other young men
who were interested in marrying Diaka. Until my departure in 2013, Diaka
was not officially engaged.
Mariam and Diaka both wanted to avoid polygyny. The man in whose
courtyard Mariam was temporarily living had four wives and more that fif-
teen children. The quarrels and jealousy amongst them were things Mariam
experienced regularly. One day, she confusedly told me that her father had
remarried, something he had promised not to do. Additionally, his second
wife was younger than herself. This caused Mariam to be worried about her
mother and she desperately wanted to find a job to be able to sustain her
financially. At the time, Mariam was dating Sidiki. She explained to me that
she could not marry him because she was a Fulani and they have very com-
plicated issues regarding marriage: If people see you with a certain man, it
would be impossible to marry him later. Further, Sidiki’s parents did not want
Mariam to be their son’s wife. Later, she remembered that time: ‘I was really
miserable. Because of him, I did not accept young men who proposed to me.
Carole, I had so much worries due to him, they did not finish’ (informal
conversation, 17.12.2012).
When I came back to Kankan in November 2012, Mariam had become
engaged and moved to her future husband’s family in Conakry. She briefly
came back in December for the civil and religious marriage celebration. When
I asked her whether her husband approved that she would work, she nodded.
Even though Mariam was happy to have found a suitable husband, she felt
extraordinarily tense the week before the marriage and even felt ill. Mariam
especially feared her mother-in-law. The relationship between mothers-in-law
and daughters-in-law is always very delicate: A woman can be on very good
terms with her husband, but if she has problems with her mother-in-law or her
husband’s family more generally, her life can become quite difficult. This fear
turned out to have become reality: When I met Mariam in Conakry in Feb-
ruary 2013, she told me that she barely spoke with her mother-in-law and her
husband’s sisters; they all hated her, she lamented.
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Marrying signifies a major step in a young woman’s life. It is, what Jennifer
Johnson-Hanks (2002, 871) calls a vital conjuncture, a “nexus of potential
social futures.” Thus, the choice of one’s spouse is a very delicate matter. If
the family does not, for example, approve a marriage, the consent of the man
is meaningless. Mariam’s story illustrates that cohabiting with the mother-in-
law can severely impact one’s matrimony. Often, it is the mother-in-law who
decides what a young spouse must do and not her husband. While Madame
Fofana allowed young men to visit and go out with her daughter Diaka,
Mariam had to hide her current boyfriend Sidiki from her host family. Mariam
explained this was because of their different ethnical backgrounds: Diaka is a
Manding and Mariam belongs to the Fulani. According to Mariam and Djé-
nabou, being a Fulani complicates a young woman’s search for a husband for
two reasons: Firstly, because, among the Fulani, virginity has immense social
and economic value, and, secondly, because marriages within extended families
Figure 6.2 Young Women at Mariam Bah’s Wedding
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are common. Virginity is of huge importance among other ethnicities as well.
However, I have been told that gendered norms are more restrictive for women
within the Fulani ethnic group and they are known for practicing a restrained
form of Islam (cf. Furth 2005, 237–241; Andrews 2009, 52).
The extent to which a young Guinean woman has a say in the choice of her
husband depends on many factors. The most important are her ethnic, edu-
cational, and economic background and her family’s marriage tradition. The
research participants stressed that nowadays in Kankan young women have a
greater say regarding marriage issues than they did only a generation or two
ago – a statement supported by findings for the whole country (Bano Barry,
Diallo, and Camare 2006, 71–72). Interestingly, these findings show that par-
ents are more involved in choosing a woman for their son than a husband for
their daughter. The life trajectory of young women, their conduct, and bar-
gaining abilities have an impact as well.
Diaka and Mariam are aware that polygyny is an integral part of Guinean
society, and they dread the prospect of ending up as a co-wife. Thus, they
hoped to live a monogamous life, being allowed to work and, thus, being
economically independent. Young women such as these two profit from the
attention, the guarding, and the gifts of male friends and boyfriends. Further,
they constantly ponder their various possibilities at hand: They check out
which man, who meets the most important characteristics imposed by their
families, is seriously interested in marriage. At the same time, they leave sev-
eral suitors’ offers open, until they decide which admirer they prefer.
Mariam’s example shows that even if young women choose their husbands
themselves, they mostly do so within the boundaries set by their families. Bruce
Whitehouse (2016, 43) shows the gap between the imagined, idealised husband
and lived realities for young people in Mali: “Confronting both economic
uncertainty and severe social penalties for defying family authority, and mindful
of their responsibility to uphold family honor, they often accede to kin demands
and consent to unions they would not have entered independently.” This also
holds true for young women in Kankan – and for young men alike, as my data
and the example of Boubacar described by Michelle Engeler (2015, 110–113)
depicts. Women can, for example, say no to a proposed husband but also try to
convince their parents, especially their fathers, of their own choice. However, in
Guinea, ‘forced’ marriages for young women and, to a lesser extent, for young
men, are still widespread (Koundouno-N’diaye 2007, 36).
The Neighbour’s Quarrels
Thierno lives in a room of a one-floor house. I regularly visited him and, thus,
got to know his neighbours, especially Fatoumata Barry and her three chil-
dren. Fatoumata Barry and her husband Oury Barry got along quite well, as
Thierno recounted. In the evenings, they often sat beside each other, chatting
and joking. In the mornings, they left together for the market where Madame
Barry sold rice. But then, she had an accident with a motorcycle and did not
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generate an income anymore. Once, her husband left for a nearby city for
some days where he married a second wife. This young woman, whom I
estimated to be barely fourteen years old, is the younger sister of Mister
Barry’s close friend. Since the second wife entered the household, there have
been constant disputes between Mister Barry and his first wife.
One source of quarrels were the finances. The first wife complained of no
longer receiving any money. She also criticised her husband for giving his new
wife all sorts of presents, such as a small, portable TV. Whenever Madame
Barry met someone in the neighbourhood, she complained about her hus-
band’s behaviour. Then, the first wife’s mother intervened and asked Mister
Barry to share the TV equally between the two wives. He retorted that this
was exactly what he did. As the quarrels continued, Madame Barry once
decided not to wash her husband’s clothes. When he complained, she argued
that he had abandoned her, meaning that he did not spend the night with her
as would have been his duty. At a certain point, Mister Barry’s elder brother
and Thierno’s father came to the house, the latter an elderly man and the
second imam of the neighbourhood’s mosque. In front of the two men,
Madame Barry accused her husband of neglecting her since he had taken a
second wife: He did not give her any money, nor did he buy her any gifts.
Further, he did not sit beside and chat with her as he used to do. And in
addition, he never spent the night with her – all things her husband did solely
with his second wife. After listening to the two sides, Mister Barry’s elder
brother and Thierno’s father considered a separation between the two as the
best solution, but neither of the concerned agreed. The two mediators then
asked Mister Barry to treat his two wives equally. They also urged Madame
Barry to respect her husband and not to contradict him.
One evening some days later, Mister Barry was very angry because his first
wife had gone to watch TV at a friend’s home. He shouted that he would
chase her away. The following Sunday evening, more than ten women, some
of whom were selling at Dibida market, came to talk to Mister Barry. First,
Madame Barry explained her viewpoint and the problems she has with her
husband. She only criticised her husband’s misbehaviour, never her co-wife.
When he wanted to defend himself, the women did not give him the chance to
do so. One elderly woman spoke in the name of the others. She summed up as
follows: Firstly, at the very start of his matrimony with the second wife,
Mister Barry had not sensitised his two wives to collaborate. Secondly, since
he had married his second wife, he did not spend half of the nights with
Madame Barry. Thirdly, Mister Barry did not give his wives the same amount
of money and bought the small TV only for his second wife. Fourthly, he did
not eat together with both wives. Fifthly, Mister Barry chatted and joked only
with the second. Lastly, he did not drive Madame Barry to the market any-
more. After every point the female speaker asked he whether her statement
was true to which he agreed. Thus, the verdict of the women was clear: ‘The
first wife is right. The husband did not do what he was support to do’,
Thierno recounted (field notes, 19.12.2012). Further, they asked Madame
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Barry to forgive her husband and she accepted. During the following days,
Thierno saw the two women talking to each other. He also observed that they
were having dinner together with their husband.
By not washing her husband’s clothes, Madame Barry protested against
his behaviour in a discrete and subtle way that her husband, however,
understood perfectly. The story illustrates that women hint at the Qur’an
whenever men do not behave according to social gendered norms, one of
which is to treat their wives equally. Even though “women do not have the
right to speak in front of their husbands,” as Djouba Boumbaly, a female
radio journalist, put it (interview, 06.03.2012), they can call on third parties
for interventions when they have severe problems with their husbands. Such
mediations are common in case of quarrels between spouses but also
between other people who have fallen out. In Kankan, I have repeatedly
been told that elderly women are especially suited to act as mediators
because they are regarded as guardians of harmony. During such media-
tions, both sides give their views and the intermediating party passes judg-
ment based on local gendered norms. These gendered norms of behaviour
are not fixed but can be bargained in everyday life, for example through
such intermediations.
Bargaining Polygyny
I first want to reproduce a conversation of women talking about marital
problems. Several women have installed a simple place for braiding hair under
a corrugated iron roof at Sogbé market. While the women braided the hair of
their customers, a conversation emerged. A woman complained about her
husband who did not treat his wives equally. Another woman responded that,
according to her, a man should not take more than one wife, but if he does so
nevertheless, he should wait until the first attains menopause. Further, the co-
wives should live in separate buildings. A third woman disagreed as she still
saw problems because men do not treat each wife in the same way. All women
agreed that no wife can prohibit her husband from taking another wife.
Often, she is not even informed but finds herself confronted with a fait
accompli. Another woman joined the discussion and suggested going to a
diviner. For the first woman, this was not a suitable solution; she said she
would just endure the situation. Then, one of the women turned to me, the
scribbling ethnographer, and told me that she had so much poison in herself
due to her marital problems, that if I wanted to write about it, it would fill my
whole notebook (field notes, 27.02.2012).
Whether polygyny is an advantage or a problem for women’s bargaining
power is a much-debated issue (e.g. Madhavan 2002; Glover 2015; Kringelbach
2016). Writing about Haussa women in Nigerian Kano, Alaine Hutson (2001,
751) stresses that uncertainty is a huge challenge in polygynous households. As
a consequence, both sexes uphold strong bonds with their families, neighbours,
and friends in case of emergency. Jealousy is a widespread problem in
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polygynous families, as the story of the quarrelling neighbours indicates. This
does not only affect the women themselves, but also their children and other
members of the family as various authors describe. I have heard many stories
about half-siblings not being on good terms. Thus, the mothers’ competition
often passed onto to the children.
From my interviews and conversations, I learned that most women in
Kankan would prefer a monogamous marriage. Many women stressed that,
in principle, they have nothing against polygyny as long as the man lives up to
his duties according to what is written in the Qur’an, which is, to nourish the
whole family and to accord equal treatment to his wives. They complained,
however, that in reality this is never the case. The example of Mariam’s
father shows that Guinean Muslim men are all “potential polygynists”
(Antoine and Nanitelamio 1996, 138). This gives polygyny a looming pre-
sence. I contend that, in Kankan, the practice of polygyny generally
enhances men’s power: In a polygynous household, every wife tries to gain
the position of the favourite, since this has certain emotional, social, and
economic advantages for her and also for her children. The first and the last
wives are typically those who are in the best positions; the first one because
she is the eldest and thus, the younger women and other family members
pay her respect and obey her commands; the last one because she is often
the husband’s favourite.
Women adopt various strategies to avoid polygyny or enhance the chance
of remaining or becoming the favourite wife. As we have seen, generating an
income helps to alleviate marital problems. One tactic is to indirectly convince
one’s husband of not taking another wife. Here, a woman talks to a con-
fidante, for example the husband’s siblings, mother, aunts, or friends, who
then discuss the issue with him. Women try to bear many children – boys, if
possible – thereby pleasing not only their husbands, but their in-laws as well.
Furthermore, they try to make their spouses content by means of their
appearance and attentiveness. Women also try to influence their lives by con-
sulting a marabout or a diviner. Thus, the marabouts and diviners – after
being paid a modest fee – offer these women hope of attaining their conjugal
objectives. According to Saskia Brand (2001, 155) the goal of visiting a mar-
about is “to keep the attention of one’s (future) husband or lover from stray-
ing to other women, not just for the sake of love, but also to secure an income
for oneself and the children (it is an open secret that often more money is
spent on girlfriends than on wives).”
My data show that men as well as women seek help from marabouts and
diviners, but for different reasons: men’s reasons tend to be business-oriented,
while women’s reasons tend to be family- and health-oriented. In Kankan,
people differentiate between marabouts and diviners (fêticheur). The former
use Islamic scripts, whereas the latter typically work with shells. Visiting
diviners is socially contested, not least because they are said to be able to
curse someone. The work of marabouts is also discussed contradictorily;
therefore, most women do not openly talk about this topic.
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The Challenges of Female Graduates4
There are women who are freer or more intellectual than men. But you must
know that even if a woman is the President and makes the law for her country,
her husband still rules over her. In the end, the country remains under the
husband’s authority.
(Discussion among young men in a café, field notes, 30.01.2013)
Djénabou Dramé, Labelled a Rebel
Djénabou Dramé was born in Kankan in 1986. She is a faithful Muslim who
prays several times a day. Djénabou’s father, whom she calls ‘a real dictator’,
is the second muezzin of a nearby mosque. Her mother had been engaged in
petty trade. Djénabou was always very ambitious at school. As a result, she
was always among the best in her class, competing rather with the boys than
with the other girls, as she repeatedly emphasised. Because of this interest in
education and her friendship with boys, the other family members regarded
Djénabou as a rebel. Unlike many young women in Kankan – as, for example,
her sisters – she did not leave school after several years to marry but wanted to
go to university. Her father, however, was quite sceptical. He did not like the
idea of having one of his daughters pursuing her educational ambitions with-
out first getting married. The fact that all her older sisters, whose husbands he
had chosen, had separated eventually made him change his mind; Djénabou
was thus able to earn a bachelor’s degree in political philosophy.
Even though she was not yet a mother, Djénabou had assumed this role
some years ago, when she had started caring for her homonym,5 the daughter
of a relative. While still a teenager, she became a member of different NGOs.
As a result, she gained work experience, met interesting people, and visited
other parts of the country. Djénabou’s father did not like her travelling
around and being with men, but he knew that this might mean the possibility
for his daughter to generate some income, thus contributing to the low family
budget. Equipped with her bachelor’s degree, Djénabou found a job as a
teaching assistant at the university. Working conditions were not favourable,
but it was better than being unemployed – the fate of all too many young
graduates. Whenever possible, Djénabou took on other job opportunities; she
was my research collaborator throughout fieldwork and acted as an election
observer in her district during the legislative elections in 2013. With the
money she earned, she supported her family. Thierno admiringly remarked
that this was not the obvious thing to do: ‘Usually young women just think of
their boyfriends and spend their money in other forms. They buy fancy dres-
ses, a new cell phone, or even a trendy, Chinese motorcycle,’ he stressed
(informal conversation, 24.02.2012).
Whenever we met elderly people, they praised Djénabou for being not only
smart, but also faithful, respectful, and helpful. After teaching at university,
she usually immediately returned home to cook for everybody. Thus, in many
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regards she was behaving according to local gendered norms. However, Djé-
nabou’s university studies, her engagements in the NGOs, and, above all, her
financial support of the family had not gone without criticism. Some of her
elder brothers and sisters did not like the fact that she had succeeded where
they had not. Sometimes, Djénabou’s financial responsibility was a heavy
load and she complained about her brothers’ irresponsibility.
Djénabou was not yet married, but she hoped to find an appropriate husband
soon: An intellectual who understands her, supports her decision to engage in
various activities, and gives her many liberties. Furthermore, he should be
honest, faithful, and monogamous. However, Djénabou was keenly aware that
finding such a husband will not be easy. Regarding marriage, she was torn
between her own aspirations and those of her family. One day, she told me:
‘Marrying is a personal thing. After the wedding, you must spend your whole life
with that person. Marrying is not just for the family, it also includes feelings’
(field notes, 28.11.2012). Djénabou was afraid that her father would run out of
patience and try to marry her to someone she did not like, as he had already once
tried to do, in the summer of 2012. The suitor, a close friend of her father and a
distant relative, already had a wife. According to Djénabou, he did not treat
women respectfully and was very egoistic. Thus, she refused to marry him.
In autumn 2013, thanks to the financial help of a friend, Djénabou was
able to start a master’s degree in human resources at a private university in
Conakry. In the evenings, she attended additional classes, for example in
computer science. During her free time, she was busy writing poems and a
novel. When Djénabou graduated, she was lucky enough to gain temporary
employment in a project. However, when she did not receive her salary for
two months in a row, Djénabou quit the job. After some months in the capital
city during which she was unsuccessfully looking for job opportunities, she
went back to Kankan. There, she found a temporary job as a consultant for
an international NGO. Thanks to this position, she had a good salary and
travelled a lot for further education and sensitising campaigns to small towns
and villages. Djénabou, being very ambitious, has high hopes; she dreams of
someday becoming a foreign ambassador.
Generally, not many young women in Guinea are able to study. Djénabou’s
case is exceptional because she went to university even though she stems from
an underprivileged family. Also, her parents and sisters have only basic formal
education. The difference between the high number of men and the low
number of women at university level is striking (République de Guinée 2006,
37–38). However, this is not a Guinean particularity but a matter of fact
throughout Africa; only 6 per cent of the professoriates at African universities
are women (Mama 2007, 4). In the administrative region of Kankan, the rate
of women who have never been to school is, at 83 percent, the highest in the
country (Danfaca 2005, 22–23).
Guinean graduates regard their university studies as a privilege, and other
people consider them to be very courageous, especially the women. At the same
time, their academic background implies specific expectations to their life
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trajectories. For Djénabou, education has always been the key to success. Djéna-
bou’s vision of herself is that of a caring mother who, at the same time, pursues her
professional goals, a supportive, faithful husband by her side. Aware that for this
vision to become reality she must acquire more professional qualifications, she
decided to continue her academic studies in Conakry. Similar to Djénabou, many
Guinean graduates dream about continuing their academic career. They wish to
go abroad on scholarship, to a place where the educational system is better than in
Guinea. Once back in their country, they would have earned the esteem of their
community and improved their chances of getting fixed employment.
Djénabou and other graduates always try to follow the most promising path
that might help them to achieve their goals one day. Jennifer Johnson-Hanks
(2005, 370) calls this constant evaluation of the present in circumstances, where
uncertainty prevails, “judicious opportunism.” She states: “The challenge is
not to formulate a plan and implement it regardless of what comes but to adapt
to the moment, to be calm and supple, recognizing the difference between a
promising and an unpromising offer.” Throughout the day, male young grad-
uates, like non-graduates, are busy with all kinds of different things. That
hustling (Kaufmann 2016, 166–172) is not easily understandable for an out-
sider. Some of Kankan’s male graduates have started their own little commerce
with the help of so-called Big People. However, none of the female research
participants started their own business. Nevertheless, some help their mothers
or relatives to sell items on the market or in a boutique. Contrary to male
graduates, female graduates usually do not hustle; they must reveal exactly
where they are going and why whenever they leave home.
Djénabou took on the role of a foster mother for her homonym. In a socially
accepted way it enables her to learn how to care for a child and, thus, to become
a ‘good’ mother. Usually, women marry and have children at an early age. I was
told that some young women fear entering university without marrying first
because people would talk negatively about them. For Djénabou, studying was
an accepted excuse to postpone marriage. But as she had finished her masters’
degree in summer 2014, the pressure from her family increased. How to find an
appropriate husband, somebody who would treat them well and support their
various activities, was a constant topic of conversation for female graduates such
as Djénabou, Diaka, and Mariam. Additionally, female students and graduates
have a bad reputation; gossip and stories about prostitution, sexual favours, or
multiple boyfriends are omnipresent. Some men are leery of intellectual women,
suspecting that they are more likely to oppose the practice of polygyny than
illiterate women. And the facts bear out this suspicion: The polygyny rates for
well-educated and illiterate women are 33 percent and 56 percent, respectively
(République de Guinée 2006, 97). Aishatou Diakité, Djénabou’s friend who
holds a bachelor’s degree in sociology, explained:
A woman who has been to university has a bad reputation. People say:
‘An educated woman is full of herself. She wants to dominate the house-
hold.’ So not many men want to accept and understand you if you have
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been to university. If your education achieves a higher level, you are
already rejected by a certain part of the society; you are not highly
esteemed.
(Field notes, 29.01.2013)
Marrying and founding a family is also a necessity and a huge challenge for
male graduates. However, it is not so much the question of finding an adequate
wife but of having enough money, firstly, to pay for the bride wealth, secondly,
for the expensive wedding, and, thirdly, to settle down. Former male students
typically dream about constructing their own house where they could take care
of their whole family. This puts much pressure on male graduates. Conse-
quently, in Guinea like in most other West African countries, the foundation of
a family has become increasingly difficult for young men and hence, they marry
much later than women (Sommers 2010, 326–327; Honwana 2012, 104).6
Djénabou is of Muslim faith. She respected local Muslim principles and
emphasised that her husband must be faithful as well. According to Djéna-
bou’s explanations, God is the one who predestines life and watches her clo-
sely: If she is a ‘good’ woman, this will positively influence her life. This,
however, does not result in passiveness. On the contrary, by behaving
according to local Muslim principles, Djénabou actively participates in her
divine destiny and thus takes responsibility for her life. Becoming a ‘good’
woman is a central identity for most young women in Kankan, regardless of
their educational, ethnic, or economic background: By creating an image of
herself as a ‘good’ young Muslim woman, Djénabou hopes to achieve several
goals: Firstly, that elderly family members and neighbours respect and praise
her publicly. Secondly, that she gains the confidence of her father. Thus, she
has been able to travel around for her workshops and to study in Conakry, far
away from her nuclear family. Above all, behaving like a ‘good’ young woman
enabled her to pursue her academic ambitions and not to marry yet: Because
Djénabou had always obeyed her father’s dating strictures, she found herself
in a good bargaining position when she opposed his choice of a husband; as
her behaviour had been irreproachable, her judgment was respected.
Djénabou subordinates to her father, brothers, and other men. Usually, she does
not question this. However, being a young intellectual woman in a place such as
Kankan where a strict understanding of gendered norms prevails is not always
easy. There are instances when Djénabou, like other female graduates, challenges
female subordination. Djénabou and her friend Aishatou once lamented:
It is true; a woman must submit to her husband. I think this is the case
in every community. But here, it has a slavish aspect. Women are not
allowed to say what they think; they should not discuss. Everything
men do is good, everything women do is bad. When we went to school




Djénabou and Aishatou stated that because of their educational background
and NGO activities, they were aware of certain sorts of gender-related injus-
tice. Their harsh critique has to be seen in the context of the general difficult
social and economic reality women in Kankan face. On the one hand, they
must behave according to gendered norms and subordinate to men; on the
other hand, they must gain sufficient funds to sustain their families in the
times when their husbands or fathers are not capable of doing so. Still, men
remain the heads of the household.
Conclusions: Bargaining Local Gendered Norms
In this chapter, I have demonstrated that, locally, men’s control over women is
an important aspect of masculinities. Barbara Hoffman (2002, 11) describes
women’s status in the Mande world as ambiguous. According to her, women
enjoy “respect and reverence as mothers and elder sisters while enduring
public and often private domination and lack of personal autonomy as indi-
viduals. Mande society generally reserves relatively little public acclaim for
the bearer or the role of motherhood, and none at all for the woman who
chooses to follow another destiny.”
While the female research participants claim that their decision-making is
limited, they make multiple choices that reveal their agency. These decisions
are influenced by past habits and experiences and their imagined future lives,
thus an outcome of the interplay between the three dimensions of human
agency (Emirbayer and Mische 1998). Female strategies to reach their goals
are manifold. Women use ‘sweet talk’ on their husbands or intermediary
parties if they want to convince them of certain issues. Making decisions
relating to income-generating activities, family affairs, education, and mar-
riage issues can create difficulties, thus women do so with discretion. Fur-
thermore, women try to behave properly according to social and religious
norms, for example by keeping the house and the children in order, being
polite to elderly people, praying five times a day, or by not wandering around
at night. By acting so, they gain a reputation as a ‘good’ Muslim woman.
What it means to be a ‘good’ Muslim, however, is open for bargaining. Erin
Stiles and Katrina Daly Thompson rightly note: “Women are deeply involved
and impacted by debates about what it means to be a ‘good Muslim’ – a label
that often hinges on notions of normative gender performance and under-
standings of appropriate Islamic sexuality that affect both men and women”
(Stiles and Daly Thompson 2015, 1–2).
I contend that women strategically (re-)negotiate various forms of power
and authority. Women in Kankan know very well in which situations it is
suitable to remain silent and when it is legitimate to raise their voices. Their
proper behaviour such as being obedient and attentive, and treating one’s
husband respectfully helps, for example, to alleviate marital problems. Fur-
ther, women consciously work on their reputation by conducting themselves
properly, which might enhance their possibilities in the future. Thus, while
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they conform to local gendered norms in many aspects of their lives, they
sometimes challenge them, but mostly within socially accepted boundaries, as
the examples depicted in this chapter have illustrated.
Haleh Afshar (1996, 134) calls this “the politics of activism, resistance and
compromise.” Asef Bayat and Linda Herrera (2010, 18), writing about young
Muslims, describe the “[m]anoeuvring within the constraints and making the
best of what is available” the politics of possibilities. In brief, women in Kankan
adopt manifold ways of daily manoeuvring to achieve some of their goals within
the context of the local political, social, and economic structures. They generally
challenge gender relations only within accepted norms and only seldom – in
Deniz Kandiyoti’s (1988, 282–283) words – “step […] out of line and lose […]
their respectability.” Women may become their family’s main provider and thus
gain economic independence, but they do so without violating the men’s social
position as heads of families. They test the limits of socially pre-defined gender
relations, but not far enough to provoke a backlash that would give them a bad
reputation as a woman or wife.
While Nantènin Nabé and Fanta Doumbouya take up the local discourse
regarding gendered norms and thus reproduce it, their actions sometimes
belie their words. Financial independence is a good tool at their disposal to
improve their situations. Nowadays, quite a number of women in Kankan are
economically powerful. This changed economic reality has fundamentally influ-
enced gender relations in Kankan and elsewhere. It is common to hear men
complaining about their wives and daughters not being under their control any-
more and, thus, getting loose. In an idealised past, men have been responsible for
the income of their households. Actually, however, four out of ten women in
Guinea provide for more than half of their family budgets. Hence, many women
not only manage their household, but also (partially) its income and thus, its
survival. Men fear they would no longer master their wives and daughters.
Women’s economic power and their associated political articulations indirectly
question men’s authority. However, given the difficult economic conditions in
Kankan, men have no choice; therefore, many men provide their wives and
daughters with the seed money that permits them to set up as petty traders.
The whole issue of gendered economic possibilities is closely interlinked
with marriage. If men are, for example, unable to provide for their families,
they also lose the possibility of rewarding their wives with gifts or punishing
them by taking another wife. However, we should not forget that female
income-generating activities do not only lead to tensions; they might also
contribute to a better social climate between couples. Not being forced to ask
one’s husband for money all the time diminishes matrimonial problems. This
enhances the chances of remaining the only wife or of being the beloved one.
Young graduates’ agency is also manifold regarding marriage issues and
they are influencing their fates by different means. Mariam hid her boyfriend
from her family to behave in accordance with Fulani gendered norms. Later,
she was able to convince her father of her husband’s suitability. Diaka was
weighing the pros and cons of marrying one of her admirers. While their
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character was one important criterion, their financial possibility was another.
Djénabou credits her behaviour to local norms that made her father accept
her refusal to marry a man who did not suit her. At the same time, Djénabou
likes to consider herself a rebel at heart who does question and sometimes
challenge local norms.
Generally, it would not be too difficult for female graduates such as Diaka,
Mariam, or Djénabou to find any husband. But they typically do not imagine
their future solely staying at home, running the household, and caring for
their children and husbands. On the contrary, female graduates are quite
ambitious. Thus, much time and energy is put into the challenge of finding a
spouse who fits their ideas: Female ex-students are typically looking for a
man who gives them enough liberties to pursue their own professional ambi-
tions and encourages their various activities. In brief, these young highly
educated women perform a balancing act between behaving like a ‘good’
Muslim woman and following their ambitions and pursuing their goals to
lead an independent life as a soon-to-be wife. Therefore, young female grad-
uates form a specific category within Kankan’s society and are not repre-
sentative of young women in general. Regarding marriage, there is a major
difference between young women and men: Men have much more time at
their disposal until they come under social pressure to wed. Thus, they can
primarily concentrate on establishing themselves in order to have enough
money to finance a marriage. While a man can wait until he is around forty, a
woman who is not yet married at the age of twenty-five has a major problem.
The example of the quarrelling neighbours illustrates that women can call
for interacting parties in cases of major conflicts with their husbands. Such
mediators are typically elderly people of both sexes. The powers of the med-
iating elderly women become visible in the example of when they did not let
Oury Barry defend himself. Women such as Fatoumata Barry also contest the
behaviour of their male counterparts by referring to the Qur’an, according to
which a man should treat his wives equally. For Mali, Rosa De Jorio (2009,
103) remarks that “references to Islam emerged as an authoritative idiom that
some women used to question existing power relationships within Malian
society and their conceptual foundations.” And Orit Avishai, Lynne Gerber,
and Jennifer Randles argue that “religious women appropriate religion to
further extrareligious ends such as economic opportunities, domestic rela-
tions, political ideologies, and cultural affiliation” (Avishai, Gerber, and
Randles 2012, 409). Visiting a marabout or a diviner is another applied
strategy to attain one’s marital goals, for example avoiding polygyny.
I argue that criticising aspects of gender relations, such as polygyny or a
husband who is considered as too old and, thus, probably impotent, is a
strong political articulation as it challenges the status quo. I therefore agree
with Corrie Decker (2015, 6) who notes that debates about sexuality and
gendered norms in general “are windows into the religious, social, economic,
and political forces at play.” Everyday political articulations become visible
when bargaining processes take place, that is, whenever individuals or groups
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challenge existing gendered norms. In Kankan, these are mostly contestations
about normative ideas of femininities and masculinities which are multiple
and in a constant process of production and reproduction.
Notes
1 Parts of an earlier version of this subchapter have been published in the Journal of
Culture and African Women Studies (JENdA): Ammann, Carole. 2016. “Women
Must not Become Lions – Gendered Norms in Kankan, Guinea.” JENdA: A
Journal of Culture and African Women Studies (28): 68–81. Excerpts are reused with
the publisher’s permission.
2 Every day, someone prepares the meal. People do not cook twice or three times a
day, they cook just one sauce and one big pot of rice a day.
3 However, as Anna Dessertine (2013, 135, author’s translation) notes, long distance
trade is allowed for first wives in polygamous households “because they are emo-
tionally and economically often neglected.” Saskia Brand (2001, 130), in contrast,
argues that their advanced age makes traveling possible.
4 A large part of an earlier version of this section has been published in an edited
volume on young graduates in urban Africa: Ammann, Carole. 2017. “Looking for
Better Opportunities. An Analysis of Guinean Graduates’ Agency.” In Dealing with
Elusive Futures. University Graduates in Urban Africa, edited by Noemi Steuer,
Michelle Engeler, and Elísio Macamo, 93–121. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag. Excerpts
are reused with the publisher’s permission.
5 In Guinea, homonyms are people with the same first name. The relationship
between homonyms is often very close. In Kankan, it is not uncommon during
childhood to spend some time in the family of one’s homonym.
6 Whereas in Guinea only 3 percent of women are still celibate at the age of 25, 44
percent of men are not yet married at this stage (République de Guinée 2006, 96).
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7 Struggling for Recognition
Interactions with Local Authorities
Introduction
When there is a problem, people often take us women for complaining. People
put them in front because they think women are more listened to than men
when they complain. And people are afraid of protesting women. When women
make something, it is until the end. The Presidents fear dealing with them, they
prefer the youth. Politicians are afraid of women taking off their clothes. People
say that this brings bad luck for the sitting President, thus people are afraid of
women’s protests.
(Djénabou, informal conversation, 19.01.2013)
Interactions between Kankan’s female population and local bureaucrats are
manifold. Typical spheres of encounters are public buildings, such as the gover-
norate, the prefecture, and the municipality and their courtyards, but also the
markets, hospitals, schools, or the streets where ordinary citizens come upon
teachers, nurses, the police, or tax officers. All these encounters are influenced by
the three temporal dimensions of agency (Emirbayer and Mische 1998), that is,
people’s past experiences of statehood during the rule of Sékou Touré, Lansana
Conté, and the short period under Moussa Dadis Camara. Furthermore, how
women imagine state and statehood impacts on these interrelations. Lastly, sta-
tehood is being bargained over in everyday encounters between ordinary people
and state officials in the present. In this chapter, I focus on women’s interactions
with low and middle ranking bureaucrats. What constitutes this relationship?
How do women link up with state institutions? What modes of political articu-
lation do they use and for which purposes? Which topics can galvanise women
for collective social action in Kankan?
I myself have personal experience of interacting with local (male) state
employees. One frustrating but at the same time very insightful experience
was when I was trying to get a research permit from the Julius Nyéréré Uni-
versity in Kankan. I did this with the help of Boubacar Condé, who was
teaching at the university and who was on good terms with many important
personalities within the tertiary education institution. For my request, I needed
the signature of several elderly men from within the university. Whenever I was
knocking on their doors, they were absent and when we had an appointment,
they did not show up. When I was finally able to meet them, they told me that I
had written something wrong in my request. This whole process was highly
annoying and the lack of a research permit was problematic regarding the
advancement of the project because I was unable to talk to the local autho-
rities. When I finally received my signed and stamped mission order in early
November 2011, Boubacar Condé was very surprised about how smooth the
process has been; normally, such a procedure takes much longer, he explained.
Thanks to this experience I learned what problems ordinary people in Kankan
face when they ask for a particular service from the administration.
In 2000, various authors recorded a lack of research on postcolonial states’
bureaucracies. They called for anthropological studies of state employees’
daily behaviours and their interaction with ordinary people (Hansen and
Stepputat 2001, 17; Greenhouse 2002, 11; Blundo and Le Meur 2009, 22).
Thomas Bierschenk and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan (2014) present exactly this
type of empirical studies in their edited volume, States at Work. Dynamics of
African Bureaucracies. In this chapter, however, I do not analyse statehood by
merely focussing on bureaucrats. I mainly look at daily and ordinary encounters
between various female segments of Kankan’s society and employees of the local
government. In what follows, I first illustrate different forms of female claim-
making. In the second section, I look at Kankan’s markets as a sphere where
“actors fight for access to and control over space, resources and political alle-
giance” (Prag 2010, 65). Hereby, I specifically focus on women selling at Kan-
kan’s markets and their experiences of statehood by analysing the interactions
between market women and the local government represented by different actors
such as the chief of the market, tax collectors, security agents, and various
employees of the local government.
Women Making Claims
Traditional’ Authorities: Women’s Restricted Influence
For many different social problems, be it between couples as we have seen in
the story of the neighbours’ quarrels, or be it between two persons who, for
example, both claim a certain terrain, the people in Kankan prefer looking
for solutions within their close environment rather than going to the police or
the gendarmerie. Recognised persons who are approached for conflict solu-
tion are mostly elderly people. They can be of either gender, however, men are
consulted more often than women. These people also act as moral guides by
emphasising their understanding of local codes of conduct. Solution-finding
can take place within families, neighbourhoods, sèrès, or among friends.
Other respected persons who are often consulted are the Imams, the muez-
zins, members of the council of the elders, or representatives of the Sotikemo,
or the Sotikemo personally. The line between ‘traditional’ authorities and
local government is blurred and often an actor represents both. The chef de
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quartier, for example, officially belongs to the state administration and should
be elected by the neighbourhood’s population. However, he is not remunerated
and people usually mentioned him in the same line as ‘traditional’ authorities.
The statement by Madame Koyaté (interview, 21.11.2011), one of the Female
Leaders, nicely illustrates how solution-finding processes can take place: “If I
have a problem, I go to my mother. My mother says to my father: ‘Your
daughter has a problem.’ And if there is no solution, we go to the sectorial chief.
Above him is the chef de quartier, then the urban community and so on.”
The image of a hierarchical administration has been fostered throughout
Guinea’s history. It implies the normative behaviour that each citizen should
respect the hierarchies and act accordingly. This has two sides: On the one
hand, people have easy access to persons they are already familiar with, such
as the chef de quartier. On the other hand, going up the hierarchical ladder
step by step is time and energy consuming. All too often, people complain
that their issues are left hanging. Therefore, these hierarchies restrict access to
state institutions and enhance the state’s authority as well as the image of its
strengths. One way of bypassing the hierarchical route is through personal
contacts. If a person knows someone working in the local or – even better –
the national administration, that person goes directly to him or her.
This behaviour, namely to rely on personal networks instead of going through
the hierarchical route, is condemned: “It is not normal, but everyone does it if he
or she has the possibility to facilitate the task”Mamby Bah, a taxi driver born in
the late 1960s, explained (interview, 12.01.2013). As I have illustrated in Chapter
3 on corruption, people denounce it, but still, everyone does it.
‘Traditional’ authorities are said to be quite strong in Kankan – as they are
throughout Guinea (Rey 2010). The research participants used to say that if
they do not give their accord to a certain issue, nothing happens. Here,
Fatima Sadiqui, Amira Nowaira, and Azza El Kholy’s (2009) distinction
between power and authority is useful: While the local government has
power, the ‘traditional’ authorities possess authority, that is, power acknowl-
edged by the society. When I asked Ismael Diallo, a young male graduate,
who yields power in Kankan, he explained: “It is a decentralized power that
is here but there are also les sages. The latter are listened to. You must try not
to frustrate them if you want to achieve a certain goal. The authorities are
more powerful but les sages are more listened to. Because they are credible,
people trust them” (interview, 24.01.2013). State officials working on the
national level are aware of ‘traditional’ authorities’ influence in Kankan:
Twice I could observe how important people, mostly ministers, arriving from
Conakry gathered in Mister Konaté’s courtyard, and together they went and
greeted the Sotikemo. As the example of these ministers illustrated, before
going to meet and greet the governor, the prefect and the mayor, they went
and paid their respects to the Sotikemo first.
All recognised ‘traditional’ posts can only be occupied by a man. Further-
more, in Kankan there is no female chef de quartier. That means that women
are to a large degree excluded from important and powerful positions. When I
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asked the male research participants why women did not have access to these
posts, they hinted at the ways in which things have been done in the past that,
apparently, cannot be changed. Interestingly, some research participants
regardless of gender mentioned women’s hidden strategies to influence male
leaders. ‘Traditional’ authorities would consult their wives, sisters, mothers,
aunts, daughters, and other women of their social surrounding and listen to
their advice. Jeanne Konaté, a university teacher, hinted at exactly that, while,
at the same time demanding a change in gender relations:
Traditionally, women whispered behind their husbands, because some-
times we say that the husband transmits what the handkerchief has said
during the night. Another saying is: The night will bring advice. But I
have said to myself that a woman can be at the man’s side and participate
in the same manner he does.
(Interview, 12.12.2012)
Women are consulted in specific situations, for example when a new Imam is
selected. Aisha Bah, an elderly woman, explained that women can easily estab-
lish whether or not a man is honest – an important characteristic when someone
wants to occupy an influential ‘traditional’ post: “If you want to choose an
Imam, ask a woman. Women know all the weaknesses and qualities of the men
in their community. If a woman says, ‘he is honest, he can become Imam’,
automatically her words are taken into consideration” (interview, 09.02.2012).
By quoting the saying ‘the night will bring advice’, Jeanne Konaté and others
explain that women do not necessarily have to be present when important deci-
sions are made; they have already influenced the male decision-makers before-
hand. Gendered norms in Kankan inhibit a man from openly admitting that a
woman has affected his decision; thus, her influence passes unnoticed. Female
interventions are secret and behind the scenes, as people in Kankan would say.
Still, by mentioning that “behind every big man stands a strong woman” (inter-
view, Bemba, 10.12.2012), men can counter every argument that pleas for more
gender equality within the ‘traditional’ sphere. Furthermore, women are able to
exert influence on people in their social circle only if they are listened to, as they
have no possibilities to impose their opinions. As we have seen, in Kankan – as in
other African cities – elderly people’s words have considerable weight. Thus, a
woman’s position and influence increases with age. Therefore, the older a woman
becomes, the more seriously her advice and suggestions are taken. Still, that does
not reverse the fact that women’s influence in the sphere of ‘traditional’ autho-
rities is restricted, as they themselves cannot occupy such a position.
Madame Kanté, Releasing a Prisoner
Madame Kanté, a financial inspector, was born in the mid-1950s in Mali but
she has been living in Guinea for many years. Since 1995, she has worked for
the National Service for Water Facilities, first in the Forest Region and then
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in the Upper Guinea Region. Besides this main employment, Madame Kanté
headed the Local Office of Women’s and Children’s Affairs. Furthermore, she
was an active member of different local, national, and regional NGOs. These
organisations were concerned with human rights issues, environmental pro-
blems, and the promotion of women. Madame Kanté for example presided
over an organisation called ‘Women and Development in the Upper Guinea
Region’. In addition, she has been an active RPG member for twenty years. I
suppose that Madame Kanté got the position as Local Director of Women’s
and Children’s Affairs thanks to her engagement in women’s organisations
and her longstanding party affiliation. Madame Kanté is proud of the fact
that ordinary women trust her and therefore come for consultations with their
problems. When I asked Madame Kanté about her view on women’s place in
Kankan’s society, she said: “Women are the barometer of society, they are
indispensable. The problem is that they do not know their rights which makes
it difficult to make claims. And those little female intellectuals who make
claims are treated as liars” (interview, 21.02.2012).
Madame Kanté is a member of the local state bureaucracy, but at the same
time, she criticises its output from her viewpoint as a leader of women’s NGOs.
Madame Kanté sees her position as an intermediary between the local govern-
ment and ordinary women: “We are here, at the interface,” she explained. Often,
her posts and roles blur: One morning, at the beginning of the 2000s, a female
family member to whom Madame Kanté refers to as sister, arrived breathlessly
at her house. She informed Madame Kanté that a young man had been arbi-
trarily detained at the gendarmerie. He had spent the night with his friends and a
young woman in a bar drinking. But apparently, they had all drunk too much
and started fighting over the woman. Thereafter, the men had all been detained,
but as the others had enough money, they could pay their way out of prison. He,
however, had given all the money he had to the girl in question.
Madame Kanté and the sister immediately went to the central prison. When
she saw the bad conditions the young man was being detained under, she star-
ted crying. The officers explained that the man had taken drugs, but Madame
Kanté contradicted them and stressed that he had been drinking, not taking
drugs. The officers asked her to pay a certain amount of money, but she refused
because, in her view, the young man was innocent. When Madame Kanté
could not persuade the responsible officer to release the prisoner, she went to
see the governor Ibrahima Sory Diallo. Madame Kanté and the governor
returned together to the central prison. The latter became very angry when he
learned what had happened. “The situation was really hot that day,” Madame
Kanté recounted. Thereafter, the person responsible for the central prison was
dismissed immediately due to her efforts, as Madame Kanté stressed: “I made
him leave before sunset.” The young man was released, after which his whole
family came to thank her, Madame Kanté remembered.
Madame Kanté stressed that it is her duty as an intellectual to speak for and
aid the voiceless such as this young man who had been unjustifiably arrested.
When she could not find a solution herself, she did not hesitate to call on the
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governor in person. And she insisted on his presence in the central prison:
“Everybody knew that Ibrahima Sory Diallo was difficult. When I went to fetch
him, he said that he is busy. I answered that I knew he was busy but his duty was
to be at our disposition. Finally, he came with me” (interview, 21.02.2012).
Madame Kanté could partly act individually when she helped to release a
prisoner because she has the possibilities to do so: First, she is a well-educated
woman who has the intellectual and linguistic capacity to bargain with anyone.
Secondly, she has long-standing experience of working for the state administra-
tion and, thus, speaks the ‘bureaucratic language’. Thirdly, she is also able to
communicate in the vocabulary used in the international development industry.
Fourthly, Madame Kanté is well connected in and outside the local administra-
tion. She knows whom to address in which situation. Thus, it has been easy for
her to knock at the governor’s door to ask him for a service – something which
would be impossible for an ordinary woman who does not know him personally.
Lastly, Madame Kanté, being around fifty at the time this episode occurred,
could count on her seniority to lend weight to her words.
This episode shows the blurring of Madame Kanté’s different positions:
Initially, it started with a call from a sister. When Madame Kanté arrived at
the central prison, she showed her membership card of the Guinean Organi-
sation for Human Rights. She then asked the governor for help in her role as
the head of the Local Office of Women’s and Children’s Affairs. Summing up,
Madame Kanté wears many hats and uses the one most appropriate for each
situation. However, ordinary women who do not have such important perso-
nal connections and who do not hold powerful positions would never visit the
governor, the prefect, the mayor, or any other such person on their own.
Demanding One’s Widow’s Pension
Madame Fofana’s husband, a school director, died in January 2009. He had
been a state employee and, thus, Madame Fofana – as her husband’s only wife –
was entitled to receive a full widow’s pension. However, a good colleague of her
late husband told Madame Fofana not to apply for the widow’s pension yet. He
was in charge of paying the state officials’ salaries and disguised Mister Fofana’s
death – a common practice, and not only in Guinea. He thus continued disbur-
singMister Fofana’s salary until some people detected the practice and he had to
reduce the amount. Two years after his death, the administrative controller
stopped the payment altogether. Thus, Madame Fofana filed the necessary
papers for receiving her widow’s pension in 2011. However, the matter was
complicated and she had to fight for it.
One evening in early 2013, I noticed that Madame Fofana was coming
home from the city, nicely dressed, jewellery hanging from her ears and neck.
She told me that she had been at the prefecture to see the treasurer. Mister
Touré, an acquaintance who worked at the prefecture, had informed her two
days before that her widow’s pension had arrived. When she went to see him
the following day, he gave her a small part of the money and told her to go to
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the treasurer the day after. The very next day, she went there, but Mister
Traoré, responsible for disbursing the pensions, had ‘eaten her money’.
Madame Fofana was angry and exclaimed: ‘If tomorrow he will not give me
my money, I will directly go to the gendarmerie’ (field notes, 07.01.2013).
These were not the first troubles Madame Fofana had with Mister Traoré.
She had deposited the claiming papers for receiving her widow’s pension, but
she still did not get it, so she went to Mister Traoré asking what the problem
was. He then told her that he had lost the paperwork. Thereafter, Madame
Fofana travelled to Conakry where an uncle was working in the concerned
ministry. He helped her and said that she should get her pension in the capital
city. Madame Fofana, however, declined the offer as she was afraid that she
would have to travel to Conakry quarterly in order to obtain the widow’s
pension. She wanted the money to be transferred to Kankan.
From then on, Madame Fofana regularly went to the treasurer. “I did
everything, but the money is still not released,” she exclaimed (interview,
14.01.2013). Madame Fofana became very angry and intended going to the
gendarmerie as she had some male relatives working there, but another
woman advised her not to do so. It could be that she would never get the
money at all if she went to the gendarmerie, the woman explained. It would
be better to visit the treasurer repeatedly. In fact, Madame Fofana was not the
only women not getting her widow’s pension; there were many women who
regularly visited the treasurer for the same reason. There, they got to know
each other. One day, one of these women proposed to visit the prefect.
Everybody agreed and together they directly went to the prefect’s office:
MADAME FOFANA: We went directly to the prefect’s office and they let us in.
The people could not stop us because we were many, fifty or sixty
women. An elderly woman, the oldest amongst us, was speaking in our
name. She spoke in Maninkakan. She said to the prefect that we had
come for our pensions: ‘If you can do something about the pensions, you
should say so. If you cannot, we will go to the governor. If the governor
cannot do anything either, we will go to Conakry.’
CAROLE: And how did the prefect react?
MADAME FOFANA: He said: ‘You are right, stay calm.’ He called the treasurer
and we remained there. The treasurer told us that he will give us our
money at 4 p.m. At 4 p.m. we went to fetch it. The prefect said that they
should not pay us at the treasurer but in his office, so that he could wit-
ness. The women have been paid in front of him. (Interview, 14.01.2013)
Madame Fofana was not among the women who received their widow’s pen-
sions in the prefect’s office that day. She was told to wait until mid-February.
Madame Fofana explained that she could not have gone to the prefect if she
had been on her own. She would have continued frequenting the treasurer,
“by staying behind him and sensitising him little by little until, one day, the
first pension will come” (interview, 14.01.2013).
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Madame Fofana’s husband belonged to the local administration’s highest
pay grade, thus Madame Fofana’s life did not, at first, change much in eco-
nomic terms as she still received his salary for two years after his death. Her
way of recounting this is interesting: For her, this practice seemed to be per-
fectly normal and she did not see anything condemnable in it; everyone would
profit from such an occasion. At the same time, Madame Fofana became mad
at the treasurer, Mister Traore, because he had – in her terms – ‘eaten her
money’. Regularly visiting and bargaining with Mister Traore, then again, was
perfectly right according to Madame Fofana’s normative understanding.
However, she once told me that she would not do the same, namely bargaining,
at school for her children to receive better marks: They get the marks they
deserve; she explained (informal conversation, 24.01.2012). This illustrates,
once again that people condemn corrupt practices in certain situations while
they accept and are involved in them in others.
When the disbursement of her late husband’s salary stopped, Madame
Fofana started fighting for her widow’s pension. At first, she did this alone
using her contacts in Conakry. But then, she opted for not going to the gen-
darmerie but joining other women in similar situations. Together, these
widows went to the prefect. Contrary to Madame Kanté, Madame Fofana
could not have gone to the prefect on her own. But the widows easily got
access to the prefect’s office due to their high number. There, some of the
widows received their pension. Mamby Bah, who worked as a driver at the
city hall, nicely depicted that collective agency can increase the chances of a
positive outcome: “If you have a personal problem, you cannot go alone to
the mayor. If you have got a relative, you go there and you explain your issue.
But if you happen to be in a group, you are strong and you can directly go to
the municipality” (interview, 12.01.2012).
These widows represent what Asef Bayat (2010, 22) calls a ‘passive net-
work.’ ‘Passive networks’ “refer to instantaneous communications between
atomized individuals, which are established by tacit recognition of their com-
monalities directly in public spaces or indirectly through mass media.”
Madame Fofana got to know the other women at the treasury. There, she
learned that she was not the only one who had difficulties receiving her
widow’s pension. By forming a ‘passive network’, these women massively
enhanced their bargaining possibilities and partly achieved their goals.
Women’s (Almost) Absence from Youth’s Protests
In mid-November 2011, we heard that youths had blocked a road in the
Kankan Koura neighbourhood to protest against the local enterprise Kaba
Guiter, because their vehicles raised too much dust. Dadis Camara had pro-
mised to asphalt the country’s principal roads and the most important streets
of major cities in the country’s interior. In Kankan, the government commis-
sioned the enterprise Guiter to do the work. Locally, Guiter is named Kaba
Guiter in accordance with its boss’s name, Ousmane Kaba, one of the First
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Lady’s brothers. The initial contract consisted of thirty-three kilometres;
however, Kankan Koura did not get a share. As the company’s headquarters
was in Kankan Koura, the neighbourhood’s inhabitants considered this
unfair. Thus, some young men went to see the company’s president and asked
him to asphalt their main street. The latter promised to do what he could to
deliver the neighbourhood an asphalted road, Saa Daffé, who held a good
position within Kaba Guiter, stated (interview, 14.12.2011). Then, the gov-
ernment granted Kankan ten additional kilometres in which Kankan Koura
was included. The work, however, did not proceed as planned and only parts
of Kankan’s major streets had been asphalted as at the end of 2011.
After signing the contract in 2009, Kaba Guiter took away what was left of
the ancient tarmac that Sékou Touré’s government had constructed in Kankan
Koura. However, the enterprise did not apply the new asphalt and, conse-
quently, the enterprise’s heavy vehicles raised copious amounts of dust that
disturbed the neighbourhood inhabitants. Initially, the enterprise irrigated the
road twice a day to reduce the dust, Daffé said (interview, 14.12.2011). How-
ever, Kaba Guiter stopped doing so regularly, Fodé Guidou Sakho lamented, a
young graduate who was one of the protest’s spokespersons, and the dust pro-
blem was aggravated as soon as the dry season started.
On Monday morning, November 14, 2011, young people living in Kankan
Koura blocked the road between the N1 that crosses the bridge and leads to
Kankan’s centre and Kaba Guiter’s base. Hence, they were hindering the
enterprise’s employees from going to work. Fodé Guidou Sakho explained
that their goal was to raise the authorities’ awareness of the issue. For that, a
protest was necessary, otherwise the authorities would not have done any-
thing, he stressed (interview, 21.11.2011). First, the enterprise’s representative
for human resources came to talk to the young people. Then, a police car
arrived. The police officer asked the young men to write a request. Being well
aware that this was what the local government wanted, they had already done
so before. In a very polite tone the young people told the governor, the pre-
fect, the mayor, and the security director to asphalt their road which would
eliminate the dust problem. Finally, two vehicles of the mobile squadron full
of heavily armed policemen came to the spot. They had been told that
Kankan Koura’s youth were protesting violently. When they saw that the
scene was peaceful, their chief proposed that the young men should present
five representatives and together, they would go to the prefecture. They agreed
and delegated five young men of different ethnical and educational back-
ground. According to Sakho, the following persons were present in the pre-
fect’s office: the prefect, the Sotikemo’s representative, Kaba Guiter’s chief
Ousmane Kaba and some of his staff, journalists representing the national
radio and two private radio stations, the military camp’s major, the police
chief, the squadron’s leader, and the five young men from Kankan Koura.
First, the prefect accused Kankan Koura’s youths of having taken the
wrong approach; they should have respected the hierarchical ladder and
deposited the complains in written form. The prefect also stressed that with
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the change that Guinea underwent thanks to Alpha Condé, people should stop
protesting. Fodé Guidou Sakho, as the spokesperson, replied that Kankan
Koura had massively supported Alpha Condé in the presidential elections’
second run and that they share his vision of change. Therefore, they would
protest peacefully without throwing stones as has happened in previous times
(interview, 21.11.2011). As the meeting between the different actors went on,
the positions hardened. At one point, Bangaly, Kankan’s youth representative,
told the young men to leave the room for a brief moment. Outside, the former
advised the latter to pay the local authorities more respect and to apologise.
The five young men then did as they had been asked, however, but against their
will. Thereafter, everybody left the prefecture.
Once the five young men went back to Kankan Koura, they told their peers
what had happened. Together, they decided that they would push the matter
“until the President knows what is happening in Kankan. Because we now
want the asphalt” (interview, 21.11.2011). The very same evening, a delega-
tion went to see the mayor to inform him that they did not agree with the
prefect’s verdict and that they would block the road again the following day.
The second day of protest finished with another reunion, during which the
governor told Kankan Koura’s youth representatives that they had been right
and not the prefect. Additionally, Ousmane Kaba promised to irrigate the
affected street twice a day until it would be asphalted.
Youths in Kankan Koura deliberately chose to block the road instead of
presenting their pleas in written form by addressing the local administration,
because they knew that they would not be able to achieve an immediate result
if they had chosen to proceed along the hierarchical route. Fodé Guidou
Sakho emphasised that Kankan Koura’s youth were merely claiming their
rights, but the local government perceived their actions as a strike. Having
previously had bad experiences with striking youths in 2007, when the latter
demolished many administrative buildings in Kankan, the local government
summoned all the representatives of the security sector. This (imagined) threat
gave the young people in Kankan Koura power: Within a few hours, a meet-
ing with all the important parties was assembled.
During that meeting, no women were present, whereas some took part in
the protests – at least at the beginning. Once the military arrived, the women
left the scene because they were afraid. I have been told on several occasions
that women fear protests because they regularly turn to violence. In Kankan,
a huge number of women have been marching on the streets only during the
general strikes against Lansana Conté. During the incidents in Kankan
Koura, the young men had tried to co-opt young women, as Fodé Guidou
Sakho explained: “We tried to mobilise the girls to protest, because the
authorities are not really afraid of boys’ protest. But once there are girls, the
authorities are afraid” (interview, 21.11.2011). Anna Dessertine (2019, 2)
confirms this: “[O]nce women take to the streets to participate in protests and
mobilizations, their presence alone becomes politically efficacious.” These
statements illustrate that if women make claims alone or alongside men, the
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local government takes the events much more seriously. This has been reg-
ularly observed during (youth) protests, in which women would typically only
engage in cases of real necessity.
Djénabou’s citation at the beginning of this chapter hints at the President’s
fear of women’s protests – especially if they threaten to take off their clothes
and thus place a curse upon the watching men: ‘If you are the President, you
must do everything not to be hated by women, because women are sacred. If
they are against you, sooner or later you must abandon power’, Djénabou
explained (informal conversation, 30.11.2012). This phenomenon is what
Laura S. Grillo (2018) calls ‘Female Genital Power’. In her book, Grillo
provides numerous examples of (mostly) elderly women striping naked and
making lewd gestures during protests. In this way, they cast the severest curse
they have to sanction the people in power. When elderly women expose their
breasts and genitals, this “is a rebuke in the strongest of terms” (Grillo 2018,
9). That is why even if women are mostly absent from protests such as when
Kankan Koura’s youths were bargaining over dust, the mere thought that
they could participate – and much worse, take off their clothes – gives them
power, not only in Guinea, but also throughout West Africa.
Market Women Interacting with the State1
Kankan’s markets were the key for the city’s urbanisation; they had already
made it flourish at the end of the eighteenth century, when it became “a
thriving, transregional trading hub” (Osborn 2011, 165). At that time, both
men and women were engaged in trading activities: Men typically sold salt,
imported candles, beads, matches, and kola nuts. Women preferred selling
foodstuffs, cloth, cotton, and woven mats (Osborn 2011, 166). Thus, Kankan’s
market was “a vibrant and dynamic place that was neither a masculinized nor
a feminized space” (Osborn 2011, 168).
Nowadays, each market disposes of an office responsible for the distribution
of the market tables, tax collection, foodstuff inspection, the installation of night
guards, dispute settlings, and so on. If someone disregards a regulation, or if the
inspector decides so, the commodities of the corresponding market woman are
to be seized and brought to the market office. There, she must bargain with
members of the market office to free the seized commodities. The local govern-
ment appoints the market offices’ members, who are typically selected due to
their party affiliation. According to Sarata Cherif, the responsible of Sogbe’s
market office, they do not get any remuneration. However, they use unofficial
means to gain money. Cherif proudly told me that she can guide all these market
women even though she is not an ‘intellectual’ (interview, 31.01.2012).
Additionally, each of Kankan’s markets has a market chief. Aminata
Camara officially represents the small minority of male and the large majority
of female vendors at Dibida market. She acts as an intermediary between
them and the local government. Camara is an elder and – judging by her
appearance and the food she sells – a rather poor woman who sells half-
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spoiled tomatoes. A former mayor has appointed Camara due to her long-
standing RPG membership. The female market chief is known for her ability
to settle disputes, a vital skill for market leaders (cf. Clark 1994). Aminata
Camara recounted: ‘Sometimes even the military’s families come to look for
me, or high ranking officials. They come to me to solve conflicts. I am well
known at the market, at the security, everywhere. People do not put me into
prison, I am not someone like that. I have power’ (field notes, 07.12.2012).
Market women’s interactions with representatives of the local government
are manifold. Some encounters take place on a regular basis, such as tax
collection. Others are quite unpredictable, for example food inspections. In
what follows, I elaborate on three examples of interrelations between women
selling at Kankan’s market and the local government, namely tax collection,
the unblocking of a road next to Dibida market, and instances in which the
local government shuts down Kankan’s markets.
Collecting Taxes
Local governments want to exercise control over markets “but often lack
legitimacy or means of regulation” (Prag 2010, 65). One possibility of exert-
ing authority is through food inspection. Employees from the market office
control whether the offered foodstuff has the required quality. One official
regulation in this regard is that vendors must cover all aliments that cannot be
washed, for example palm oil, cassava flour, or peanut paste. Market
women, however, do not cover their merchandise after every sale. They use
codes to warn each other whenever employees of the market office inspect
food: One day I was doing research with Djénabou at Sogbe market. Sud-
denly, a woman selling at the market entrance said in a loud voice: ‘There is
the risk of rain!’ Within three seconds, all vendors quickly covered their
merchandise and half a minute later three persons from the market office
started their inspection (field notes, 20.01.2012). The women at Dibida
market use a similar code to inform the other vendors of the inspectors’
arrival by naming the head cover women wear for entering the mosque
(field notes 25.01.2012). If the inspectors find food that is not covered, they
confiscate it and bring it to the market office.
Collecting taxes is another instance of authority’s control. All vendors at
Dibida market must pay 100 Guinean francs (approximately 1 euro cent) per
day. Officially, all vendors must pay this tax regardless of the size of their
market stands. This theoretically also holds true for ambulant vendors. In
practice, however, they easily avoid the tax collectors due to their mobility.
Further, debating the fee and personal relations with tax collectors can result
in a tax remission. At the time of research, the smallest banknote was 500
Guinean francs. During a conversation in 2012, Oumou Silla, a meat vendor,
explained that the tax she must pay felt like a rent to her, as the place was
government property. The female vendors expected the local government to
use this tax to clean and refurbish the market.2
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Members of the market office employed by the municipality collected the
tax every third day. The market women appreciated the man responsible for
collecting taxes inside Dibida market, calling him Ali Sebebilala, ‘the ticket
giver’. The research participants told me that they let Sebebilala keep the
respective change of 200 Guinean francs, a practice that seemed to be accep-
ted by all vendors I talked to. Even though giving Ali Sebebilala the change
was voluntary, ‘it became somehow obligatory,’ because all market women
followed the practice, as Silla explained. The female vendor emphasised that
they respected the tax collector because he was very sympathetic and com-
passionate: If a woman happened to be absent from the market for some time
because of family obligations, illness, or because she had travelled, Sebebilala
would not complain about the missing taxes, nor would he confiscate her com-
modities or give the table to someone else, as would be the official requirement.
However, Sebebilala’s employer, the municipality, had nonetheless sanctioned his
Figure 7.1 Women Selling their Commodities
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‘misbehaviour’ by cutting his salary as it was noticed that he did not deliver the
amount of money he should have in accordance with the number of tables
(Oumou Silla, informal conversation, 14.01.2012).
The blurred boundaries between the state and society become exemplified by
‘the ticket giver’ Ali Sebebilala, who, despite being an employee of the munici-
pality was considered by the market women to belong to their own social group,
rather than to the local government. Typically, men working at the market office
have a bad reputation among the market women. The research participants
consider it unbecoming for a head of a family to wander through the market
quarrelling with women all day long to collect taxes. However, Sebebilala due to
his behaviour was seen differently. Dibida’s vendors decided to give Ali Sebebi-
lala the change of 200 Guinean francs – almost twice the amount of the official
tax – due to his personal behaviour, and continued to do so, even after the
municipality had cut his salary. Thus, Sebebilala could continue working at the
market and the women still had the ticket vendor they wanted. The practice of
giving a state’s employee a small sum of money or some natural products as a
sign of gratitude for his or her work seems to be a widespread practice in West
Africa, as Giorgio Blundo and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan (2006, 75–76)
demonstrate. The relationship between Sebebilala and Dibida’s vendors can be
described as a reciprocal dependency: The market women give Sebebilala an
additional 200 Guinean francs every third day, thus paying a part of his salary.
The tax collector, in return, turns a blind eye on vendors disregarding official
regulations. The municipality, too, profits from this arrangement as it can reduce
its outlay on Sebebilala’s wage.
Unblocking a Market Road
A second example of an interaction between representatives of the local gov-
ernment and market vendors highlights the bargaining for the control over
parts of Kankan’s main market: In February 2012, the municipality decided
to remove street vendors from the road around Dibida market that leads directly
to the central bus station. Normally, the road is crowded with market stalls. Some
women illegally sell their commodities with clothes spread on the floor and
ambulant vendors carry goods in pushcarts or on their heads, which makes it dif-
ficult for cars and motorcycles to get through, resulting in accidents. The problem
of women illegally selling on the street had been an old but still unresolved one, a
member of the market office explained (informal conversation, 27.02.2012).
The information that the market women should no longer use the road as
market place spread through various channels: The municipality informed
both the head of market and the market office’s members. They were then to
pass the message to the market women. In addition, the news was announced
in the local radio stations through which the women were continuously sen-
sitised to respect the law by not selling on the streets. Obviously, the message
spread rapidly by word of mouth among the market sellers. Nevertheless,
some affected women reported that they had not been informed beforehand.
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Members of the local government widely debated the reluctance of these
market women to free the road. Especially involved were the mayor Fodé Quatre
Kourouma, whom the local population just called Fodé Quatre, the vice-mayor
Mister Nabé, as well as two municipal officials, Madame Konaté and Madame
Kanté, the heads of the Office of Women’s and Children’s Affairs at prefectural
and municipal level, respectively. Fodé Quatre told me that there was enough
space in the market for those selling their commodities illegally outside. Some of
them even had a table inside the market, but they were convinced they would sell
more quickly if they were situated outside the market walls, Fodé Quatre
lamented (informal conversation, 01.03.2012). Some women selling inside the
market shared his view, as they told me. They even congratulated the mayor for
his decision as they hoped to gain an advantage and to sell more in the future
(informal conversations, 03.03.2012).
Madame Kanté complained about the police being too arrogant vis-à-vis
these market women, whose situation she understood: ‘Most women are poor.
They sell quickly during the day to buy something to eat for their family’s
evening meal. We have to make these women understand that we are not their
enemies; on the contrary, we are here to help them’ (informal conversation,
23.02.2012). Like Madame Kanté, Madame Konaté stressed that they would
find a solution together with the concerned women. One viable option would
be the relocation of the latter to Sénkéfara or Missira, two almost empty mar-
kets within half an hour’s walk from the city centre. One problem with these
solutions, however, was the local assumption that the first people who sell on a
newly established market would eventually die. After a meeting with Dibida’s
market chief and some vendors, Madame Konaté emphasised that the law had
to be respected. Furthermore, she underlined that the women concerned were
very difficult to convince: ‘The problem is that they are not educated; too many
of them did not go to school. It is so difficult to make them understand things.
They do not know their rights and duties. The law is on our side, they are not
allowed to sell on the street’ (informal conversation, 23.02.2012).
The affected vendors for their part were furious, not knowing where to go.
They were afraid of losing their clients if they had to change their points of
sale. Furthermore, the commodities of several women were confiscated and
taken to the market office. Mister Nabé the vice mayor, was not optimistic of
finding a satisfying solution as he was unsure whether the measures taken by
the municipality would solve the problem of women selling on the street. In
addition, he considered the discussions with these market women as an
unsuitable tool to solve the conflict. He explained that, for four days in a row,
female vendors had come to his office to explain their situations as their
families’ breadwinners. They wanted a selling table inside Dibida market, but
there were not enough for all of them: ‘It is a question of habits and money,’
he said (informal conversation, 02.03.2012). In the end, Mister Nabé was
right: The measures taken by the local government did not resolve the pro-
blem of women selling on the market road. A few days later, the market road
was as crowded as before.
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Market women can be characterised as a ‘passive network’, which in Asef
Bayat’s (1997, 66) words represents “an inherent element of street and back-
street life; [it] ensure[s] instant cooperation of the individual actors once they
feel a threat to their well-being.” When the government banned the vendors
from selling on the street near Dibida market, they, on an ad hoc basis got
together and discussed the problem with Aminata Camara, the female chief
of the market. Together, they then decided that the latter accompanied by
some vendors, should go to the municipality to find a solution for the diffi-
culties at hand. Aishatou Diakité, a young female graduate, remarked in this
regard: “Market women are very united. When one of them has a problem,
they help each other or give advices or they make that their husbands inter-
vene in their problems” (interview, 20.01.2013).
As the examples show, market women do not hesitate to call on local state
employees to consider their special situations – as breadwinners of their
families – and help them in times of trouble without making their lives harder
by confiscating their commodities or giving their selling-tables to someone
else. As the statements by the mayor, Mister Nabé, Madame Konaté, and
Madame Kanté illustrate, employees of the local government create bound-
aries between themselves and women selling at Kankan’s markets at different
levels. First, they manifest through the bureaucrats’ posture: While members
of the local government sit uprightly on a chair behind a desk in their offices,
the women must bring their pleas forward while sitting on a wooden bench.
State employees in Kankan usually wear so-called ‘traditional’ outfits or
modest suits. Female state bureaucrats demonstrate superiority and hint at
wealth by having an expensive-looking hairstyle, wearing jewellery, and
holding a big handbag in front of them. Secondly, difference is being estab-
lished by the discursive formation of governmental employees; on the one
hand by referring to the law that backs their position and thus gives their
actions legitimacy; on the other hand, by promoting an image of Dibida’s
vendors as a uniform group. Even though some men have also been affected
by the municipality’s prohibition to sell commodities on the road around
Dibida market, the governmental representatives only talked of women,
labelling them as uneducated, stubborn, and therefore difficult to handle. The
state employees, in contrast presented themselves as well educated, and
knowing right from wrong. Interestingly, Sarata Cherif the head of Sogbe’s
market office, did the same even though she is not highly educated herself.
She said: “The minds of these women resemble children’s minds a little bit”
(interview, 31.01.2012). Altogether, these practices create a boundary between
members of the local government and the market women.
That dispute around the market road was a conflict of interest: The local
government, on the one hand, officially wanted to ensure free traffic circula-
tion. Its actions, however, can also be analysed as a means of enforcing its
authority. The affected vendors, on the other side, were reluctant to move to
another market far away from the city centre, as they were afraid of losing
both clients and income. Dibida’s vendors, such as Oumou Silla, typically
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complained that the local government ‘does nothing but eating money’
(informal conversation, 14.01.2012). They expected the municipality to use
the tax money to clean, equip, and reconstruct the market. Besides, the (local)
government should build up infrastructure; deliver basic services, such as
education, health, and electricity; provide micro credits; and create jobs.
Above all, the market women demanded lower food prices. These claims and
the contestation over regulation at Kankan’s markets is a typical example of
silent politics: Even though a delegation of Dibida’s vendors and the market
chief went to discuss the issue at the municipality and the prefecture, they
did not consider their action as political. Summing up, Kankan’s market
women are not as powerful as those described by Ebbe Prag (2010, 66–67)
in Cotonou’s largest market, Dantokpa, but they are still able to influence
the local government by political acts emerging from the everyday due to
their sheer number.
Figure 7.2 Women Selling on the Road next to Dibida Market
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Closing the Market: Feeling Ethnically Discriminated
One of the most prominent differences amongst female vendors is their eth-
nical background. This cleavage is noticeable in daily interactions in Kan-
kan’s markets. Manding customers accuse Fulani vendors of charging them
more than Fulani clients. In return, Fulani vendors accuse employees of the
market office, who are all RPG members, of treating them worse than their
Manding counterparts. They claim, for example, that commodities belonging
to Fulani sellers are more often seized and brought to the market office.
Another such instance is when the local government closes Kankan’s markets.
Whenever important persons from the government arrive in Kankan – as
when the First Lady visited the city – the administration closes the city’s
markets, schools, and sometimes even the small boutiques under the pretext
of a spontaneously declared public holiday. Madame Camara, an elderly
woman working for the local government, explained that the closing was
implemented in order to have many people welcoming the important guests.
She further told me that during the Conté period people in Kankan indirectly
showed their malcontent with the President and his government by not
showing up and, thus, not welcoming the ministers when they arrived in the
city (interview, 19.01.2012).
Market women are hugely affected by these closures, as they do not earn
the money to buy the evening meal for their families. Therefore, they all
lament such orders. I also heard women who are generally in favour of the
local government and who are not directly affected by such measures com-
plaining about them. People working for the local government such as the
above-mentioned Madame Camara or Sarata Cherif, the representative of
Sogbe’s market office, are aware of the difficulties women get in to due to such
closures. But they both emphasise that this does not happen regularly and,
therefore, the vendors must accept the government’s decisions (interviews,
19.01.2012 and 31.01.2012).
Market women claim not to be in a powerful position vis-à-vis the local
government. However, there are always means to bypass the administrative
directives to close the markets. Some women sell their goods as ambulant
vendors, moving from place to place to escape the local police. Market
women call this ‘the market of running, running’. Others just go to the
market for a few hours. As there are not many vendors but still quite a high
number of clients, they may even profit from the prohibition. Nevertheless,
ignoring the government’s directives is risky as one’s commodities could be
confiscated. On the day before the closing of the markets and especially on
the following days, one can hear heated debates all over the markets. Women
of Fulani ethnicity claim that the market officials systematically turned their
eyes away if they see Manding women selling commodities. They in contrast,
risked getting arrested by the market offices’ members and thus losing parts
of their merchandise. This example illustrates how Kankan’s Fulani minority
may interpret actions by the local RPG governmental as acts of ethnic
196 Struggling for Recognition
clientelism or discrimination. Mister Nabé, the vice mayor who is married to
a Fulani wife and a Manding wife, is aware of this perception. He noted: ‘The
matter of the market women is not solved easily; it always turns into a ques-
tion of ethnicity’ (field notes, 03.02.2012).
Market women are typical victims of harassment. Especially Kankan’s
Fulani vendors perceive governmental decisions, such as the closing of the
markets or individual acts by members of the market office, as discriminatory
practices. Because both state officials and the market office’s employees are
RPG members and thus represent the very government many Fulani oppose,
their actions are eyed critically and interpreted in ethnic terms. Generally,
market women cannot simply be regarded as victims; on the contrary, their
agency is manifold. Kankan’s market women, especially ambulant vendors,
sometimes avoid tax collection or engage in bargaining with the tax collectors
to reduce the fee they must pay. Others make special profits on days Kankan’s
markets are officially closed by participating in the ‘running market’, to avoid
being caught by members of the market office.
Conclusions: From Silent Politics to Marching on the Streets
Women Shaping Statehood Silently
In this chapter, I have looked at women’s political articulations and their
agency regarding the local government. Jo Beall (2013, 175, italics in original)
rightly notes that the “local government can often prove to be an ambiguous
arena” for women. It “has the potential to engage more effectively with
women and to address their interests. Nevertheless, however circumscribed,
competing interests remain clustered around power and resources at local
government level in ways that exclude women.” In Kankan, there are differ-
ent layers of encounters between ordinary women and the local government.
Such interactions take place in the bureaucrat’s office, in front of a govern-
mental building, at a crossroads, in the chef de quartier’s boutique, at Dibida
market, and elsewhere. Women of all ages, ethnicity, religious, economic, and
educational background take part in these encounters. The local bureaucrats
also have different ethnicities, the Manding, however, are the most numerous.
In Kankan, there are a handful of female state employees, but they are still a
small minority. Like in neighbouring countries, most bureaucrats are
advanced in age. Lastly, they can draw on more educational competence than
the average inhabitant.
State employees gain legitimisation for their work through the state as an
institution. Many bureaucrats misuse the state’s image as a powerful actor for
their own, personal interests. By putting on a hegemonic attitude, they assume
an air of superiority and intimidate people, especially ordinary women, who
typically do not marshal the same economic and intellectual capacities and
personal networks. Because of this and other practices, Kankan’s inhabitants
experience employees of the local government as arbitrary and corrupt and
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the whole bureaucracy as inefficient. At the same time, the local government,
whose employees in the end represent the state, is still a strong point of
reference. Whenever, for example, one of Kankan’s many associations under-
takes something, they first talk to the responsible institution at the correct
administrative level: When women form a new group, they try to get an
accreditation by the Local Office of Women’s and Children’s Affairs; when a
women’s association decides to clean the ditches along Kankan’s main roads,
its members inform the mayor or the vice-mayor beforehand; and when a
youth association repairs one of the neighbourhood’s roads, they will have
first talked to the neighbourhood’s Imam or the chef de quartier. The goal of
this information policy is to get the local authority’s consent, so that nobody
can later claim they should not have done this or that. Besides, such exchan-
ges of information are a way of getting to know the local bureaucrats, and
these contacts might be helpful as, in the future, these associations might
hope to receive funding.
While in Kankan, the local government is an ambivalent sphere for
women, the ‘traditional’ authorities are even more so. While women, espe-
cially elderly women, are sought after to resolve social conflicts and give
advices, they cannot occupy a ‘traditional’ post, such as becoming the Soti-
kemo, who is said to have the most powerful position in Kankan. Several of
the research participants hinted at women’s silent influence, because in their
positions as mothers, sisters, aunts, or wives, they would advise these powerful
men. These counsels would then shape decision-making without being
noticed, they stressed. Regardless of this advice, I argue that women are sys-
tematically excluded from the influential ‘traditional’ sphere, not least because
in Kankan, the impact of ‘traditional’ authorities goes far beyond their own
realm: They also influence women’s presence and access to local institutional
politics. Alpha Condé for example, through an intermediary, asked for their
consent when he installed Fatoumata Maty as Kankan’s mayor. Furthermore,
‘traditional’ authorities can impede general alterations regarding local gen-
dered norms. Even though people such as Bemba, one of the Sotikemo’s
advisors, might be quite open for changes within the ‘traditional’ political
sphere and also greatly welcomes the ongoing democratisation process in
Guinea, it remains clear that ‘traditional’ authorities are not willing to share
(part of) their power with women and other minorities.
Women’s Formation of ‘Passive Networks’
I have followed Thomas Bierschenk’s (2014, 242) call for empirical research of
statehood that “focuses on the heterogeneity, the incompleteness and ‘omni-
presence’ of statehood – so that it is impossible to define, once and for all,
where exactly the border between state and non-state lies.” Aminata Camara,
Dibida’s market chief, is one such example that illustrates the blurred
boundary between the state and the population. A former mayor nominated
her due to her support of the governing party and her age, whereas
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educational and economic factors were not important. The chief of the
market does not receive any salary from the municipality and sells her com-
modities at Dibida like the other vendors. At the same time, Camara is
expected to act as an intermediary between them and the local government in
times of conflict, such as during the dispute over the access and control of a
public space, namely the road outside Dibida market. Therefore, the market
chief is an “intermediate, situated […] at the interface between the state and
society” (Cornwall and Coelho 2007, 1).
The street in Kankan, as in other parts of the world, can become political
(Bayat 1997). Street politics are typically not institutionalised, but erupt on a
spontaneous, non-organised basis. This also holds true for the various exam-
ples I have given in this chapter, such as when the local government pro-
hibited ambulant vendors around Dibida market to sell their commodities on
the street or when youths protested against the local enterprise Kaba Guiter
in the neighbourhood of Kankan Koura. These forms of claim-making were
not planned long beforehand nor will the instances have long-lasting effects.
Nevertheless, Dibida’s vendors and Kankan Koura’s youth have caught the
local government’s attention.
In the “political streets” (Bayat 1997) of Kankan’s markets, “the political in
its fleeting and intangible, transmogrified forms” (Navaro-Yashin 2002, 3)
becomes visible. There, bargaining between local state employees, such as tax
collectors and members of the market offices, and ordinary market vendors
occurs on a daily basis. For Dibida’s vendors, the state’s actions are some-
times predictable, for example the routinised tax collection. Dibida’s market
women give Sebebilala, the tax collector, 500 Guinean francs every third
day – almost twice the amount of the official fee – thus paying a part of his
salary. The tax collector, in return, turns a blind eye to vendors disregarding
official regulations. The municipality, too, profits from this arrangement as it
can reduce its outlay on Sebebilala’s wage. As Christian Lund (2007, 24)
notes, the line between taxation and bribery is often fuzzy; both enforce gov-
ernmental authority. The vendors do not consider their action as political.
Nevertheless, it has an impact on the behaviour of the local government
insofar as Sebebilala, despite ignoring official guidelines, is not replaced.
Other events, such as food inspection or the closing of the markets on special
occasions, are quite unforeseeable. The exact procedures of these instances,
such as how to release one’s merchandise when it has been brought to the
market office, are unclear and therefore give representatives of the local gov-
ernment a looming presence, therefore enhancing the state’s authority.
The (female) vendors recognise the similarities of their daily struggles.
Based on these shared difficulties, a sense of solidarity emerges that forms the
basis of political demands. In Kankan, market women are loosely organised,
forming a ‘passive network’ using Asef Bayat’s (2010) term, which they fall
back on in case of necessity. This has been the case when the local govern-
ment decided to banish ambulant vendors from selling on the market road or
when one of the responsible night guards was stealing their commodities
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earlier the same year. Bayat (2010, 14) claims that commonly perceived dan-
gers trigger “collective actions of noncollective actors.” Such ‘passive net-
works’ form into collective networks, after which public protest might
eventually follow, only if they are afraid of losing their gains. Women selling
outside Dibida market indeed felt threatened by the local government and
were afraid of losing their clients and, thus, their daily income. However, they
decided not to march on the street, but to send a delegation to the munici-
pality to bargain and to find a solution for the problem at hand.
The concept of the ‘passive network’ is also viable for the widows claiming
their widows’ pensions. It was at the treasury where Madame Fofana recog-
nised that other women were facing a similar fate. By exchanging and dis-
cussing their situations, these women advised each other of how best to do
something. Therefore, they started forming a ‘passive network’. At a certain
point, one widow proposed to communally go to visit the prefect. The latter
was very understanding and thanks to his help some of the women finally
received their widow’s pensions. As Djénabou put it: ‘Here in Guinea, the
voice of a single person does not count. The voices of many people frighten
the authorities’ (informal conversation, 19.01.2013).
Having personal relations to state employees is helpful in many ways.
Firstly, one has direct access to a specific institution and need not take the
hierarchical route, which might never lead to the desired outcome. Secondly,
it enables people, also women, to act individually when addressing their pro-
blems. Then personal involvement is very important, as the example of
Madame Konaté and Madame Kanté shows. Because Madame Konaté had
newly arrived in Kankan, she could handle the problem with the market
women from a greater distance than Madame Kanté, who had spent many
years in the city and who is engaged in different NGOs. The latter showed
more empathy with the market women and did not try to increase the dis-
tance between herself and these ordinary women.
The Fear of Women’s Protests
How have statehood practices and interactions between local authorities and
ordinary people changed since Alpha Condé’s election as the head of state?
By looking at the case of the protests by Kankan Koura’s youth, some chan-
ges have become visible. Fodé Guidou Sakho and his fellows emphasised that
they were claiming their rights and did not strike. These young men, like the
members of the local government they were dealing with, support the current
President and thus reinforced his notion of change. Hence, Kankan Koura’s
youth stressed that they would not protest violently, nor would the summoned
police and gendarmerie use force, as has been the case in former times (and is,
obviously, still happening nowadays).
The young men who protested in Kankan Koura motivated young women
to accompany them. Fodé Guidou Sakho explained that women’s presence
would give their actions more legitimacy and the local government would
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take them more seriously. This idea is widespread in Kankan. An acquain-
tance who works at the Hôtel de l’Université told me of his problem when he
officially wanted to register for public electricity. When his endeavours were
unsuccessful for some months, he sent his younger sister. He explained: ‘In
Guinea, it is like this: If you want a problem to be solved, you have to send a
woman’ (field notes, 16.01.2013). This is related to the assumption that
women only go to the local government in case of urgent necessity. Thierno’s
statement echoes that: ‘People know that if a woman comes, there is really a big
problem because women do not dare going to the authorities. So, the little
women who dare are listened to’ (informal conversation, 26.11.2012). However,
a woman would only go to the mayor, the prefect, or the governor if she is in an
appropriate position to do so, for example if she knows them personally, such as
Madame Kanté who persuaded the governor to accompany her to the local
prison. As we have seen, women otherwise go to these offices in groups.
I argue that ordinary women in Kankan, like the female vendors, despite not
forming a strong network, can put pressure on the local government by their
sheer number and can thus sometimes pursue their goals. The statements by
members of the local government demonstrate that they were aware of market
women’s economic role within their families. They feared that the female vendors
would publicly protest if their income were further reduced. Especially in a
region where the majority of the population supports the President, the govern-
ment tries to avoid negative publicity. The fear of women’s public protest – and
even worse, taking off their clothes and using their Female Genital Power (Grillo
2018) – therefore, prompted members of the local government to handle market
women more carefully to a certain extent.
Notes
1 Parts of this section have been published in an earlier article: Ammann, Carole.
2016. “Everyday Politics. Market Women and the Local Government in Kankan,
Guinea.” Stichproben. Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien 16(30):37–62.
Excerpts are reused with the publisher’s permission.
2 For a discussion on the distinct perception of market fees and local taxes in Foré-
cariah, see Anita Schroven (2019, 173–181).
Bibliography
Ammann, Carole. 2016. “Everyday Politics. Market Women and the Local Govern-
ment in Kankan, Guinea.” Stichproben. Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastu-
dien 16(30):37–62.
Bayat, Asef. 1997. “Un-Civil Society. The Politics of the ‘Informal People’.” Third
World Quarterly 18(1):53–72.
Bayat, Asef. 2010. Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East.
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Beall, Jo. 2013. “Decentralizing Government and De-Centering Gender. Lessons from
Local Government Reform in South Africa.” In Governing Women. Women’s
Struggling for Recognition 201
Political Effectiveness in Contexts of Democratization and Governance Reform,
edited by Anne Marie Goetz, 175–195. New York/London: Routledge.
Bierschenk, Thomas, and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, eds. 2014. States at Work.
Dynamics of African Bureaucracies. Leiden/Boston: Brill.
Bierschenk, Thomas. 2014. “Sedimentation, Fragmentation and Normative Double-
Binds in (West) African Public Services.” In States at Work. Dynamics of African
Bureaucracies, edited by Thomas Bierschenk, and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan,
221–245. Leiden/Boston: Brill.
Blundo, Giorgio, and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan. 2006. “Everyday Corruption in
West Africa.” In Everyday Corruption and the State. Citizens & Public Officials in
Africa, edited by Giorgio Blundo, and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, 69–109. Cape
Town: Zed Books.
Blundo, Giorgio, and Pierre-Yves Le Meur. 2009. “Introduction. An Anthropology of
Everyday Governance. Collective Service Delivery and Subject-Making.” In The
Governance of Daily Life in Africa. Ethnographic Explorations of Public and Col-
lective Services, edited by Giorgio Blundo, and Pierre-Yves Le Meur, 1–37. Leiden/
Boston: Brill.
Clark, Gracia. 1994. Onions Are My Husband. Survival and Accumulation by West
African Market Women. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press.
Cornwall, Andrea, and Vera Schattan P. Coelho. 2007. “Spaces for Change? The Pol-
itics of Participation in New Democratic Arenas.” In Spaces for Change? The Poli-
tics of Participation in New Democratic Arenas, edited by Andrea Cornwall, and
Vera Schattan P. Coelho, 1–32. New York/London: Zed.
Dessertine, Anna. 2019. “Women, Power, and the State in Guinea.” In Oxford
Research Encyclopedia of African History, edited by Thomas Spear. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.013.538.
Emirbayer, Mustafa, and Anne Mische. 1998. “What Is Agency?” American Journal of
Sociology 103(4):962–1023.
Greenhouse, Carol J. 2002. “Introduction. Altered States, Altered Lives.” In Ethno-
graphy in Unstable Places. Everyday Lives in Contexts of Dynamic Political Change,
edited by Carol J. Greenhouse, Elizabeth Mertz, and Kay B. Warren, 1–34.
Durham/London: Duke University Press.
Grillo, Laura S. 2018. An Intimate Rebuke. Female Genital Power in Ritual and Poli-
tics in West Africa. Durham/London: Duke University Press.
Hansen, Thomas Blom, and Finn Stepputat. 2001. “Introduction. States of Imagina-
tion.” In States of Imagination. Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State,
edited by Thomas Blom Hansen, and Finn Stepputat, 1–38. Durham/London:
Duke University Press.
Lund, Christian. 2007. “Twilight Institutions. An Introduction.” In Twilight Institutions.
Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa, edited by Christian Lund, 13–32.
Malden: Blackwell.
Navaro-Yashin, Yael. 2002. Faces of the State. Secularism and Public Life in Turkey.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Osborn, Emily Lynn. 2011. Our New Husbands Are Here. Households, Gender, and
Politics in a West African State From the Slave Trade to Colonial Rule. Athens:
Ohio University Press.
Prag, Ebbe. 2010. “Women Leaders and the Sense of Power. Clientelism and Citizen-
ship at the Dantokpa Market in Cotonou, Benin.” In Africa’s Informal Workers.
202 Struggling for Recognition
Collective Agency, Alliances and Transnational Organizing in Urban Africa, edited
by Ilda Lindell, 65–81. New York: Zed Books.
Rey, Pascal. 2010. “The Local and the Global: Local Power and Globalisation.”
International Social Science Journal 61(202):437–444.
Sadiqi, Fatima, Amira Nowaira, and Azza El Kholy. 2009. Women Writing Africa.
The Northern Region. Vol. 4. New York: The Feminist Press.
Schroven, Anita. 2019. Playing the Marginality Game: Identity Politics in West Africa.
Vol. 19. New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books.




In this book, I have analysed various aspects of women’s political articula-
tions in Kankan, Guinea. The empirical data shows that generally, women in
Kankan do not see themselves as political actors. Their emic notion of poli-
tics solely refers to the male dominated institutional political sphere. In their
understanding, someone who is a party member and frequents party meetings
is engaged in politics – even if ordinary women’s role within political parties is
not to raise their voices nor to make decisions. I argue that to reveal political
articulations of marginalised people, such as women in Kankan, we must also
look outside what is considered to be institutional politics, which is typically
identified with elections, parliaments, ministries, political parties, trade
unions, and rebellions. Women’s political articulations are subtle and often
hardly visible. They mostly manifest themselves in women’s daily agency such
as during encounters with representatives of the local government, but also
within everyday actions, for example within their families.
The concept of agency as promoted by Mustafa Emirbayer and Anne Mische
(1998) proved to be helpful in investigating various aspects of social life in the
secondary city of Muslim Kankan. Researchers typically neglect the habitual and
the projective dimension of agency. However, they must be taken into considera-
tion when analysing a person’s everyday actions. I have argued that local gendered
norms are constantly formed and reformed. Here, the habitual side of agency is
crucial. Especially elderly people tend to stress that local, habitual ways of doing
things are unchanged since past times. Kankan’s elderly inhabitants, in particular
elderly men, do not understand why things should change if they have been suc-
cessfully done that way in the past. Alterations in gendered norms are therefore
often not welcome – not least because they threaten to change current power and
gender hierarchies. According to this understanding, issues such as women’s
empowerment are perceived as being imported from the ‘West’, triggered by
‘modernity’, and consequently not compatible with local gendered norms. The
prohibition of polygyny, for example, does not fit into local habitual Muslim
practices, these elderly (and, by the way, also many young) men and sometimes
also (elderly) women claim.
The imagination of an altered future is crucial for any form of agency. If,
for example, the two graduates Diaka Fofana and Mariam Bah had not
imagined their future husband to be highly educated and economically well
off, they would not have evaluated the various options at hand and made
their choices accordingly. And if Djénabou Dramé would not have seen in
schooling the possibility to change her prospects, that is, not to end up as a
petty trader like her mother, she would not have invested so much time and
energy in her education. Thanks to the imagination of her future work situa-
tion, she is able to make a living by working for various NGOs and to sub-
stantially contribute to her family’s otherwise tight budget.
As I have emphasised throughout this book, women in Kankan, as every-
where else, cannot be considered as a monolithic block: They only partially
share the same interests and goals. One similarity is their gendered duties to
take care of their children and (to some extent) nourish their families. I have
argued that they also mostly share a certain expectation of what the state
should do for its citizens. In Kankan, women expect the state to build up
infrastructure, to deliver basic services, and to make staple food affordable for
ordinary people.
There are, though, many lines of division among women in Kankan. The
most prominent are the differences concerning educational background, age,
ethnic belonging, and economic and social positions. In Guinea, as in many
other parts of the world, seniority is a crucial aspect, as power and authority
increase with age. This holds true for women and men alike. Regarding West
Africa, Filomina Chioma Steady (2011, 23–24) writes that it is usually with
menopause that women’s access to political leadership roles becomes easier.
Elderly women can thus achieve the status of ‘social males’ and ‘neutral per-
sons’. The same holds true in Kankan. Women of a certain social age do not
get accused of being prostitutes or sexually loose as young women would do if
they join a political party as an ordinary party member – or even worse, if
they aspired to public and political roles. Furthermore, postmenopausal
women have typically less obligations within their households and therefore
more time to frequent political parties.
The practice of highly respecting elderly people in Kankan is habitual and
influenced by local, religious norms (Brand 2001, 305).1 It is not regarded as
respectful to contradict someone who is older than oneself. Nevertheless, in
reality, the older generation is criticised by the youth because it is the elderly
who control and disapprove of the young men’s and women’s behaviour. Djé-
nabou explained that young people like herself secretly call their parents, and
mostly their fathers, ‘dictators’: ‘They do not see that things are changing’, she
once lamented (informal conversation, 21.11.2012). Young women, especially
those who are highly educated, disapprove of certain local practices and norms.
My data shows that in a secondary city such as Kankan, where the inhabitants
claim to be attached to ‘traditional values’, a (young) person’s behaviour is
closely watched. Especially (young) women must behave according to local
gendered norms if they do not want to be stigmatised as a ‘bad’ woman, for
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example by getting pregnant without being married. According to the local
understanding, such behaviour would also have negative consequences for
one’s (future) children.
Another dividing line among Kankan’s women is ethnic belonging. At the
time of the research, Guinea’s elite was able to politicise ethnicity, above all
the mistrust between the Manding and the Fulani. In Kankan, the former
constitutes the majority and mostly supported Alpha Condé, Guinea’s Pre-
sident since 2010, and his RPG. The Fulani are the largest minority and
typically voted for the main oppositionist, Cellou Dalein Diallo and his
UFDG. In this book, I have shown that while Kankan’s Manding and Fulani
inhabitants mostly live harmoniously together and interact habitually with each
other, ethnic tensions became virulent before, during, and after the presidential
elections of 2010. Ever since, the issue pops up from time to time, especially
when rumours consolidate into prejudices about the social ‘other’. In Kankan,
the Fulani have a contradictory image: On the one hand, they are praised for
being successful and well-connected traders; on the other hand, they are blamed
for being egoistic and only profit-orientated. As a result, they are regularly
accused of manipulating the food prices, especially the price of rice.
As the RPG has not only won the presidential but also the legislative elec-
tions, many Fulani feel systematically excluded from the state. Consequently,
acts by the national and the local government are (rightly or wrongly) inter-
preted in ethnic terms. Regarding ethnic belonging, gender is not a prominent
issue: Both men and women get involve in ethicised disputes, and both men
and women are among those who call for forgiveness, national unity, and
reconciliation. However, there are differences regarding Fulani’s and Mand-
ing’s gender relations: According to the local popular perception, the Fulani
perform a ‘strict’ version of Islam. Consequently, wedding practices among
the Fulani seem to be more complicated than those among the Manding.
Moreover, Fulani women are more closely watched.
The educational background of a woman is also crucial. I often heard ‘intel-
lectual’ women talking condescendingly about ordinary women, labelling them
as stubborn and ignorant. Ordinary women, in contrast, consider the educated
elite as too far away from their own daily problems. Members of women’s asso-
ciations lamented that the ‘intellectual’ women got rich at their expense when
setting up a project that received funds from the government or international
donors. Women who speak French fluently have a privileged access to state
institutions, where French is the lingua franca. The use of French gives women
power and sometimes also authority in the political sphere, as Fatima Sadiqi
(2009, 259) describes for educated feminists in Morocco.
However, being a well-educated woman in a city such as Kankan comes
with its own challenges: On the one hand, their professional ambitions are
high. They expect the state to provide a job as it has done for the generation
that studied during the First Republic. At the same time, young graduates are
aware that they would probably not get hold of a post within the adminis-
tration without crucial personal connections. Therefore, they are constantly
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on the lookout for other possibilities to make an income and finally becoming
a social adult and a respected person. On the other hand, finding an adequate
husband is quite a demanding challenge. Some men are leery of intellectual
women, assuming the latter would contest local gendered norms which sti-
pulate women’s submissive behaviour. It is a balancing act for highly educated
women to go their own way without stepping outside the accepted behaviour
and losing their credibility and the image of a ‘good’ Muslim woman.
In Kankan, women claim that their bargaining possibilities within households
are very limited. Their actions, however, sometimes contradict their words. A
woman such as Fanta Doumbouya, who has her own hairdressing salon and
who is her family’s main breadwinner, makes use of quite a few possibilities to
influence her husband and her larger family. Generally, women’s bargaining
powers in Kankan increase if they substantially contribute to their households’
budgets – similar to what Ann Katherine Wiley (2014, 107) demonstrates for
Mauretania – even though they do not officially state so.
Women and Politics in Guinea
On the markets, the women sang songs for Alpha Condé’s government’s praise.
And people talked a lot about Nantou Chérif who presented the RPG during
the legislative elections. The opinions differed: Some liked her, others said that
she was too old and had not the necessary competences for a seat in the par-
liament. Everywhere people only spoke about the elections. In my neighbour-
hood, some erudite men from the mosque had a place where they met and
talked about politics every day. Young people discussed politics in their grains,
women talked about it at the market. Everyone became a politician.
(Djénabou, email, 23.10.13)
In this email, Djénabou described how Kankan’s inhabitants, young and old,
men and women, Fulani and Manding alike, were animatedly discussing pol-
itics before the legislative elections in 2013. As noted, from the local female
actors’ point of view, the institutional sphere constitutes politics. In the emic
perception, politics also hints to everyday bargaining processes where actors
fight ruthlessly or when nepotism is prevalent. If, for example, a person gets a
certain post within the local administration without having the necessary
requirements, people say: ‘On a fait ça politiquement.’ ‘Doing something
politically’ is a standing phrase Kankan’s inhabitants utter when corrupt
practices are used to attain a certain goal. The notion of politics is then
negatively connoted because, firstly, power and personal connections are
exploited; and, secondly, because the politicisation of ethnic belonging has
been virulent since 2010. That is one reason why women in Kankan generally
claim to be uninterested in politics. Nevertheless, many are surprisingly well
informed as to what is going on locally and nationally. In the emic percep-
tion, voting is not considered to be a political act. When I asked the research
participants whether they voted during the presidential elections of 2010, they
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reacted with surprise as if to cast one’s ballot is an unwritten law. Therefore,
for the people in Kankan voting is rather an obligation as a ‘good’ Guinean
citizen than a political action. Many male and female Manding research
participants also stressed their pride in finally having a democratically elected
head of state.
Ordinary women mostly claim that they choose the political leader by love,
that they love him ‘naturally’ and because they confide in his abilities to
improve their overall living conditions. My data shows that the people discuss
their choices among family members and friends, but they do not impose their
own view on others. One female research participant explained that women can
also claim they vote for the same person as their husbands, but they might then
not do so. No one will know the truth; when you vote, ‘it is between you and
God only’, as a man in a café stated (field notes, 11.12.2012).
I have argued in this book that, generally, women in Guinea keep away
from public protests. Throughout Guinea’s history they have done so only
when it is absolutely necessary, to ‘wipe out the fire that was about to light’.
Or as Djénabou put it: ‘If the situation becomes too painful, if the population
suffers too much, women stand up against the President’ (informal conversa-
tion, 27.11.2012). One such example mentioned is the Association of Female
Leaders in Kankan. Because they were afraid that the ethnic tensions
would turn into mass violence during the presidential elections of 2010,
they engaged in actions they would not have done otherwise: Amongst
others, they went to see the elders with the plea to do something against
the prevalent hostilities. Moreover, they organised a peaceful march on
Kankan’s streets holding signboards with messages of peace. These women
framed their actions in an apolitical way. With slogans, such as ‘Don’t kill
our sons and husbands!’, they argued from within their social roles as
mothers and wives and were not expressing their messages in political
terms. As noted, in Guinea as in other West African countries, mothers
are highly respected.
Similarly, during the general strikes of 2006 and 2007, Rabiatou Sèrah
Diallo argued in economic terms as the provider of her family, when she said
that she was unable to prepare the evening meal because the cooking pot was
empty. That was what had made her launch the general strikes. Another
example is the preparations for the Mamaya in Kankan in 2011: When the
sèrè collected the money for the festivities, the female members were success-
ful in bargaining for a reduction of their contribution. They argued that
women had to pay for their children’s clothes and shoes and “because of the
economically difficult situation” they were unable to simultaneously con-
tribute their share (interview, two male members of a sèrè, 21.10.2011). Céline
Pauthier (2007, 237) makes similar observations: “As principal supporters of
families, women are considered to be the spokesperson of everyday problems
regarding the survival of a large majority of the population, without actually
putting themselves on the dangerous and slippery terrain of directly challen-
ging the power in place.”
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I suggest that this line of argumentation, namely to frame political claims
in social or economic terms, must not be considered as a weakness or as a
sign of conservatism. On the contrary, I have contended that women stress
their social roles to increase their bargaining powers. In the local context,
motherhood is a powerful resource women can draw upon to make their
claims more credible, to increase their importance, and to finally reach their
goals. Women’s political articulations which are framed in social terms enjoy
legitimacy in the eyes of the broader Guinean population. And this is not a
new phenomenon, as Anna Dessertine (2019, 8) reminds us: “Whether in
more recent steps or previously in the nationalist struggles, politically active
women are generally presented, and present themselves, as mothers defending
their children who have been unjustly killed, assaulted, or wronged.”
In Kankan, as elsewhere, women loudly rant about thinks they dislike, for
example when the national government increases the petrol prices, when the
night watcher of Dibida market steals the vendors’ commodities instead of
protecting them, or when a few of the newly installed solar streetlamps sud-
denly disappear and then again show up in the prefect’s private courtyard.
Amongst themselves, women also extensively complain about their husbands if
they feel badly treated by them, for example if the latter wants to marry
another wife. In brief, women often vehemently and loudly stand up for their
demands. Why do I then name such articulations ‘silent politics’? I choose to
use the notion of silent politics to demonstrate that women’s political articula-
tions are subtle and mostly present outside the institutional setting. Further-
more, women in Kankan do not frame their actions in political terms. This
holds true when they are visiting a marabout in cases of family problems, but
also when they are marching on the streets. According to emic perceptions,
women are not doing politics in the first instance, nor in the second instance.
Because women frame their actions as apolitical, they do not overstep the line
of locally accepted gendered norms. Consequently, their actions are considered
legitimate; although they are transgressing those norms. Summing up, the
“visibility of women in politics is thus characterized by demands that rely upon
a domestic register, foregrounding the maternal figure, which the population
associates with an impartial form of social justice” (Dessertine 2019, 10)
In Kankan, the ideal image of a ‘good’ Muslim woman is that of a sub-
ordinate person who fulfils the locally expected duties of a mother and wife.
Amongst other things, she prepares the meals for her family, she takes care of
the children and educates them, she is sexually available, she brings her hus-
band the water for washing, and she does not quarrel with him nor contradict
him. If a woman does not behave accordingly, she might be labelled as a rebel
which, according to local perceptions, has negative consequences for her chil-
dren. Djénabou explained: ‘If you insult your husband, it is a malediction for
your children’ (informal conversation, 28.11.2012). A woman’s silence, however,
must not necessarily be interpreted as resignation. As Nomi Dave (2014, 19)
reminds us and as my data confirms, voicing one’s concerns is not the only form
of political articulation. At the same time, silence is not necessarily a sign of
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exclusion and marginalisation. Silence can be considered as everything in
between submission and resistance. Madame Kanté, the head of the local Office
of Women’s and Children’s Affairs aptly explained that “there are people who
fight, but silently. Not everyone is noisy” (interview, 21.02.2012).
Women do not just tolerate and endure things they dislike, for instance if
they are not well treated by their husbands. If a couple for example constantly
argues, a woman might seek help from a family member, a neighbour, or
another confidante. These people are typically elderly men or women. A
whole group can also act as mediators, such as the female vendors from
Dibida market in the example of the quarrelling neighbours. These mediators
then listen to both parties and pass their judgment which is not always in
favour of the husband. Here, they take into consideration the behaviour of
both, the husband and the wife, according to local gendered norms.
Everyday practices often have a highly political character. Djénabou for
example resisted marrying a man her father had proposed to her, because she
did not want to become his second wife and because she disliked how he trea-
ted women in general. However, she did not say so directly. Instead, she allied
herself with her brother, Ismaël. During the summoned family council, the
latter stressed that the suitor did not have the same educational background as
Djénabou, which might become the root cause for troubles in the future. He
added that he considered the proposed man as being too old to become his
sister’s future husband. Thanks to this tactic, Djénabou did not have to con-
tradict her father directly and, consequently, she did not act as ‘a rebel’ by not
respecting local gendered norms. It was her brother Ismaël who argued against
that marriage. In the end, the tactic proved successful.
In Kankan, as elsewhere, multiple gendered norms coexist; they are not fixed
but subject to bargaining processes and therefore they are constantly adapted
and transformed. The beating of a woman is one such issue: I have been
told that in former times, this has locally been considered as normal. Nowa-
days, a man is only allowed to beat his wife if she has ‘misbehaved’. What kind
of conduct falls under ‘misbehaviour’ and how much beating is appropriate, is
again something on which opinions diverge. In brief, in Kankan as elsewhere,
there exist various gendered norms which are constantly bargained over as
people’s ideas change in the long run as to how things ought to be. Conse-
quently, gender relations are constantly shifting.
The Women-State Nexus
A special focus of this book lies at the nexus between women and the state.
As noted, the state is not a unitary actor but manifests itself in various actions
at different levels. Through such actions, it performs gender and thus, in part,
shapes gender relations. In this book, I have demonstrated that encounters
between ordinary women and representatives of the local administration are
characterised by power imbalances. They are noticeable on the city’s streets,
but even more distinctly discernible inside the administrative offices. While the
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(mostly male) state employee sits behind his desk, the claimants must take a
seat on benches. For the bureaucrats, it is a ‘home game’, because they are
familiar with the official procedures and practically set the rules for
the encounter. They can, for example, purposely let people wait outside before
they can enter the office. The imbalances are underlined by the differences
regarding dress code and educational background, which mostly crystallises in
the ability to speak French, the bureaucratic language. Ordinary women’s bar-
gaining powers are shaped by their economic and social status. If someone makes
use of relations with important state employees, local politicians, or people
belonging to ‘traditional’ authorities, they have the possibility of individually
making claims, such as Madame Kanté, who could personally release a prisoner.
In contrast, ordinary women typically merge into a ‘passive network’ (Bayat
2010) and arrive at the state employer’s office in groups, such as the widows who
claimed their widows’ pensions. By the sheer weight of their number, the repre-
sentatives of the local government were forced to listen to them.
The hierarchical function of the state restricts access to the state for ordin-
ary citizens, because people must deposit their claims with the entity in
charge. To make claims and to demand public services is difficult, especially
for people at the state’s margin, such as women. Representatives of the local
government do not deal with these demands but rather put them ‘into the
cupboard’, as the research participants put it. Without money, personal
insistence, or appropriate relations, things do not advance. The local bureau-
crats are highly inefficient; they postpone matters and lose documents. Con-
sequently, Kankan’s inhabitants generally do not have much institutional
trust. Political affiliation further influences the bargaining process during
interactions between state employees and ordinary people. As the munici-
palities’ employees belong to the governing party, an RPG membership
facilitates the encounter. Here ethnic belonging comes into play. When a
Fulani, who typically supports the main opposition party, the UFDG, does
not attain the envisaged outcome, he or she interprets this in ethnic terms: In
his perception, he or she did not reach his goal because he or she is a Fulani.
State employees denigrate ordinary people, for example market women
when they refuse to unblock the market road, by calling them ‘uneducated’,
meaning rather ‘uncivilised’. They do the same with youths such as those in
Kankan Koura. However, young men who protest are typically students and
pupils and, consequently, they are not uneducated. By accusing protesters of
having such characteristics, local state employees pose their superiority.
Moreover, young protesting men are attributed with violent behaviour, as this
has been the case when youths destroyed the local governmental buildings
and the local archive during the general strikes of 2006 and 2007. Women, in
contrast, are characterised as being peaceful because of their social roles as
mothers. Consequently, young men, such as those in Kankan Koura or the
tutors who went on strike in early 2013, strive to co-opt women because their
presence enhances the protestors’ legitimacy: If women take part, the local
authorities as well as the population take the protests more seriously.
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“Women’s intervention seems in effect to bring a supplementary, even deter-
mining, efficacy to collective action, despite their institutional under-repre-
sentation” (Dessertine 2019, 7). Consequently, the mere thought that women
might protest, which is a bad omen for the sitting President, enhances
women’s power; even more so, if they threaten to take off their clothes and to
use their Female Genital Power (Grillo 2018). Furthermore, in a place such as
Kankan, where most inhabitants support the RPG, the governing party tries
to avoid protests that lay bare its shortcomings.
As repeatedly noted, ‘traditional’ authorities in Kankan are very powerful.
They not only yield power like the local government, but they also have
authority, that is, power recognised by the population (Sadiqi, Nowaira, and
El Kholy 2009). I argue that within the sphere of ‘traditional’ authorities,
women’s impact is even smaller than within the local government. No woman
holds a ‘traditional’ position. They are occupied by elderly men who can
draw on the authority of masculinity and seniority. These elders dismiss
efforts to change existing practices by referring to ‘traditional’ habits. They
reject women’s inclusion by claiming an incompatibility with local Muslim
values. Still, women can silently influence these elderly men.
Ostensibly, many educated men, especially those who have a certain posi-
tion within the administration, institutional politics, or an NGO, state that
they want to promote women, for example their participation in the institu-
tional political sphere and women’s rights. President Alpha Condé is a case in
point: He repeatedly stressed that women’s well-being and their promotion
was one of his main concerns and the first thing to tackle in his project of
change. Sometimes, he could pronounce statements that were aptly followed
by appropriate actions, for example when, in 2005, he decided to make
Fatoumata Maty Kankan’s first female mayor. However, the discourse regard-
ing gender equality all too often diverges from actual practices, which is not
only a problem in Guinea, but also in many parts of the world (Goetz and
Hassim 2003, 6). According to official practices, women are depicted as a uni-
form category; they are regarded as the needy part of society. The state bundles
the different efforts concerning women within the Office of Women’s and
Children’s Affairs. In reality, gender imbalances that exist within society at
large are reinforced and enacted through interactions between (mostly male)
state employees and ordinary women, and through efforts taken by the elite,
such as the foundation launched by Djènè Kaba Condé, Guinea’s First Lady.
Women’s normative expectations of how the President, as the state’s
number one representative, ought to act, are precise: He should care for
Guinea’s inhabitants as a father should care for his children. He does this by
providing efficient healthcare, high-quality education, working infrastructure,
by generating jobs for the country’s youth, and – above all – by guaranteeing
affordable food prices. When the research participants articulated their
expectations of statehood in Guinea, they often denounced things that were
not functioning normally. ‘Dans des conditions normales’ is a standing phrase
in Kankan. It always hints at how people imagine things to be in an idealised
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‘normal’ life. People for example claim that, ‘normally’ the local government
should take care of cleaning Kankan’s roads and markets. With Alpha
Condé’s accession to power, the proclaimed change became a strong notion
the local Manding population believed in. They hoped that ‘their’ President
would turn things around for the better. In 2006 and 2007, Anita Schroven
(2019, 194) observed a similar “atmosphere of hope for change” when the
population expected that “change in the political system […] would […]
improve everyday life for the wider population.” However, two years into
Alpha Condé’s presidency, ordinary men and women in Kankan were still
struggling with daily hardship.
Concluding Remarks
When looking at the country’s history, it becomes obvious that women, too,
have shaped Guinean politics: Women were already active in political parties
and women’s movements before independence. The discourse and practices of
Guinea’s past regimes regarding gender issues have influenced how women
acted within the institutional sphere. Sékou Touré integrated women into his
state-building project and placed a great deal of emphasis on female emanci-
pation, gender equality, and women’s political participation. However, in
Touré’s one-party state, women were allowed to diffuse the party’s ideology
only, not to make suggestions or oppose the government’s view. During the era
of General Lansana Conté, women were not put on the front stage. President
Conté signed international treaties concerning women’s rights mostly to please
the ‘International Community’. Nevertheless, thanks to Guinea’s political
opening since the 1990s, many women’s movements have emerged. Still, in
Kankan, women’s movements are typically dormant. Because they are headed
by men or women of the elite, they are not the space where ordinary women
can put forward their proposals.
Today, there are quite a number of women who are affiliated to one of the
main political parties. Moreover, several women are present within the
national state institutions. In 2010, the candidacy of a woman, Saran Daraba
Kaba, for the presidential elections was a first. However, women’s presence in
institutional politics, especially within political parties, does not cover up the
fact that their role is not to take decisions. Even though every political party
has a women’s wing, the female party members are used rather for dancing,
canvassing, and applauding the male party chiefs than to make propositions,
express their own ideas, or contradict the predominant practices. In brief,
women’s political articulations within institutional politics is limited. More
importantly, the research has shown that it is in the silent politics that
women’s political agency comes most to the fore; yet this is often still ignored.
In this book, I have shown the resilience of gender discrimination as a
result of the deeply embedded patriarchal structures in Kankan, Guinea.
Today, many gender disparities persist. This does not mean that women are
mere victims. In their discourse, women mainly stress that men are in power
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and that the latter have the decision-making power, even if reality sometimes
belies their words. There are countless instances when women renegotiate
patriarchy. Women in Kankan (as with any other social actors) imagine their
own future and the future of their society differently. Thanks to this, they
challenge the status quo. Women do so for example through (wedding) songs
or jokes in which they critique prevailing gender relations in times of eco-
nomic hardship and political and social transformations. Furthermore, senior
women often decide on who marries whom. A woman who is the main
breadwinner of her family typically keeps a low profile so as not to provoke a
negative backlash. However, the fact that her husband depends on her eco-
nomically has an impact on gender relations within the household.
Because politics in general, and female politicians in particular, have an
ambivalent stance, women mostly frame their actions in a non-political way.
The study has shown that this form of claim making by bringing social and
economic problems to the forefront is an especially efficient means of political
articulations for women in Guinea because such behaviour is approved by state
actors and society at large. Similarly to Asef Bayat (2010), I argue that Muslim
Guinean women bargain gender relations not with the means of collective pro-
test and large-scale women’s movements, but through passive networks that form
loosely among individuals who face similar situations. Elements of ‘everyday
politics’ (Kerkvliet 2002) – such as continuing one’s education, generating an
income, choosing a future husband, or divorcing – enable women to gain ground
exactly because they do not fundamentally challenge existing norms. Anna
Dessertine (2019, 2) confirms that “women’s powers, particularly with regard to
decision-making, are scarcely visible and do not overlap with the same processes
of autonomization as they do at the household level, despite women’s funda-
mental role in the domestic economy or even in agricultural production.”
Women imagine and thus propose alternatives to the current social order.
At the same time, they also reproduce it. Women in Kankan, such as the
market women in Mauritania described by Katherine Ann Wiley (2014, 114),
do not just indirectly subvert local gendered norms “but rather [try] to
improve their positions within it.” Despite the fact that Kankan’s women live
in a structural context of patriarchy where norms are highly gendered and
powers and authority lay dominantly in the hands of men, this book has
shown that women can nevertheless articulate themselves politically and exert
influence, by means of the almost invisible route of ‘silent politics’. It is by
investigating the sphere of silent politics that women’s political articulations
become most visible. Therefore, it is quintessential that we acknowledge the
relevance and significance of silent politics if we want to integrate the agency
of actors, who are typically at the margin of the state such as women, into the
overall picture of politics and state formation processes. I sum up that
women’s political articulations within Guinea’s institutional politics are lim-
ited. The research has shown that it is in the silent politics that women’s




1 A pilgrimage to Mecca is also helpful in strengthening one’s social position as it is
linked to religious eruditeness.
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